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PREFACE
At the time when the United States 0.1' America entered World War
II, there lived on the. western r1m of our continent a --.11. group of
quiet, hard-workiDg and thrifty people; as a group they had been UT1Dl
in the Pacific cOastal region for upRrd of .50 years. 'they- comprised
0Dl7 one-tenth of 1 percent of the Nation's total population. Indeed
they- were 8) few, so concentrated in that narrow cOastal strip, that
few Americana in other parts of the United States had ever encountered0118 of them or had ever giTen any- thought to this small segment of the .
population-\mt.ll the surprise attack upon Pearl Harbor by- Japan sud-
denly- and spuriously i~entUied this minute orieDt.al-American minority- ,
with the enemy' whose ancestry it abared.
During the first year of the war this West Coast minority, con-
sisting of approximtely UO,OOO people ranging from 90-year-old
t-1~ts who had lived here for perhaps 60 years to third-generation
citizens in arms, was e.xcluded from hoM and a>urce of livelihood by a
series of mil1tary orders which were issued under authority conferred
by the President of the United States. These wartime mass exclusion
orders affected only persons of Japanese ancestry. Without being
charged with any- specific crime, without hearings, these people were
evacuated. under military guard to isolated barrack camps in the interi-
or, where the majority- of them. lived as wards of the Govermnent for
nearly 3 years. After January 2, 1945, the effective date of the
rescission of the emluaion orders, all e:mept the comparatively ArnAll
number of evacuees who had lost faith in American democracy and ~
wished to repatriate or expatriate to Japan were permitted to return tothe Pacific Coast. -
This studT is an attempt to explain how American democracy, at
a time when it was engaged in a death struggle against the forces of
tota11tari~ism across the seas, came to deal in this manner with one
of 'its Qwn minorities, a minority composed of two-thirds citizens by
birth and one-third aliens denied naturalization under the law of ourcountry. .
Note: This report prepared by Ruth E. McKee, Historian.
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PART I
THE WESt COAST'S LEAST KNOWN AND MaS'!' MISt;Fl>RESEN-ra>
MINORITY: An Account ot the Lit. and Probl8DS of the
Japanese I8i!;!'ants am their American Ch1ldrea on
the Pacific Coast ot the United States Prior to
World War II. .
.
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CHAPTm I
EARLY VOYAGERS FROM JAPAN TO THE NEW \"lORID
In August of 1610, 10 years before the Va.tf.!ower crossed the
Atlantic Ocean to deposit the Pilgrims on the northem part. of the
east coast of North America, the first Japanese ship 1mown to have
cros88d the considerably wider Pacific Ocean reached the Mmcan port
of Acapulco on the southem part of the west coast of North America.
The voyage was part of a plan to establish direct trade between New
Spain, or Yex1co, and Japan. 'ft1e ship carried, in addition to 23
Japanese merchants under the leadership or 2 Japanese noblemep, the
Spanish Govemor or the Philippines, Don Rodrigo de Yevero, who had
been shipwrecked 1n Japanese waters and entertained by the Shogun while
a ship suitable for the long and hazardous Toyage was being constructed.
During the months of their stay in Yexico City, the merchants
leamed what they could of westem practices and methods of conducting
life and business and one of -the nobles was baptized a Roman Catholic
with the name of Francisco Velasco. He took at baptisn the ramUy name
of the Viceroy, who stood his sponsor. The Ship carried the Japanese
safelY' back to Japan.
In 1613 another Japanese ship took a larger number of Japanese,
delegates .from a Christian colony, to Acapulco, whence they proceeded
to Mexico City for confirmation. Same of them were taken to Spain to
be presented at court; the rest awaited the return of their friends in
Mexico for a period of 2 years. Some members of this group of Chris-
tian Japanese, possibly a dozen, chose to remain in Jlmco when the
ship retumed to Japan. It seems probable that those few' Japanese 'Who
reached the New World in 1613 and decided to stay were the first Japan-
ese immigrants to America. No more is lmown of than, a fact that
suggests their successful &8Sim1]Ation into the life and culture or
.Jle.x1co with consequent loss of racial identity. *
It bas been pointed out that Japan, for a period of more than a
century and a half after these two voyages had been successfully acct»-
plished, had a golden opportunity to take over Cal1f'ornia. It was 1769
before the Spanish fathers established the first mission in Uta
* This whole interesting period that preceded Japan's voluntary' with-
drawal .trCD the world is treated in detail and from official documents
of both Japan and Mexico in Zelia Butthall's The Earliest Historical
Relations between Jlexico and Japan, published as Vol. 4, No.1, in
University- of California Publications on American Archaeology and
Ethnology- .
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-Calitornia, at San Diego. E2q)lorers of other nationality had not yet
reached the West Coast. However, instead of expanding her empire and
utUiz1ng her advantage, Japan in 16.'38 embraced a policy of strict
exclusion am inclusion, forbade the con'8truction ot any 1*>1'8 seaworthy
vessels and destroyed the ones already in existence, and retired ~
the world until CC:18IDOd.ore Perry forced an opening of the country. The
self-isolation ot Japan -.as the result or a growing convict10n on the
part of the early Tokugawa Shoguns over a period of years that the.
political activities of foreign m1ssionar1es-espec1aUy the Jesuits-
const1tuted a: mnace to the sfety ot the _ire. The inDediate occa-
sion of the edict ot 16.'38, however, was an uprising in 1637 of the large
Christian colony at Shimabara. Conwrts to the Boman Catholic faith
numbering 15 or 2J) thousand, waving red cross nags and shouting "Jesus1
Maria and St. Iagot" gave battle to the Imperial troops. This incident
ended in the wholesale massacre of the militant Christians and con-
vinced the Shogun tJ1at Christianity was a menace to national security.*
It was 1884 before mass emigration of Japanese nat1onals was pe1"l8itted
by the Imperial Goverruaent, which in that year yielded to the often
reiterated pleas of Hawaiian sugar planters for labor.
Thus it was tJ1at, hiatorically speakingl the Japanese were late
~ g 1ID1grants to the United States. Prior to 18601 when Japan sent
forth her first embassy to the United Statesl such Japanese as Americans
had seen had been & few castaways who had been picked up in midocean by
western ships at¥i brought to America-usually to Ca11fom1a-until
passage to Japan could be arranged for th_. The rescued were not too
eager to return to their native country, for they Imew that they stood
a good chance ot losing their heads for having visited a Christian
country, however blameless they might have been of intent to do so.
The AlMr1cans viewed these castaways with friendly curiosity,
aM, in the days whm the United States was becoming a'W'are ot the need
01 a fueling stat1on in Japanl certain polit1cians saw in the rescued
mariners a potential wedge to open Japan to trade. Thus it happened
that the few Japanese who reached our shores before dipl(Datic relations
were established between Japan and the United States were petted and
exhib1ted and made much of. ~ore Perry's interpreter on the
e;Jpedition to force the opening of Japan owed his lmowledge of the
Japanese language to a castaway named Sentaro, who was a member of the
expedition. A child castawa7, H1kozo Hamada, was a prot6g' ot tJ1e
collector ot customs at San Francisco and also the latter's patronl
SeDator Ow'in, ot Calitorn1a. Young H1kDzo .. taken to Washington and
introduced to President Pierce 1 who offered h1m an appointment to West
*The Nutth~ study covers this situation in detail; it is briefly
treated in "How Japan Lost her Chance in the Pacific," by George
Kennan, in The Outlook, June 27, 1914, Vol. 107, No.9, pp. 489-493.
.
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.Po~. Hikoso refused the appointment, preferring to attend the Catho-
11. UD1Teraity in »ar,.land. Shortly before he was 18, HikGzo was
naturalized as an American citizen 111 Balti8re, having previously been.
baptized in the »~D Catholic faith with the name of Joseph Heco. At
that time-June .30, 18,58, was the day of Beeots naturalization-America
.. 1.88 sensitiTe than in later years to gradations in sldn color, and
in scattered instance. 1ndirlduala of oriental race 1d10 applied for
Datval1~tiOD were granted it.
Aside fran Jl8bere of the embassies that. came and went during the
8ixties, there appeared in California toward the end of that decade two
-'-' colonie8 ot Japaue... One 1I8.S C<XDPOsed of possibly a dozen
farmers-the Rewspapers ot the time wre in disagree8nt as to the
n\DDber-and settled om land purchased at Gold Hill" not far from Sacra-
mento. A D:utch adventurer who was a natural1sed Japanese citizen and
arried to a Japane8e WOEn had auggled this little group ot. tarMrs
out ot Japan to help him make a fortune out or a tea and ~ venture in
the Sacramento 'falley ~ Fortune was against him-and perhaps he _s too
far frClll his base ot supplies. Arter a year or s>, he returned to Japan
pre81D&.bly to get .re plants and to raise lOOre funds. He did not
return. There was a later report. that he had been executed in Japan,
doubtless for having broken the .inclusion law. The destitute Gold H1U
farmers appealed to Charles W. Brooks, then the honorary consular agent
at San Francisco, and through his efforts round work in Amrican
tami1ies.l*
The other colony was composed of a small group ot ,Japanese
intellectuals and liberals. Some of them had been members of Various
8nbassies; one was a fomer governor ot Yedo (Tokyo). ill ot them,
according to a contemporary report. in the San Francisco Chronicle, were
"gentlemen ot refinement am 1ntluence in'their own country, from which '
they were compelled to nee, almost destitute, because their travel in
ci'9'111zed countries had made them. too liberal in their ideas to suit the
MLbdo. These Japanese gentlemen, who s,peak &1glish and French, offered
~o work tor nothing tor a year Td th any gentlemen who would learn th-
a useful occupation, but could get none to accept their services. By i
the advice ot JIr. Van Reed the,. leased a farm in Alameda county, and
hired a few intelligent white men to in8truct them. "2
Until 1884, California, ~ shortly to become a seething caldron
ot anti-Japanese prejudice, had very few Japanese of any description.
After 1871 the m.peror had Slcouraged the youth ot the ~ntry to travel
and study in the western world, and a number of Japanese students
appearEWi on the American scene. The more prosperous of these tended to
go to the more impressive and longer established eastern universities;
*Numbered references are listed at end ot report.
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tile 18pOVerished stopped. ort in CalUornia to work their -7 through
such youq and obscure institutIons of higher lea~ as the7 could
. find close to their port of entry. The Japanese consul in &n
Francisco report,ed 111 1884, just prior to the a12t.hor1zatlon of general
eigration by Japan, that there were SO Japanese in Cal1torn.1a.
To sWllllarize: \mtU general eaigratIo~ of the masses got under-
-7, with' the e.xception of the famers' of Gold Hill, the Japanese in
California were of the educated and upper classes. It is apparent
that the press and the bulk of the population were ld.ndly disposed
to-rd these strangers in their midst.
,
(6)
CHAP'l'ER II
THE DDAIGRANT GENERATION AND THE CALIFORNIA RACISTS
The friendly reception accorded the few Japanese who reached ttle
United States before general emigration was authorized by the Japanese
Government was ~arcely indicative of what awaited the bona fide 1Dm11-
grants of later Tears in the land of their choice. These newcomers
'llere predestined to trouble by the location of their port of entry' to
the new world, by the t:1m.ing of their arrival, and above all by the
fact that they were of oriental race. It is true that for a few years
atter 1881. the 1ImD1~s from Japan passed through the Golden Gate
almost \mnoticed, but that not lmpleasant anonymity SIded as soon as
they began to arrive in considerable number.
It. was natural enough that general emigration from Japan should
have been slow to gather momentum.. In Japan the initiative required to
uproot oneself' from the familiar, and undertake life and work in a
foreign country' halfway around the world, had been somewhat anaesthe-
tized by DOre than 2; centuries of a rigidly enforced stay-a.t-home
policy. At first only a few resolute and daring individuals took
passage for the United States-or elsewhere. These pioneers were con-
spicuously youthful. For years. it was rare to find a Japanese immi-
grant who was above 30 years of age, and many came to America as teen-
age boys. These male immigrants came alone. Some of the older o~es
left wives and children behind. The teen-a.ge boys were single. The
average immigrant had his passage and possibly as much as $25.in cash
with which to start lite in the new world. The inmigrants arrived at
San Francisco, 1d1ich consequently developed the first' substantial con-
centration of Japanese. After a year or two of authorized emigration,
the strangers ~re met at the pier by Japanese hotel or boardmg house
keepers who served also as employment agents to recruit labor for rail-
roads and for agriculture. The young iJmD1grants took whatever work 188
,offered at anY' wage named because they had to earn a living. They could
not arfr>rd to be particular or fastidious. They had to sustain life in
themselves, and DX)st of than had obligations to dependents or semidepen-
dents back in Japan. They had to get along as best they could while
they .were learning the waY' of life and the language of the new country.
Many of them were graduates of the middle schools of Japan, which. were
comparable to the Arrerican high school, and so had had a year or two of
~gl1sh. This required course in ~glish was of about as much practical
value to them when they were faced with Americans with various accents
as a year or two ot high school French muld be to Americans Who were
suddenly dropped into a French village where no one could speak English.
It was not until the pioneers had established themselves in the
United States and could write favorable reports of life and working
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opportunities to old neighbors and relatives in ,Japan that the less
venturesome Japanese felt disposed to try their luck 1ri the United
States. Thus it was 1891 before the annual arrivals of Japanese in the
United States exceeded 1,000, and not until 1898 did the n\Dnber reach
the 2,000 mark. Contract labor, which was the basis of emigration from
Japan.to the Kingdom of Hawaii, -.s prohibited in the United States by
Federal law at the time that mass emigration was perlD1tted, and in 1900,
with Hawaii a territory of the United States, contract labor was out-
lawed in the Islands.
Until after the tum of the century, movements of Japanese to
the continental United States .re on a sna.l1 scale. However, in the
first decade of the twentieth century, mass migrations reached their
peak, dropp~ sharply after 1908, when the Gentlemen's Agreement to
curtail the migration of Japanese nationals to the United States and
Hawaii became effective.
The accompanying table serves to establish a picture of the
volume of Japanese iDIn1gration as it affected the continental United
States and its territories during the first decade of this century.
The figures .re compiled from the annua.1 reports of the United States
CoJmDissioner..;aeneral of lJmIdgration, 1901-1910.
ADmsSIONS OF JAPANESE TO THE UNIT1!D 3TATE9 AND ITS TmRIT~,1~1 - 1910 - --
YEAR TCYl'AL CONTINENTAL U .3. ALASKA HAWAII
1~1 5,249 4,908 .3 .3.38
1902 14,455 5,.325 5 9,125
1'X>.3 20,01.,1 6,9~ 6 1.3,045
1~4 14,.382 7,776 16 6,590
1905 11,021 4,.319 10 6,692
1906 14,24.3 5,178 14 9,051,
1~7 30,824 9,948 11 2:>,865
1908 16,418 7,250 15 9,15.3
1909 .3,275 1,59.3 5 1,679
1910 2,798 1,552 7 1,2.39
- ~ -
. TOTALS* 132,706 54,8.39 90 77,777
~ - -
*Japanese sources record the return of 25,5.36 nationals to
Japan in this decade.
At this point in the chapter, it is wen to consider the triple
handicap under which this iDlnigrant generation took up life under
American democracy-or rather under that variant of it which maintained
(8)
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Ion the West Coast of the United States-Ncli 1 ing that the handicap was
composed of race, place, and time.
In the first place, these people were of oriental race, and they
were seeking economic betterment along with the blessings of liberty in
a section of the United States which was notoriouSly hostile to ori-
entals. The pattem of West Coast color prejudice had taken its first
crude shape as early as 1846. In that year a gang of greedy and social-
ly irresponsible United States citizens hastened out to California,
then Mexican territory, to await its anne:xation by the United States and
to grab what they could in the way of bootY' when this event transpired.
The annexation had been determined by the election of President Polk.
These young Americans tired of waiting for the carefully planned blood-
less conquest of California and fomented an incident which was !mown as
the Bear Flag Rebellion. On this occasion. the rallying cry of "Cali-
fornia for the Americans'. was first' heard. The ill-advised action on
the part of the young men convened the plan for peaceful conquest into
a long, bloody, and quite unnecessary episode in United States hi story. 3
These @ressiye young men, themselves first or second generation Ameri-
cans for the IIM)st part, defined the term. American very narrowly. They
excluded from the category by definition the Spanish and Mexican C&1i-
fomians, although the Spanish had arrived in the new world somewhat
ahead of the Pilgrim Fathers, and the Mexicans were compounded of these
Spanish and American Indians who might be considered genuine first
families. The Bear Flag insurrectionists were convinced that it was
improper for darker ,sldnned people to own land ~ch lighter skinned
men-themselves, for instance-might use to advantage.
up to the discovery of gold in 1848,' these wh1 te pioneers per-
secuted the native Californians and the Indians. After the discovery
of gold, they persecuted the native Californians, the Indians, the South
AJ!W!Jricans and the Chinese 'who by this time had appeared in smA-') numbers.
They were tolerant toward the Chinese as long as the latter tended
babies, oooked, laundered, and perfozmed other menial tasks' that nobody
else wanted to bother with, once the lure of the gold fields was felt.
However, when sane of the hardier Chinese ventured into the gold fields,
their presence coupled with their industry- '8S considered a menace to
. white suprenacy.
CAle of the first acts of th~ California legislature was the
imposition of an exhorbitant miner's tax levied nomiMlly upon foreign-
ers but collected, after a short time, only from Chinese. 'nle payment
of the $.30 a month tax by a Chinese gave him the legal right to grub
for gold dust J it did not protect him from the resentment of white
rivals in the gold fields. Whenever the heavy-bearded young whites
felt hilarious or depressed, they were likely to mob the thriftier
Chinese who might have managed to amass a few more ounces of gold dust
from poor pickings than their superiors had acquired trom better pickings.
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-In spite of the indignities heaped upon th8D." the Chinese con-
tinued to come to California" and in the sixties their labor bunt the
western ha.lf of the first transcontinental railroad" a task which had
been offered in turn to every other breed of worker within the United
States and promptly rejected by all. Nevertheless, since a depression
followed hard on the completion of the railroad, organized labor became
retroactively incensed over the fact that the Chinese had done this
back-breaking job" am the real persecution began.
The heavily bearded young men who" back in the forties" had per-
secuted the JLexican and Spanish Califomians and then the Chinese gold
seekers were by this time fathers or even grandfathers" but their pur-
pose of preserving Cal1fomia for the white race was unwavering" and
they had indoctrinated their sons and their daughters with all their
prejudiees and phobias. Canbined with organized labor the pioneers of
the forties am the adventurers of the gold rush days made a group for
any politician to take seriously. Tile cry of "The Chinese must got."
echoed from eve17 sand lot and from every political rally. To prove
that they meant what they said, the more impetuous staged a few massa-
cres of Chinese. By' 1882 these forces had put enough pressure upon the
Federal Government to achieve the exclusion of all Chinese iJmD1grants
for many years to come and had, by various devices" persuaded a good
many of the resident Chinese to ship back to China or at least to move
on east'W'ard in the United States.
The zeal of these crusaders had gotten the better of their c~
JlK)n sense, since Chinese labor was highly imporlant to the success of
California agriculture-and it was rapidly becoming established that
California's greater wealth 1I8.S to be derived £ran agriculture rather
than from the mines. Year by year the resident Chinese labor force
dwindled" by departure to other States and by .il1creasing age. As the
remaining ones grew older they became less c<:lnp~tent, less quick at the
important work of harvesting California' s varied and valuable Crops.
By the time that the Japanese began to arrive in any number"
there ~as a vacuum into which these newest immigrants naturally were
sucked. As long as they stayed in the vacuum, they were welcomed even
by the racists. However, the Japanese tmmigrants refused to stay in the
vacuum; th~y began hauling themSelves out of it. They were ambitious;
they wanted to better themselves. Theywere w1,ll:ing to take unskilled
labor while they were learning the language and the -.ys of America,
but their whole effort was focused upon escaping from the migratory
labor gangs to land of their own, either leased or purchased, so that
they might import their families and lead a normal American life. C&1i-
forni4 did not approve of this ambitio~ on the part. of Japanese imDd-
grants. Califonlia farmers resented having their harvest hands suddenly
become canpeting farm operators. This resentment was economic rather
than racist in flavor. The out-and-out racists saw in the transition
(10)
fran day laborer to farm operator another threat to white supremacy.
To quote from this writer's Calitornia and her Less Favored Kinoritiesfi.flt7 : '
"The forces that had accompUsbed the exclusion ot the
Chinese had developed ,legends, techniques, and arguments
which with little editing could be turned against the
Japanese. Politicians and pressure groups served their
apprenticeship in the anti-Chinese crusade. BY'the turn
of the cmtury- these veterans Ere ready to launch a new
otfensive. In the campaign against the Japanese is found
t~e most specta~ular m&!\-1-festation of Cal1f'omia's rugged
individuaUsm, which Royce labeled 'social irresponsibility.'.
The offensive began in a small way on K'iy 8, 1900: on that night"
.in the course of a mass meeting called .in San Francisco to consolidate
pressure for reenac\ment of the Chinese exclusion law-then about to
expire--it was resolved to urge the adoption of a law to exclude all
Japanese except members of the diplomatic staff fraa the United States.
James Phelan, then mayor of San Francisco, later to be .in turn Governor
of California and United States Senator, played a prominent Part at
this meeting. In l~l the California legislature appealed .in a jo.int
resolution to Congress to restr,ict the immigration of Japanese laborers.
So persuasive were the legends and fantasies developed by the crusaders,
even .in lCX)O, the year when there were only 21..,326 Japanese in the
entire United States" that an investigator for the United State Indus-
trial COJJInission was charmed into -m-iting in his report. ot "great hordes
of Japanese coolies who have already secured a monopoJ..Y of the labor in
the agricultural industries of the Pacific States * * * and are as a
class tricky"" unreliable am dishonest .* * *. The total number of
Japanese coolie laborers in California today is greater than the total
number of Japanese arrivals sh~ by the iJmD1gration records at all of
the United States ports tor the last 10 years. How, then, came they
-among us? This 1s another Asiatic mystery. The movement, the motives,
the co~ and going of these stoical, strange Mongolians are as a
closed book to the mite races. As with the birds of passage, today
there may not be one in sight, tomorrOW' they -'Y' be with us in countless
thousands \ "I.
"From 1870 to 1920," wrote Carey JlcWilliams" "anti-
oriental agitation in California was fomented, directed"
and financed by the powerful trade-union movement that,
fran the earliest d9.ys, had centered in San Francisco.
It is, indeed, rema.rkable that in a pioneer non1rxlustr~
State a labor movement of such strength had developed
that by 1879 it was able, through the Worldngmen's Party,
to seize control of the state and enact a. new, and in
some re~cts quite radical, constitution. The secret
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of the success of this early movement lay .in the fact
that Irish 1ImD1grants constituted one fourth of the large
foreign-born element in the State. * * *
,
IIJfost of the leaders of the anti-oriental movement, in
its early phases, were Irish and they were also the
leaders of the San Francisco labor movement. * * *
'l11ese leaders half been quick to realize the possibilities
of uniting their notoriously clannish fellow comltrymen
around a negative issue, namely. 'The Chinese Must Got'
It was the political, rather than the economic aspects
of oriental 1mmigra tion that interested these clever and
resourceful leaders ~ Scientific evidence has always been
lacking to prove that oriental 1ImD1grants ever actually
~sPlaced American worlanen in California or that they
ever constituted a permanent threat to labor standards in
the State. But given the chaotic state of affairs in
California in the seventies, no shrewder slogan could
have been deftsed than 'The Chinese Must Gol'"5
The' new century had brought new faces and new names to political
p~ence in San francisco, and the Union Labor Part,. had replaced the
old Worldngmen' 8 Party, which had disappeared in the depression of the
nineties. However. the tactics of the early IriSh leaders were still
effectively employed; anti-oriental sentiment was just as easli'1'
exploited - in the new twentieth century in reference to the Japanese as
it had been in the seventies and eighties against the Chinese. It was
inconvenient. perhaps, that the antilabor forces. too. exploited anti-
Japanese sentiment in the municipal election of 1901, but the Union
Labor Party, strengthened by the- recent formation of the State Federa-
tion of Labor and by an impressive teamster's strike. defeated lfayor
Phelan at the polls and elected Eugene E. Schmitz _,or of San Francisco.
Of .yor Schmitz, Carey JicWi1liA~8 'WrOte:
. If * * * Fomerly a bassoon player in a San Francisco
orchestra, Schmitz was the henchman of Abe Ruef. an
exceedingly able and corrupt politician. In the years
following the victory of the Union Labor Party, San
Francisco wallowed in corruption. * * * Although he had
been reelected as ayor of San Francisco, Schmitz was
facing indictment in 1906 for his many crimes. Hard
pressed for an effective diversionary issue, Schmitz and
Ruef saw an opportunit'l' to save th~elYes by whipping
up a Japanese pogrom."""
Early in 1905 the victory of Japan over Russia gave' impetus to
the offensive of the Califomia anti-Japanese crusade. Japan had deIl»n-
strated to the world that a sma]]. group of Asiatic islands was in
(12)
process of becoming a ~rld power. Fran that time on, the anti-Japan-
ese forces of the West Coast found it helpful to their cause to associ-
ate the growing racial minority in the United States with the rise of
Japanese nationalism, to identify the bard-working, law...abiding 1ImD1-
grants on this side of the Pacific with Japanese militarists and
jingoists on the other side of the Pacific. They began weaving into
the elaborate design of their propagama colorful threads to suggest a
Japanese plot to effect a peaceful conquest of California by means of
extensive colon1zation-and prodigious propagation.
On February 23 of 1<X>5 the San Francisco Chronicle inaugurated
the first press campaign against the resident Japanese with a series of
sc~e stories. It bas suggested that "the owner of the Chronicle, M. H.
DeYoung, had been a candidate for the United States Senate a few years
previously and some obserV'ers construed these vicious articles as a
renewal of his camidacy."5-b By Karch 1 the State legislature respond-
ed to these articles \dth a resolution, passed unan~mQusly by both
houses, d~il1g .i1Jmediate congressional action to stop further 1Imn1-gration of Japanese laborers. '
By June the anti-Japanese forces of the State had consolidated
their strength by organizaing the Japanese and Korean ~lusion League,
in San Francisco. The formation of the league was promoted by the
Union labor Party, many of whose members were also members of the power-
ful bulwark of race prejudice mown as the Native Sons of the Golden
West. Carey McWilliams offered in Prejudice a partial list of prominent
leaders of the anti-Japanese agitation. All ot those namfX1 were members,
most. of them officials, of the Native Sons of the Golden ifest and polit-
ical figures in the State. The list included Hiram warren Johnson, who
was Governor of California from 19l1 to 1915 and United States Senator
fran California from 1917 until his death in 1945; James D. Phelan,
also a Governor of California and a United States Senator; U. S. Webb,
tor some years State attomey general, co-author of the Alien land law
ot 191.3-With Francis J. Heney-a.nd zealous instigator of escheat pro-
ceedings against Japanese land O'9Iners J V. S. McClatchy, editor and p~
lisher of the McClatchy Bee papers of Sacramento, Fresno, and MOdesto,
and the guiding light of tl1e anti-oriental group for his entire life;
J. M. Inman, State senator and at one time president of the Ca1i.f'ornia.
Oriental Exclusion League; Eugene Eo Schmitz, }fayor of San Francisco
and, with Abe Ruef, instigator of the move to segregate Japanese school
children in San Francisco in 1906; Abe Ruef, powerful and corrupt polit-
ical boss-in 1908 he was tried and convicted of bribery, with Hiram
Johnson as prosecutor after Francis J. Heney, the first prosecuting
'attorney, had been spot dorm in court by one of Ruef,'s henchmen;* Aaron
*These details are mcluded in the biographical sketch of Hiram Johnson
in Who' s Who in America, 1940-1941 , p. 1400.
700079 0-4~~ (13)
.
AltUn, president of the San Francisco School Board in 1906 and Abe
Ruef' s brothe~in-la'ff-a fact that sheds some light on the exclusion of
Japanese school children from the public schools at a time when Ruef
and the Mayor were facing prosecution and so were desperate for a
"diversionary issue;" James L. Gallagher, another member of the San
Francisco School Board in 1906; a.nd Anthony Caminetti, formerly a State
senator am subsequently, in 1913-, United States Conlnissioner-General
of IDmlgration.5-C
In 1908, the year when the Gentlemen's Agreftllent went into
effect, the Exclusion League met in its first annual convention at
Seattle. BW this time it had spread its membership over most of the
Western states; California alone had 110,000 members.
The Gentlemen's Agreanent, since it placed the responsibility for
limiting :immigration with the; Japanese Government instead of with the
United States, was violently protested by the exclusion league. Under
the tenDS of this unwritten agreement entered upon by the Theodore
Roosevelt administra"tion and the Japanese Government, Japan agreed to
issue passports' only to nonlaborers, with the exception of..,trhose labo~
ers who had established residence in America and wiShed to return there,
and to the illBnediate families of such laborers. Japan voluntarily
extended the terms to cover Kerlco and Canada. In 1907 President
Roosevelt had prohibited the admission of Japanese holding passports to
Hawaii, Canada or Kexico. For the 16 years of its official life, the
Gentlemen' s Agre~nt was vocif'erously denounced by the exclusionists
on the grounds that Japan failed to administer it in good faith. Con-
clusive evidence to the contrary was not forthcoming until after exclu-
sion had become a fact, in 1924.
In 1m the California l~gislature considered a bill to prohibit
purchase of land b.v Japanese aliens, but President Taft intervened and
the bill -.s dropped. In that same year the legislature instructed the
State cODlDissioner of labor to .conduct an investigation of Japanese
labor in California and make a formal report of his findings. By ti}is
time the crusaders against the Japanese had convinced themselves of the
truth of their own fabrications; consequently when the commissioner of
labor presented a careful and objective report which stated among other
things that the Japanese wre valuable to California agriculture, the
legislature fonna11y disapproved of and buried the report-because the
commissioner's findings did not support the contentions of the legis-lators. .
The year 1910 found all three political parties in the Califomia
general elections with anti-Japanese planks in their platforms. In
1913, although Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan hurried out to
California in an attempt to dissuade the legislators tram their course,
the State legislature passed the first California alien land act, which
(14) .
made it illegal for aliens ineligible to citizenship to buy agric~-
tural land or to lease it for a period exceeding 3 years.
During the war years, from 1914 to 1918, the racists wre re-
strained by injunctions from Washington from crusading ?lith any effec-
tiveness. Not only was Japan an ally of the United States but there
was also need for the exercise of Japanese farming talent in California.
No sooner was the armistice signed, hOYlever, than the lid blew off and
the crusaders boiled over. An initiative land law of 1920 tightened the
old law in three respects: (1) it forbade the leasing of land by Japan-
ese aliens altogether; (2) it deprived them of the right to purchase
stock in any organization which owned or leased agricultural land-the
law of 1913 had permitted them to own stock as long as the total hold-
ings of the Japanese did not exceed 49 percent of the whole; and, (3)
it prohibited aliens from being appointed guardians of minor children
whose estate consisted of real property-this because it had been dis-
covered that some Japanese aliens were buying land in the name of their
citizen children. In 1923 the land law was amended to prohibit Japanese
aliens from entering ..share cropping contracts-for the vigilant anti-
Japanese element had discovered that the Japanese were farming land in
return for a s~ at the crops raised.
In 1925 the legislature passed a concurrent resolution urging
investigation of alleged infractions of the alien land acts. The cases
were instigated by State Attorney General U. S. Webb, who had co-au-
thored the ftstricti ve statutes and 'Who was at this time a pex,na,nent
member of the California Joint Immigration CoI!lnission, which had been
organized to campaign for Federal legislation to exclude the Japanese
from the United States. Elliott Grinnell Mears, in his prelimina_ry
report prepared for the July 1927 conference of the Institute of Pacific
Relations, in Honol~u, said of this organization:
"The most powerful single g roup in California * * * is the
California Joint Immigration Committee, successor to the
defunct emlusion leagues, whose Executive ~retary and
driving force, l(r. V. S. McClatchy, was folUDr17 Director
of the Associated Press, when he was editor aDd owner of
the Sacramento Bee. Largely the initiative and pUblicity
skill of Mr. McClatchy had been responsible for the legi8-
lative acts against the Japanese since the World Viar.
The Committee consists of the Deputy-Adjutant of the
American Legion, the Secretary-Treasurer of the State
Federation of Labor, Master of the State Grange, Grand
President of the Native Sons of the Golden West, the State
. Attorney General, 'and V. S. McClatchy."
There can be little doubt that the pe~suasive and deceptively
authoritative-sounding ~antasies of Mr. McClatchy were instrumental in
. (15)
1persuading a sufficient number of Congressmen and Senators that they
were justified in accepting the immigration bill of 1924 with its rider
which excluded the Japanese. A "skeleton brief," in which the bones
were _11 padde4 with ingenious fictions was prepared by Mr. McClatchy,
filed with the secretary of state, and presented to the Senate by Sen-
ator Hiram Johnson, of California, on July 27, 1921, ffienate Document
No. 55, 67th Congress, 1st Sessidgl. The sk,leton brief rested the case
for excluding the Japanese on falsifications of the volume of Ja~ese
population in California, the Japanese birth rate in California, the
alleged failure of Japan to observe in good faith the te~s of the
Gentlemen's Agreement, and the excessive number and acreage of Japanese
freeholds and leaseholds in the State.
In 1917 Japan and Kor~ had been excepted from the "barred
zoning" clause of the immigration act of that year. Japan was protected
at that time by the Gentlemen's Agreement and by the fact that she -.s
an ally of the United States in the war. The Inmigration Act of 1924,
however, annulled the Gentlemen's Agreement by denying admission to the
United States of all ilmDigrants ineligible to citi'Zenship and including
in that category Mongolians, Polynesians and races indigenous to the
Western Hemisphere-in other words, all Indians of South America and
Mexico.
Arter using its influence to achieve the Federal measure of 1924,
the joint immigration commission continued in enstence to make sure
that the exclusion measure against the Japanese was retained. In spite
of the commission's efforts, toward the end of the twenties and up to
1931, when Japan invaded Manchuria, favorable considerati.on was being
given the matter of extending the quota to Japan. It was in this period
that the anti-Japanese forces of the west Coast developed their theses
on the subject of Japanese language schools and the evils of dual citi-
zenship. It was in this period that the Nisei, or citizen generation
of Japanese Americans, began to come of age. It is true that not mny
of them were yet of an age to vote, but the fact that some were begin-
ning to vote and that there would be mre with each passing year pointed
to the .:fact that the Japanese minority was developing a voice and voting
power and hence would not make such a convenient political football in
the years to come. Unable to deprive tbe American-bom children of the
Japanese immi~ants of their citizenship without first changing the Con-
stitution of the United States, the racists made every attempt to dis-
credit the citizenship of the Nisei. It must be said that they were
renarkably succes sful in undemining public and official confidence in
the loyalty of the Nisei to the country of their birth. The racist
arguments were highly articulated and widely publicized, and the voice
of the racists was much more penetrating than the voice of the people
of good will who were in a posi~ion tQ refute those arguments. It is
!mprobable that the £urness of their success was realized even by the
rac1.sts th~8elves-until the United States entered World War II.
(16)
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CHAPTER m
THE POPUlATION MYTH
The earliest myth developed by the racists to stir up anti-
Japanese sentiment in California was the one revolving about Ule number
of Japanese i1mnigrants caning into the country-both before and after
the Gentlemen! s Agreement went into eftect. The pressure groups never
allowed themselves to be persuaded that the Gentlemen's Agreement was
an eftective curb on jJmnigration. A circumstance that played into the
hands of the agitators was the variation in methods employed by the
Census Bureau and by the ~gl"ation and Naturalization Service in
listing statistics.
In 1901, the year in which the State Government of California
made its tirst official anti-Japanese move, the CoDmissioner-General of
!migration began to lump 1JmD1gration figures relating to the continen-
tal United States together with those relating to its territories. The
Census Bureau continued to distinguish between the States and the
Territories. Obviously there was a startling discrepancy between fig-
ures given in the Commissioner-Generalts tables and those quoted by the
B\n"eau of the Census. Even scholars were misled, tor there was nothing
to indicate that the term "United States" as used in the reports of the
CoImnissioner-General of IDInigration, meant the United States together
with the Territories of Hawaii and Alaska. An indefatigable research
worker might have discovered a set of figures headed "Declared Des-
tination Hawaii, n and might then have subtracted those figures from the
total, but for some years none of the writers on the Japanese question
seems to have pursued the matter to such lengths. Certainly West Coast
politicians and agitators, eager to substantiate their assertions that
invading hordes of Japanese were about to crowd the 'White race from the
Golden West, were not interested in seeldng a reasonable explanation
tor the discrepancy and risk destruction of'theirthesis. A glance at
the table on page 8 suggests how much better the lumped figures served
anti-Japanese interes~s than could the broken down figures.
Anothel' practice of the Commissioner-General ot Immigration,
begun.in 1907, added to the confusion of the lay mind; this was the
practice of differentiating between inunigrant and noninunigrant aliens
and also between emigrant and nonemigrant aliens. NonjJnmigrants and
nonemigrants are people who enter or leave the country for business or
pleasure temporarily, so that their mov.ements are not presumed to have
any permanent ~ffect on population. This being the case, immigration
reports did not use figures tor nonimmigrant OOmissions and for non-
emigrant departures in the tabulation or ordinary arrivals and
departures.
(17)
The figures in the table on page 8, beginning in 1907, do not
include non1lBm1grant entrie" to the country. Although most writers
were actually unaware that the figures which they quoted from the
immigration reports combined Hawaiian 1mm1gration totals with those of
the continental Uriited States in the first decade of the twentieth cen-
tury, certain writers discovered a separate listing of 4,3.36 arrivals
of nonillmdgrants and were careful to add that figure to the lumped total
of 132,706, thus achieving the impressive number of 137,,042 Japanese
1nm1grants who were supposed to have c~ to the continental. United
States in the first 10 years of the century. Other writers on the
subject" without intent to ~pport current misconceptions, simply
stopped at the first table which se~ed to 8IlSlfer their needs and quoted
the figures so erroneous in their implications. Whether they chose the
figure 132,706 or the figure 137,042, there was a confounding discrep-
ancy between the number of Japanese such writers decided should be in
the United States proper aoo the number actually discovered by the cen-
sus enumerator" in 191O--which was 72,157" including 4,502 native-born
citizen children.
It is important to remember that the first decade of this century
was a highly significant period in the history of the Japanese in the
United States: in the first place, this decade witnessed the rise of
anti-Japanese agitation on the West Coast; in the second place, it pro-
. duced the first curtailment of Japanese inDDigrati.on as effected by the
Gentlemen t s Agreement in conjunction nth the Presidential. Proclamation
of 1907" which refused admission to the continental. Uriited States to
Japanese 1mmig~ants bearing passports to Hawaii, Canada or Mexico. The
confusion arising from confiicting population statistics gave credence
to a n~er of fantasies which were useful in drumming up support for
the first alien land act of California.
By the time that the 1920 census figures were available, agita-
tion against the Japanese in Cal1:fom1a was at its pre-\Yorld War II
height. The initiative measure which tightened up the Alien Land Law
of 1913 had been IlBde law, am the anti-Japanese forces were rallying to
push through Congress the Federal exclusion law. Nothing ~ould have
been JlM)re convenient for the agitators than the continued uneJqJlained
variation in the practice of treating statistics for Hawaii.
an June 19, 1920, the report of the California State Board of
Control on the Japanese in California -.s issued and presented by Gover-
nor Stephens to Secretary of State Bainbridge ColbY'. This report, fac-
tual and objective in many of its parts, was an important document in
the history of the exclusion movement. Unquestionably it shaped the
opinion of mny ~n who were in a position to enact their opinions into
law. . It is s,igniflcant, therefore, that the board had fallen into the
customary error When it made its estimate of the Japanese population of
California as of 1920. The board became somewhat enmeshed in misleading
(18)
\ .
statistics concerning i~IrInS!t-&tion under the Gentlemen's Agreement, but.
it became hopelessly entangled when it sought to determine the actual
resident Japanese population of Ca11f.ornia. It arrived at the number
87,279 as of December .31, 1919, whereas the Census found omly 70,196.
The first determined etforl to wring sen- frcB contradictory-
sets of statistics about Japanese inwn1gration and population was made
by Dr. Sidney L. Gulick, in an art.icle that appeared in the January
1921 issue ot The Annals ot the American AcadefBT ot Political and
Social Science. Dr. Gulick analyzed the State Board of Control's
report and pointed out the errors which it contained. He was the first
to ~lain clearly the different methods aup10yed by IDIDigration C0m-
mission and Census Bureau in recording statistics for continental United
States and its territories; he was the first to suggest that it 'Was well
to disregard the categories of those leaving or entering the country- if
one wished to get at the true facts of movements. His discoveries se-
to baTe been ignored at the very- time when they might have shed light
upon the antide~cra.tic activities of the racists and prev~nted a
shabby piece of Federal legislation.
As it was, Dr. Gulick's explanation passed \1nnOticed; Washington
accepted as accurate the figures offered ~ the State Board of Control,
and further immigration of Japanese was prohibited. It was not until
1929, 5 years after exclusion became a fact, that a .full and logical
~lanat1on of the baffling figures and discrepancies was pres,nted to
the public. This cplanation was the work of Dr. ROOIa.nzo C. Adams, of
the University of Hawaii. His article "Japanese tigration Statistics"
appeared. in The Journal of Sociology and Social Research for Uay-June
1929. Dr. Adams wrote:
"According to the 1910 census there were 67,655 foreign
born Japanese 1n the United States and the reports of the
CODBI1issioner-General of Inmigration showed an excess of
67,109 admissions of alien Japanese immigrants over de-
partures of alien Japanese emigrants in the ten years
ending June ~, 1920. This excess was for both Continen-
tal United States and Hawaii, but there was no specific
mention of Hawaii and 'it was natural that casual mainland
investigators familiar with census practice should assume
that the excess was for Continental United States.
"Al1(Rfing for an ordinary death rate, age considered, it
appeared that the 1920 census should show approximately
127,000 foreign rom Japanese in Continental United States.
The actual census figures were 81,.35S-an apparent dis-
. crepancy of over 45,000.
,
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"Considering the e.x1sting state of public opinion and
suspicion, this was a ~rious matter. There was much
fear that the Japanese were becoming so numerous as to
jeopardize the interests of the White Race. It was
charged that the Gentlemen t s Agresent was ineffective
and even that its express terms were being, violated in
an important degree. A picture of a horde of Ja~ese
Supplanting AMricans was in the minds of manY' people
and the 1.rmnigration statistics were quoted in support ot
doctrines based on such fears. 'ftle more reassuring fig-
ures of the census were discounted qy the theory that
ma.ny Japanese had evaded the census agents in order to
conceal th..ir true numbers. It
The lumping of figures for Hawaii and the continental United
States bY' the Immigration Commission was a simple matter to grasp. The
second source of error, involving "the classification of travellers and
the classificatory- tems and also the procedure through which the
statistical data are secured, It was far from simple. It began with the
tact that nonemigrants and non1JmDigrants were not co\Ulted, since their
movement was not supposed to have any permanent effect upon thepopulation. .
As Dr. Adams indicated, if all actual emigrants and immigrants
were properlY' classified" this practice would be legitimate, but since
anigrants were rarely classified as such-with regard to Japanese leav-
ing the United States tor Japan--the practice was very misleading. His
investigations led him to the discovery that abo~t five-s~hs of all
Ja~ese going to Japan from the continental United States and 'more than
nine-tenths going to Japan from Hawaii were classified as nonemigrants.
Bona fide nonemigrants were those who visited Japan with a definite
expeetation of returning to America. The vast majority, however, re-
turiled to Japan without being at all sure whether they would stay t~ere
or return to America. It they said in America that they expected to
remain in Japan, they lost the privileges of the legal residence which
theY' had established in America and with them the right to retumj in
other words, they bumed their bridges behind them. On the other hand,
if they said they were going to Japan for a visit, they were classified
as nonemigrants ai1d retained the privilege of returning if they foun~
conditions in Japan unfavorable. Many of these aliens took their citi-
zen children with th_, of course, and in that event the citizen
children were classified with American citizens travelling abroad-with
DO indication of race, this being the practice of the immigration
authorities. Since the figures for nonemigrants and citizens leaving
the CO\Dltry were excluded from the tables of immigration and emigrati9n,
there was naturally a verY imperfect picture of actual movements into'
, and out of the country- of the people' of Japanese race. While a number
of these uncertain travellers did come back to the United States to
(20)
rlive, a large number of them found that they could adjust to Japanese
life and accordingly remained in Japan, keeping their citizen children
with them. This latter group of aliens together with their citizen
children were thus misclassified and were not included in' the' count of'
snigrants. According to Dr. Adame, the error due to this misclassifi-
cation tor the period or 1911 to 1920 was about 24,000 tor the cCXltin-
ental United States and about 17,000 tor Hawaii.
Dr. Adams was painstakingly thorough. He checked statistics
from all sources, Ja~nese, Hawaiian, the United States Census and the
United States Inmigration COIm11ssion, and it was only by doing so that
anything like a complete picture of real movements-to say nothing of
I
any canprehension of the conflicting and contradictory populatiori tig-
ures--could be obtained. He found the discrepancy between his improved
statistics and the census figures for 1920 to be only 2,189 for the
States and 1,158 for Hawaii, a far cry from the figure of 45,000 which
had been bandied about by pressure group writers and orators to point
the need of a drastic exclusion law. He found also that Hawaii .in that
decade "lost over two thousand persons of the Japanese race or people
by excess of departures over admissions while, for the mainland, 84-
mis sions were only a 11 t tIe more than balanced by departures." In
other words, in that decade more Japanese .re leaving American so11,
both continental and island, than were arriving upon it.
To continue with Dr. Adams' major conclusions, there was no
evidence ot any myBteriously achieved inrush of &lien Japanese or that
the Gentlemen' s Agreement was not being maintained in good faith by
, Japan. The increase in population during the decade was a result of
births, ~t of illegal entries into the United States. The number of
married women had increased !ran 5,582 in 1910 to 22,195 in 1920, am
these Japanese wives were young. Although about 14,000 citizen children
had beE taken to Japan before the 1920 census was taken, the cenS'.1S was
able to show an increase from 4,502 in 1910 to ,29,672 in 1920 of Ameri-
can-born citizens of Japanese ancestry in the continental United States.
The accompanying table shows the st.eady increase of citizens and
the decrease with the passage of the years of the aliens in this
minority group.
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rCHAPTER IV
THE BIRTH RATE
--
Very little attention was given to the West Coast's rising gen-
eration of Japanese American citizens until after the C1OS8 of World
War I.. Iftle Alien Lam. Law of 191.3 had prohibited further purchase of
agricultural land in California by aliens ineligible to citizenship but,
had permitted wch aliens to lease farm land for a ,3-year period. Dur-
ing the war years, with Japan an ally of the United States and with the
greatlY' increased demand for agricultural produce, Japanese farmers in
Califomia were allowed to produce food for freedom without hindrance.
However, once the war had S'l~ed and election year -.s at hand, ~ertain.
California politicians took stock of the situation and became aware of
the fact that Issei parents were purchasing land for their citizen
children, taking title in the name of the children. There seemed to be
a good many little American citizens with Ja}:8nese faces, and the m:yth-
makers quickly turned their attention upon the birth rate among the
Japanese 1DDD1grants.
The advocates of the initiative measure to tighten up the first
alien land act made dark predict;Lons of a "yellow peril n menacing
California, chiefly through the birth of innumerable Japanese American
children. When the voters of California endorsed the initiative jleasure
in sufficient number to make it a law of the state" the pressure groups
campaigned with intensified fervor to obtain Federal legislation 1i1ich
would prohibit subsequent jJmnigration' of Japanese. Amazing statemen~
about the fecundity of Japanese women were made and believed. "Peaceful
penetration II was a phrase frequently ancountered in the speechee and
writings of California's superpatriots and yellow journalists in the
years between the close of World War I and the enactment of the exclu-
sion law. The term wae applied to an ingenious theory of a Japanese .
plot to people California with hQrdes of Japanese. Wives and picture
brides, it vm.s said, wre sent by the Japanese Government to California
under orders fram the FiDPeror to have a baby every year; these babies
would grow up American citizens in name and loyal Japanese at heart J if
every Japanese woman carried out the Imperial instruction faithfullY', it
was reckoned that within halt a cent~ the Japanese 1ft)u].d outnumber the
Caucasians in California and would seize control of the State.
The Japanese male immigrant, with rare eJOOeptions, came to the
United States alone. He was young and he had only enough money to get
here. If married, he left his wife in Japan until he could win a little
security in the new country and then he sent for her. Whether he worked
on the railroads or in seasonal a gricultural enterprises, he 11 ved a
migratory life of hard work and great discOmfort. In several years, with
luck, he might lift himselt out of the migratory labor class and become
(25) .
a tenant famer--or perhaps he might open some smA 11 business in a city.
. <Alce he had a permanent roof over his head and had saved Slough money to
pay the steamship passage, he sent for his ufe--or for his wife and
children, as the case might be. If unmarried, he .faced a probl&n in the
total absence of \1nmarr1ed girls of his owm race in the United States.
Had he inclination to marry outside his racial group, he was prohibited
in both Cali.tomia and Oregon by lan against miscegenation. Very few
of the Issei bachelors could afford to make the long trip back to Japan
to find and bring back a wife. However, since marriage was a family
affair in Japan, with the parents making all arrangements, it was possi-
ble and proper for a young man in America to ask his parents in Japan to
select a bride for him~ Photographs were exchanged-hence the term
"picture bridetl-am when these wre mutually approved,- the two famjlies
~ Jap~ drew up the marriage contract and sent the bride to join the
groom in America, quite in accord with Japanese ethics and law. In
deferenc,e to American opinion, an American civil ceremony became an
established part ot the procedure.
With rather less formality, in the early days ot our country,
shiploads of young women were sent from &1gland and various European
countries to provide the early s ettlera of the eastern colonies with
wives; however, west Coast nativists preferred to regard this only
practicable course left open to. Japanese immigrant bachelors as some-
thing unprecedented in the annals of American history J and as they
developed their thesis, it became a "diabolical plot,. on the part of
Japan to penetrate peacefully the rich Coastal States by means of in-
tensive propagation.
The first official coDlnents on the birth rate among first gen-
eration Japanese occur in the report made in 1909 by agents of the
United States Immigration CODIDission on immigrants in agriculture and
industry in the West~rn States. At that time an increasing number of
married Issei were finding themselves in a position to send for their
~ves. In Sacramento six-sevenths of the Japanese business men--an
unusually high proportion for that period-had prospered sufficiently
to have their wives with them. According to this early report,
"Slightly more than a third of the married men investigated had no
offspring * * * a few of the marri~es took place only a year or two
ago J blt ghe scarcity of child'1:"8Di is chiefly explained by the fact
that mat of the Japanese in this country have not been leading a. nor-
mal life. ~ of the husbands and wives have been separated for years J
and a large percentage of the wives are gainfully employed.'f6 The
agents cemmented also on the situation among those Los Angeles Japanese
who had wives in residence: "* * * one-fourth of the families investi-
gated where the marriage had taken place at least three years previou~,
were without children."6..a,
. (24)
.
Ten years or so later, with agitation violent,'it was cust<Xlary-
tor pressure group leaders to perform interesting legerd8&in with
statistics to suggest the possibilities to future population content of
the Japanese birth rate. John S. Chambers, Controller of the State of
Cali.fomia and chairman of the Japanese ~lU8ion Isague wrote just
after the initiative measure had been adopted:
"CaW'ornia has gone as far as she could go under the
federal and state constitution and the American-Japanese
treaty. If she could have i§:>ne further she 1fOuld have
done so. The next development California seeks to bring
about is the stoppage of iDmigration from Japan through
action by Congress J and the third step, the amending of
the Constitution of the United States to the effec't. that
children born in this country of parents ineligible to
citizenship, themselves shall be ineligible to citizenship."7
Mr. Chambers juggled statistics dizzily, snatching out of the
air totals which had nothing to do with those officially established.
He picked out 50,000, "or the bulk thereof" for the Japanese who
entered the country- under the Gentlemen's Agreement prior to 1920,
stating that the majority of these immigrants were laborers, sent in
violation of the agre~nt, and conclooing that the picture brides were
"brought here primarily so that the Japanese population ot this statemight be increased" and also so that they might work in the fields "as .
CODm:>n laborers, frequently with babies on their backs. Their rate of
birth is between three and four times that of our own race * * *. At
this rate, in ten years there will be 150,000 Japanese born here, and
by 1949 they will outnumber the white people. "7-& By census enumera-
tion by the close of !Ir. Chambers' lO-year period there were not 150,000
American-born children of Japanese parents but onl)'" 68,.357 in the entire
United States; in 19~ there were 79,642.
Dr. Gulick, in an article appearing in the same issue of the
same. magazine as Mr. Chambers', listed conveniently some of the brasher
statements of prominent Californians on this subject:
"~'ernor Stephens On his covering letter to Secretary
of State Colb)'", sent with the Report of the State Board of
Control of Ca1ifomia in 1920J states that 'the fecundity
of the Japanese race far exceeds that of any other people
that we have in our midst.' Senator Phelan testified be-
fore the House Conlnittee on Inmigration in September,
1919 that every Japanese 'picture bride' has a child with-
in a year after landing. Yr. McClatchy testified before
the Senate Committee on Immigration, September 25, 1919
that 'the birth ~ate among the Japanese is five times as
great per thousand as among the whites,' and 'that picture
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brides U8uaUy give birth once a year. or nearly once a
year to children, and this is one of' the ways by which
Japan deliberately and carefully fSif}] violates the
"Gentlemm t s Agreement" \ . The IDs. Angeles Time swell
set forth the popular belietand&nxietyOvir"" "-Eb:e situ-
ation in its prophecy that it the present birth rates are
a1ntained f'or the next. ten years there would be 150,000
children of' Japanese descent born in Calitomia in 1929
and but 50.000 white children. And in 1849 the majority
of' the population of California would be Japanese, ruling
the state. itS
Further along in his article Dr. Gulick disposes of the "picture
bride" legend:
.
"But the most convincing reply to the excited fable mongers
is the Report of' the state Board of Control as to the num-
ber of 'picture brides' admitted in 1918 and the number of
their children. The name of each bride, of the steamer on
which she arrived, of her husband and his address, and of
the date of the birth of her child are all recorded. The
period begins January 4, 1918 and ends February 29, 1920.
The number of 'brides' named is '524; the number of children
born in those two years and two months 1s 182. That is to
. say, only 34.S percent of the brides became mothers in
that period. How many American brides would become mothers
in a similar length of time after marriage?nS-a
In reality, as compared with the staggering numbers hinted at by
agitators, there were not very many picture brides brought into the
country. Between July 1, 19l1, and February- 29, 1920, when the last
picture brides arrived-the Japanese Government issued no more passports
to picture brides after January 25, 1920-5,749 brides entered Cali-
fornia through the port of' San Francisco.9 Whether picture brides or
wives of longer acquaintance with their husbands. the Japanese women of
these years -re young married women at the height of fecundity. .
In 1921, Professor Inul, then assistant professor of Far Eastern
history am politics at the University of Southem Cali.fomia. had this
to say on the subject:
"It is true that the Japanese birth rate in this country
is large * * *. WhY'? 1. Becauze more than 60 percent
of the Japanese are living in rural communities which
usually have higher rate 01' natural increase. 2. Because
01' their economic well-being as compared with their former
environment in Japan; but this is universally true of all
immigrant races. 3. Because California's birth rate is
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low, as the state is composed of many immigrants from
, the East, the majority of whom came here to ~nd their
lives after they pass their middle age. The largest
percentage of Japanese men in this state are between the
. ages of thirty and torty; women, between twenty aM thirty.
4. Because they are young, their death rate is very- small,
wh1J.e the increase is abno~l. 5. This increase will
d,cline; as ttme goes on, thos~ who are in the period of
reproduction w111 pass into anothe~ stage, while it is too
early for the second generation to take their place. As
was stated betore, the Japanese are human beings. They
. have no monopoly on perpetual youth. This accusation
and its arguments is one of the best emmples of the
vicious and malicious means used by the anti-Japanese to
vilify the Japanese."
The California" Committee of Justice, which organized to oppose
the Initiative Alien Land Act, warned:
n~ 2.2 per cent of California's total population is
Japlnese. In 1919 more white children were born in Cali-
tornia than all the Japanese children born here in the
ten years preceding ~ We should not be placed .in the ridic-
ulous position of 97.8 per cent of our population being in
fear of 2.2 per cent * * *. The highest Japanese birth
rate is only 7.4 per cent of the whole as against 90.8 per
cent of American births. Within a few years Japanese
births w111 become even less, because (1) immigrants,
irrespective of race, have fewer children after the first
generation; (2) the average of Japanese male adults now
here is about 40; (.3) the abolition of 'picture marriages'
will make it more difficult for Japanese to marry; (4) the
arrivals of Japanese will decrease as the reeult of present
diplomatic negotiations. till
That these statements of Dr. Gulick, the spokesman of the Cali-
fornia Committee of Justice, Professor !nut and many other thinking
persons of both races were well founded is borne out by the census
figures. In 192:> the Japanese Government voluntarily stopped issuing
passports to picture brides. Although the'terms 0f the Immigration.Law
of 1924 permitted wives of established resident Japanese to enter
American ports to join their husbands, the majority of men who had
married before cigrating fran Japan had by 1924 already imported their
wives; if they bad not yet done so, these women who had stayed on in
Japan for a1 or .'j) years were not very likely to produce children when
and. if they were reunited with their husbands in the United States.
Study of' the census figures shows that the number of Japanese American
(27)
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births decreased steadily after 1921 and was still decreasing at the
time of the 1940 enlDneration. Ironically, the birth rate was dec11n1ng
at the very time when agitation against the phenomena.! Japanese birth
rate was at its height, and at the time when the Federal Govemment
barred Japanese iDlnigrants from the United States. By 1940 the census
returns showed that the birth rate among Japanese Americans in every
State on the West Coast was lower than the birth rate of the general
population.
BmTH RAT~ IN PACIFIC STATES, 1940 CENSUS
- - -. ~.. --.L -..
Birth Rate 8JOOng Birth Rate of Total
California 15.8 per thousand 16.1 per thousand
Oregon 15.5 per thousand 16.4 per thousand
ANNUAL NUlmER OF JAPANESE A!lERICAN BIRTHS
IN PACIFIC STATF.S, 192:>-1940 12
~ ~ - - ~ -- ..:.:
~~ ~920 :930~~
California ',032 2,224 1,480(Jregon 219 75 6.3
W&8hington ~ 1,160 375 171
-
After the wartime exclusion of all persons of Japanese ancestry
from the Pacific Coast area had been ordered by the Western Defense
~d, and as the last few contingents of this minority group were
being rushed into assembly centers to await further dislocation of their
persons and their lives, the Tolan Committee reported officially in May
of; 1942: '
nContrarr to alarmist predictions about the reproductive
tendencies of the American Japanese, their birth rate dur-
ing the past decade has been insufficient to balance mor-
tality and emigration. Since 1930 the Japanese populationhas ~e2reased* by 11,887, or 8.6 percent. .
"Future increases in the Japanese population will come
largely from native-born parents. More than 90 percent
of the foreign-born females are .35 years or older; more
-~
*Underscoring not in original.
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than- 50 percent are 45 or older. Almost three-fourths of
the foreign-born males are 45 years or older, and about
45 percent are 55 years or older. The births of the third-
generation Japanese will fail for some time to offset the
high mortality rates consequent upon the abnormal age com-
position of. the alien Japanese. The total Japanese popu-
lation, therefore, may be expected to drop substantially
during the coming years:
"The advanced age of the alien Japanese is reflected in .their length of residence in this country. More than -
one-fifth of the West Coast Japanese. aliens have been
settled here for over 30 years. Two-thirds entered the
United states before the Exclusion Act of 1924. Those
entering since that time have been mainly women, and
certain limited categories permitted by 1&w."13
,,~
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,C HAPTER V
DUAL CrrIZENSHIP
Until the American-born citizens ot Japanese ancestry began to
come ot age, the Japanese minority in the United States, because ot the
law which denied naturalization to oriental aliens, was without a vote,
a tact that made the Japanese group a convenient political football.
With the maturing ot the citizen children ot these Japanese nationals,
however, this group began to have a voice. Each year, as more ot the
citizen children came of age, that yoice would increase in v~lume.
Nothing short ot a revision of the Federal Constitution could deprive
American-born children ot any ancestry ot their right to vote. It may
be recalled that the chairman ot the Japanese Exclusion League, who was
also the controller ot the State of Calitornia, stated openly in 1921
that the next objective to be achieved by his group, after further im-
migration should be prohibited, was "the amending ot the Constitu~ion
ot the United States to the effect that children born in this country
ot parents ineligible to citizenship, themselves shall be ineligible to
citizenship.'f
The crusade to effect euch a change in the Constitution depended
tor success upon its ability to discredit the citizenship ot the Nisei.
The crusaders argu8d that all American-born children ot Japanese par-
ents held dual citizenship; that dual citizenship ot Japanese Americans
implied dual allegiance, with first allegiance, not to the United
States as the country of their birth, but to the Japanese Empire as the
country ot their ancestry. It was charged that Japanese law made every
child ot a Japanese tat her a citizen ot Japan and that all such chil-
dren were incontrovertibly loyal to the Emperor ot Japan. It was made.
to appear that Japan was unique among the nations in holding as its
subjects the children born in foreign countries to Japanese nationals,
and that ot all the varieties ot second generation immigrant stock in
the United States, only the Nisei suffered conflicting loyalties. Only
was it rarely admitted that a conflict could trouble the minds and
hearts ot the Nisei, because it was asserted that the Nisei were ~rn
with a peculiar capacity tor passionate and enduring loyalty to a coun-
try which they had never seen and which 1a7 six thousand-odd miles re-
moved from their homes, and it was maintained that the Nisei -were born
without that capacity, taken for granted in the offspring of non-orien-
tal immigrants, tor lo~lty to the country ot their birth. Vo S.
McClatc~, pillar ot the exclusion leagues and executive secretary tor
life ot the Calitornia Joint Immigration Commission, set forth these
arguments in detail in his speech made before the Honolulu Rotary Club
in 1921 and in even greater detail in his "Skeleton Briet," which was
prepared tor the indoctrinati9n ot Congress.
(30)
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The campaign never achieved its ultimate goal, but it was r..
markabl,y successtul in generating 8U8picion ot the Nisei. By 1942
enough suspicion ot the loyalty ot these American citizens ot ,Japanese
ancestry had been generated b)" pressure group propaganda to obtain the
signature ot the President ot the United States upon the ex.cuti ve or-
der which allowed the wartime mass exclusion ot all persons ot Japa-
nese ancestry from the Pacific Coast region. The logic and the facts
which the racist campaign overrode in roughshod tashion demand serious
consideration, belated though such consideration is. Earlier awareness
ot the over-looked facts might well have spared the United States a
costly experiment with human lives.
In the tirst place, dual citizenship results trom a contlict
between the nationalit7 laws ot the country ot a child's ancestry andthe country ot his birth. It the country ot his birth claims him as a .
citizen regardless ot his ancestry, and it at the same time the country
ot his ancestry claims him as & citizen regardless ot his place ot
birth, the child involuntarily holds dual citizenship. Since the
United States does not recognize the claim ot any other nation to the
allegiance of American-born children--with the exception of children
born in embassies--the dualit7 lacks substance and need not inconven-
ience the holder so long as other American citizens, manr of whom have
or have had dual citizenship themselves, retrain trom making cap,ital of
this tie with a toreign country which, according to United States law,
does not exist.
Countries of the modem world inherit their wa7 ot determining
citizenship at birth trom two sources. Some countries favor one, some
another, but traces of both are perceptible in"the nationalit7 laws ot
most countries. One of these sources is Roman law of the ancient
world; the other is the common law of the mediaeval world. ~ Roman
law, the citizenship ot the child followed that ot the tather. . Common
law, tounded in this detail "on feudal considerations," claimed tor the
realm every child born therein. The Roman qr ci 'Vil law ruling on the
determination of citizenship at birth is known as "jus sanguinis," the
lawot descent or blood, and the co.on law ruling as "ju8 soli,," the
law of the soil or place of birth.14
Durward V. Sandifer, tormerl,y ot the Department of State, made
a thorough studr ot the nationalit7 laws of the world, in 1935, and
reported that no country relies 801elY' on the rule ot jus 80li, for to
do 80 would be to dear citizenship to the children ot nationals una-
voidably detained in a toreign countr7.l5 Children born in toreign
embassies have from ancient times been excepted trom the application ot
the rule ot jus soli, since embassies are not within the jurisdiction
of the countrY' in which theY' are located but are under the jurisdiction
of the country which they represent. In the United States, the first
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Congress, in an act ot March 26, 1790, provided for the retention or
citizen8hip by- children born abroad to American citizens.
To quote tram ~. Sandifer:
" * * * it seems apparent that the rule" of J!!
8anau1D!8 i8 con8iderably- more extensive and has much
greater intluence in the determination ot nationalit7
than the rule ot .iU8 soli. The validity- ot this statement
becoaes more apparent it the extent be recalled to which
the countries with law8 ba8ed principally on jus 'so11 in-
clude provisions based on ~1U8 S&nRU1n18. The problE. cre-
ated b7 thi8 situation is rendered even more significant
when it is noted that m08t of the jus soli countries are
new countries, and until ~ecentl7, countries of extensive
immigration. A8 most or the countries or emigration
follow the rule of jus sanguinis, the result is a multi-
plication of instances of dual nationalit7. Although
the mere fact of a widespread status of dual nation-"
alit7 acquired at birth, with such a status continuing tor
a number of 7ear8 duriDg minorit7 does not, in itself,
present an especiallY' 8erious problem, the urg;ent neces=
!!tz to which this situation E2!nts is the develoanent
o! sound rule! for the termination ot dual nationality
a~ as!ge set or that at which comDeting; claims by !:~
countries to the alleg;iance of the same man may be
calculated to cause serious friction~~
- --
Hi8 research into this subject showed that ot 79 countries--not
including the United States--48 followed principall7 the rule of jus
8anguinis, 29 that of jus soli, and 2, both equall7. The British Em-
pire and the two Americas "to~ the stronghold of the law ot jus
eoli."l5-b Up to World War II onl7 .3.3 countries had provided a method
tor the termination of the status of dual citizenship tor foreign-born
children ot nationals, and of these .3.3, 22 were countries whose laws
are ba8ed principally- on jus sanguinis. Japan was one of the 22 coun- .
tries. Until 1940 the United States made no provision tor the termi-
nation of the American citizenship acquired at birth bY'its foreign-
born children of nationals.
Japan did not codify- nationality- laws until 1899. Mass emigra-
tion had not been authorized until 1884, and it was slow to gather
momentum. It was .not until women began to emigrate to join their hus-
bands and establish home8 that the question of the status of foreign-
born children of Japanese parents arose. "Since most of her trade and
political contacts were with European powers at that time, Japan
(52) .
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borrowed the Continental jus sanguinis rule, providing that' A child is
a Japanese it his or her rather is a Japanese at the time of his or her
birth. . "*
It happened, however, that Japanese emigr-ants in general went
not to European countries which operated under the same rule but to
countries ot the Western Hemisphere which operated under the jus soli.
Thus their children were born to a position ot duality as regards cit-
izenship. The Nisei were particularly conscious ot discomfort in this
position because they were singled out from other second generation
Americans who were born to the same involuntary duality, tor the spe-
cial attention ot West Coast jingoists. As early as 1914 and 1915,
the maturing Japanese Americans began to petition the Japanese Govern-
ment to change the law.17
It was in response to these petitions that the Japanese Govern-
ment, on March 15, 1916, made the tir~t ot two moves toward releasing
its torei~born children tram the obligations ot their involuntary
Japanese citizenship. This was the promulgation ot the Japanese law
ot expatriation, effective about a year later. The toll owing trans-
lation ot the law was made by Y. S. Kuno and Max C. Baugh.
"Ao
"1. When a Japanese woman marries a foreigner and
thereby obtains the right ot citizenship or subject-
ship in the nation to which her husband belongs, she
is e~triated.
"20 When a Japanese subject obtains ot his or her
own accord the right ot citizenship or subjectship
ot a foreign nation, he or she is. expatriated.
"Note.-A male subject ot 'the Japanese
empire who is over 17 years ot age, will
not be allowed to expatriate himself
until he has completed active military
service in the Japanese army or navy or
he is known to be tree tromldlitary duty
(on acco~t ot physical disability, long
resi4ence in a foreign country, etc.).
*Law No. 66, )larch 16, .1899. Japanese Civil Code, Vol. IU.
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"3. Those who have been expatriated on account ot
marriage may be allowed to be repatriated through
permission ot the State Minister ot Home Altaire,
provided she or he doJDicUes in Japan after the
dissolution of the marriage.
"B.
"1. Foreign born male or female Japanese subjects
may be allowed to expatriate through the State
Minister of Home Altaire, in the Imperi$l Japanese
government, provided he or she domiciles in the
country where he or she was born and thereby and
therein obtains the right of citizenship or
subjectship.
"NOte l--It is imperative that the step
be taken by his or her legal representa-
ti ve when the applicant is under 15
J'e&rs of age.
"NOte 2--It is imperative that he or she,
though over the age of 15 but under legal
age, or a person adjudged incompetent,
shall take this step on17 with the con-
sent of his legal representatives.
"TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.--Bec&use the Japanese
government thus claims foreign born Japa-
nese as subjects of the empire, though
not so stated, it is reasonable to. say
that Japanese born in America must con-
form strictly to the provisions in the
note under A.2. That 1s, unless such
native son expatriate himself from Japan
before the age of 17, he can not expa-
triate himself until he has satistied
the military requirements.
"0.
"1. Those Japanese who have expatriated themselves on the
ground of Qeing foreign born or of their own accord may
repatriate 'when they establish their domiciles within
the. dominion of the Japanese 8Ilpire.
(34)
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,"2. Foreign naturalized subjects, their children,
or foreign males or females who have been naturalized
by virtue of adoption by Japanese families, or who
have married a Japanese man or WC8&n and as8umed the
family name of said man or woman, will under no cir-
cumstances be permitted to again becc-.e Japanese
subjects it they once torfeit the naturalization
right thu8 obtained. "9"'"
Although thi8 law constituted a st~p in the right direction, the
procedures were cumbersome and time consuming. Japanese law required
the pre8entat1on of a birth certificate before expatriation could be
approved, and manr of th.ose ot the right age to be eligible to expa-
triate at the time when the law went into eftect could not meet the
requireaent.l6-a Birth certificate8 were not a comaonplace in the
tir8t decade ot the twentieth century--or even in the second decade,
tor that matter--e8pecially in rural communities. Even it a birth
certificate existed, papers had to be sent to Japan tor consideration
and processing before approval or disapproval was ottic1al. According
to statements made by Nisei who eXperienced these procedures, the time
consumed between filling in the first to~ and receiving otticial
approval ot expatriation amounted to at least a year and frequently to
as much as 2 years.
The Calitornia state Board ot Cont~l, treating the subject ot
dual citizenship 1n 1920, headed the section wit~ the caption: "once a
Japanese, Always a Japanese." ~e tirst two paragraphs, not entirely
accurate at the time, and definitely untrue alter the 1924 revision ot
the Japanese nationality law_contain the essence ot all argument8
developed by the anti-Japanese element up to and including the present
time.
"Every- Japanese, wherever born, is a citizen ot Japan
unless expatriated. Every Japanese ~ the United States, .
whether ~eric~rn or not, is a citizen ot Japan
and as such is subject to military duty to Japan froB
the age ot seventeen years until forty years ot age,
unless expatriated. The Americ~born Japanese holds
dual citizenship: first, allegiance to Japan with
compulsory $1litary service; and second, rights ot
citizenship in America. Under such circumstances, a
Japanese, though born in America and thereby acquir-
ing all the rights and privileges ot an American
citizen, owes his tirst obligation ot allegiance and
military service to Japan. It is contended by
writers on international law that becau~e our country
is cognizant ot this dual citizenship with its re-
quirement of compulsory military serVice to Japan,
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the United State8, in event ot war with Japan, could
not d.and mUitary service from the American-born
Japane8e but would be obliged to permit them to re-
turn to Japan, th.re to render military 8ervice in
behalf ot J~pan. American-born Japane8e would
appear to be. enjoying all the advantages of American
citizenship without a8suming the mo8t important
re8ponsibilities of such citizenship.
"Once a Japanese, alwaTs a Japanese, unle8s each
. individual Japanese renounces allegiance in the
unner pre8cribed bT the Civil Code of Japan and hi8
renunciation is accepted bT the Japane8e government.
No matter how marty 8uccessi ve generation8 of Ameri-
can-born Japane8e there maT be, none of the children
born in America are relieved of allegiance to Japan
unles8 the parent has renounced allegiance to Japan
and had his renunciation accepted by the Japanesegovernment. "9-b ~~~~ ~-~-~--
The above statement was followed closelT bT the comment: "So
tar a8 could be learned, none of the8e fjenunciationil have been
accepted bT the Japane8e government."
The implications of such statements di8\urbed a great many
people back in 1920, when the United State8 was not in a 8tate of war.
They were understandablT much more alarming when thrust upon the We8t
Coast populace 22 Tear8 later tram the front pages or We8t Coast
paper8, by courtesy ot the Dies Committee, wh08e member8, at this time
when thoughtful people were reluctant to disavow the right8 of American
citizen8 on the ba8ie ot ance8try, felt moved to publicize the report
which they had contrived before the United State8 entered the war
against Japan and which Congress had refu8ed to approve for publication
a ~ Governaent expen8e. In 1943 the report was finallT published as an
o,tficial document bY' the Govenaent Printing Office. However, it was
earlT.in 1942, when officialdom was holding back frCD sanctioning the
forced evacuation ot the Japanese Americans from their home8 along the
Pacific Coa8t, that the committee released its more inflammatory co~
jecture8 to the press. Such details of the Dies Committee report on
dual citizenship as have any relation to fact have it only in an ana-
chronistic 8ense. The writer8 of the report juggled time and place,
presenting as if they had bearing on conditions of the forties state-
ments which had some apPlication to conditions of the Tear8 between
1916 and 1925.
As background for appreciation of Chapter XXIII of the Dies
"Yellowft Report--the chap~er, one page in length, devoted to the
subject of dual citizenship--the following tactual and documented
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account ot what had happened to affect the Qual status ot the Nisei
since the Japanese Government first revised its nationality law in
1916, 1s offered.
Alter the first modification ot the Japanese nationality law,
the Americans of Japanese ancestry were increasinglT dissatisfied with
their status and increasingly aware of the suspicions directed against
their Americanism. As early as 1919 the ri8ing generation began to
petition the Japanese Government to make further changes in the law
which, they protested, Md been inadequatel'T modified in 1916. The
nuaber ot petitions mounted steadily until, in 1924, the Japanese'
Govenment responded with a liberalization ot the expatriation law. A
portion ot one of the8e petitions otters a fair sample ot the thinking
or the young citizens ot this minority group:
"We are all men ot Japanese parentage, born on the
soil of the United States, and who have been educated
in the schools of that count~. We wish to be con-
sidered citizens of the count~ in which we are now
living, and to show that men of Japanese ancest~
can be as lo.val to the count~ of their adoption as
men of other ancest~ residing therein * * *. The
. question ot dual citizenship and the criticisms which
have been made against American-born Japanese have
caused us to reel that some legislation should be
passed b'T the count~ ot our ancestors that ~
free us ot any obligation to it, and allow those ot us,
who have located within the United States with the
purpose and intention ot rMaining and interesting
ourselves in the atfairs of that count~, to show
that we can be good and loyal citizens ot the count~
ot our adoption * * *. We respectfully petition that
at the coming session ot the Japanese Parliament, a
law be enacted, whereby those of Japanese descent can
select their own citizenship without restriction ot
law, and, having once made such decision, can remain
citizens or that count~ without any que8tion ot
dual allegiance."17-a
In response to such petitions as the one just quoted,
" * * * the special session ot the Japanese Diet in
the summer ot 1924 amended the Law ot Nationality,
'and the amended law went into force on December 1,
1924. According to this new law, a child born ot
Japanese parents in the United States, Canada, and
certain South American countries. which hold to the
principle of .1~s soli is not claimed as a subject .
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rthe \1estern Defense Command, on the subject, "Dual Citizens and the
Japanese Draft L9.w" suggests some of the problems of the dual citizen:
"Nisei with dual citizenship who have reached the age
of 20 years are subject to service in the Japanese
Army under the provisions of the compulsory service
law. If the Nisei lives on foreign soil, however, he
~ may apply to the proper authorities, either the Japa-
f nese Consulate or the local Japanese Association, for
deferment by reason of his foreign residence. Appli-
cation for such defe~nt must be renewed every year
until he reaches the age of 37 years. A deferment
granted to a Nisei in a foreign country because of
his residence is not valid if the Nisei goes to Japan
for more than three months. New application for
deferment must be made for some other reason, such as
attendance at a school. Students are granted educa-
tional deferments if they are under 22 years of age
and in high school~ under 2; years of age and in
junior college~ college, or preparatory school, and
under 27 years of age and in the university. The
student who is over th~se age limits must report for
induction regardless of his student status.
"During the 1930' 8 the secretary of the Japanese
Consulate in 108 Angele8 decreed that renouncement of
Japanese citizenship could be made only by a person
li v1ng on foreign 80il. Early interpretation of thi8
was to the effect that Nisei studying in Japan were
legal residents there, and so could not expatriate.
A later interpretation has allowed the acceptance of
the address of the parent8 a8 the legal address ot
the Nisei, so that Nisei in Japan may now expatriate
at any time before they reach legal draft age. Nisei
permanently exempted trom the draft tor any reason
may expatriate at any time. The 8ame treedoa ot
expatriation at anr time applies to girls inasmuch ~8
they are not affected by the draft laws.
"It the dual cit:ci.zen residing tor a time in Japan does
not renounce his Japanese citizenship and is drafted,
he will lose his American citizenship as a result ot
his service in the Japanese Aray. To avoid this,
Nisei cO8ing to Japan are urged to expatriate their
~apanese citizenship betore leaving the United States.
The feeling of the Japanese is that Nisei born in the
United States have a greater job in the developaent
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of Japanese welfare in the United States than in
serving in the Japanese Army ."21
Early in 1941, 20,000 Japanese Americans in the Hawaiian Islands
petitioned the Secretary of State to request the Japanese Government' to
s18plity further procedures for expatriati~ of its dual citizens.
Lieutenant General C. D. Herron, then coJ8landing the Hawaiian Depart-
Bent of the United States Ar87 said in reference' to thie action:
"In the willingnese of the younger Japanese to eign
this petition and in their loyal and eager compli-
ance with the draft, as in the attitude ot the older
, generation in accept~ the new order j;elective
sernc.!? for their children, there ie coaplete refu-tation ot the suspicion ot their 10ya1ty."2~ .
At this point, the Dies Committeete summing up ot the dual citi-
zenship of Japanese AmeriCans is quoted in lull:
"Dual citizenship is insisted upon by all the total-
itarian goverments. 'ft1e Japanese Government has
the following law on ite statute books with refer-
ence to the citizenship of Japanese:
"A child is Japanese it his or her lather
is a Japanese at the time ot hie or her
birth. (Civil Code ot Japan, vol. 3,
art. 66.)
"'nle Japanese Government requires that e...ery child
ot Japanese extraction shall be registered at birth
with the Japanese consulate it that child is born in
a foreign country. ~e registration is then for-
warded to TokJO, and the Japanese Goverraent con-
siders the child to be just as auch a Japanese citi-
zen as if born in Japan.
"Froa the committee's investigation it would appear
that the Japanese residing on the West Coast, to
whom this law also applied, carried out not only the
, letter of the law, but the spirit of the law as well.
i This law operatee among the Japanese despite the
fact that all Japanese children who are born in the
United Statee or its possese1ons are automatically
American citizens. They are citizens by accident
of birth.
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"It. is impossible to ascertain how marl1' Japanese in the
United States hold dual citizenship status. However,
Shiro Fujioka, executive secret&r,- of the Central Japa-
nese Association, southern California branch, aade the
following statement with reference to dual citizenship:
'Of the 50,000 American-born Japanese who
return,d to Japan (Kibei), the great majorit7
are dual citizens.'*
"'Ibis s..e percentage would undoubtedl7 ~old true with
~ reference to the Japanese Americans who did not go to
.: Japan to be educated there.** It has been conserYa- .
'0 tivel7 estimated that about 75 percent of the Nisei,
; or American-born Japanese, have dual citizenship.***
"The Committee has in its files a copy of a set of ;
expatriation blanks which can be executed by Meri-
can-born Japanese in order to become expatriat'ed
from Japan. 'Die 'Statement of Expatriation' Bust
be filled out in duplicate. Very pertinent questions
are required to be answered regarding the prefecture
from which the subject's parents came, name ot father,
reason for expatriation, by whom the application is
made, etc. The applicant also 8Ust receive recent
cont~tion ot date of birth froa the Minister of
State in Japan, where births of all Japanese children
*The WRA Historian wrote to Mr. Fujioka, residing at. the time at
Heart JIountain Relocation Center, asking him if he recalled making such
a statement and it so, was the figure an estimate, and did it include
Nisei tram Hawaii. A letter written tor- Mr. Fujioka by his daughter
Kaoru Peggy Fujioka, dated August 14, 1945, contained the following:
"It .is true that father did make such a statement. He points out, how-
ever, that the figure is an exceedingly rough estimate. Others have
ob8erved the number as more closely approximating 30,000. It is very
difficult to say which of the two figures is more accurate as no offi-
cial record was ever kept. Furthe~ore, thi8 tigure represents the
number of those returning to Japan in the twentieth century tram both'
the continental United states and Hawaii--with the greater aajorit7
leaving from the latter place."
**It 8hould be observed that the basi8 for this a8sumption is not
indicated.
~A~It would be interesting to know who estimated--let us omit the "con-
eervati velt"--this percentage.
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ignoring it is in itself a repudiation. We do not
ask the descendants of European aliens here to re-
nounce citizenship arising from the jus sanguinie
of European governments and we do not accuse them
. of disloyalty arising out of the fact of dual citi-
zenship or failure to renounce it. Dual citizen-
ship is not dual allegiance and does not create
.di.lo~ty to this nation. It is significant that
Japanese descended persons have done more to shake
off the dual citizenship they never solicited than
have European descended citizens. Since 1924 the
80le method by which an American-born Japanese can
obtain rights to Japanese citizenship is by being
registered within 14 days after birth with a Japa-
, nese consular official.* * * Such registration,
howe¥8r, could not constitute acceptance of Japa-
nese citizenship by an infant who is not sui .1uris
and i8 powerless to prevent the idle act. * * *
It we are to suspect citizen. of disloyalty simply
because the country of their ancestors lOoks upon
them as .entitled to the benefits of citizenship
under its law we must necessarily suspect all
German and Italian descended citizens of disloyalty.
We must also entertain serious doubts about the
101&lty of all of our citizens of foreign stocks,
which means of all our citizens, tor we are all
descended from foreign stocks * * *. All that the
silly suspicion of these people arising out or the
charge ot dual citizenship proves is that there is
a lot of nonsens, in prejudiced Skul18.~24
.
I
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CHAPTER VI
JAPANF.9E LAtVUAGE SCHOO~
Considering the Violence of the attack made against language
schools in recent years, it is curious to discover that in the cam-
paigns for the alien land laws and even the drive for exclusion, little
was said of the l~ge schools. Mr. McClatcny in his skeleton brief
on Japanese immigration and colonization, which was presented by
Senator Hiram Johnson to the Secreta~ of State in 1921, a document ot
143 pages ot fine print, devoted only a third 'ot page 52 and a few
lines on page 53 to the language schools, while the State Board of Con-
trol in its report dismissed the schools in a page and a half. Dr.
Gulick, champion of the Japanese Americans, was moved to protest this'cursory treatment of the subject by the State board, saying: '
"There is no more important approach to the Japanese
problem as' it is and will continue to be through the
decades, than through the school.
"'!be problem of the Japanese language schools is i
apparently being allowed to drift as was the case in
the Hawaiian Islands. A wise policy in regard to
them ia much to be desired--a policy of proper super-
vision and regulation. n8-b
Shortly after the ImDdgration Law ot 1924 went into effect, a
moT_ent to have the Japanese exclusion clause revoked and to have
Japan put under the quota system began to gather m~entUIB. It was be-
ing argued that the quota basis of admission would permit somewhere
between 125 and 185 Japanese to enter the United States annually, that
more than that number .ere coming in under the categorical exceptions
named in the law, and that there was no point in preserving a law that
was obnoxious and insulting to a proud and powerful nation since its
re'V'Ocation would .ean such a negligible Tolume of iJIIDigration. The
question was being considered seriously by an increasingly large pro-
portion of the people.
The California Joint 1mm1gration Commission, whose continued
existence wa~ dedicated to preservation of the exclusion law I set forth
to tighten up its defences and freshen its arguments. The language
schools, heretofore' passed over, were recognized as sUitable material
tor exploitation. Yet at that particular time, there was an embarrass.-
ing obstacle in the way of a wholehearted attack on the Japaneselanguage schools. .
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In 1921 the California Legislature--possibly under the influence
of Dr. Gulick'8 article--bad embelli8hed its 8chooll.w with Section
1534 under the Political Code of California. Under the authority of
thi8 8ection, all foreign language schools were placed wi thin the ju-
risdiction ot the State Department ot Public Instruction. Standards
were established and had to be maintained. All teachers had to paS8
examination8 in Engli8h ~8 well a8 in the foreign tongue U8ed.in the
8chool, and furthermore they had to pass an e~2nation in United
States history. The law ot California regulated the administration ot
the schoo18, decided What textbooks were suitable for the instruction
of American children, and what hours were proper. This law was obvi-
ousl,. a hindrance to any all-out campaign to calumniate the language
schools. The Native Sons of the Golden West, the California American
Legion, the State Grange" Mr. McClatch.r, Mr. Hearst. and State Attorne,.
General U. S. Webb were, tor an interval" frustrated. The body politic"
of Ca11tornia' s Joint Imaigration CoDlDi88ion could 8C&rcel)" launch a
crusade again8t the Japanese language schools so long a8 the8e operated
under the supervision ot California' s State Board of Education. To 8ay
that the language 8chools were subver8ive would be to imPl.Y'til& tm State
Board of Education -:&s 8ubTer8i'Ye too-or at be8t cr1m1nall,. negligent.
Thi8 period ot inaction was not too protracted. Although no one
among California'8 immigrant population was sutficientl)" bothered b,.
the State' 8 8upervision ot foreign language schools to contest the law"
over in Hawaii a Japansse named V. T. Tokuahige contested a similar
law, and" on February 2l, 1927 won hi8 case.25 Ln Nebraska & German
contested a law which placed foreign language schoo18 under State con-
trol. He, too" won his case, and the court ruled:
" * * * evidentl,. the Legislature has attempted to
. interfere with the calling of modern language teachers"
with the opportunitie8 ot pupils to acquire knowledge
and with the power of parents to control their own."2~
On M&,. ~, 1927, California Attorne7 General U. So Webb, on thebasis of the Hawaiian case and quoting from the Nebraska case which had I
involved a German parochial 8chool, delivered an opinion to the effect
that State control of language schools was 1nvalid. On the strength ot
this opinion, legal requirements tor language schools were waived.27
Thi8 arbitrar,. removal of the foreign language schools from State
supervision in Calitornia cleared the field tor a major ottensi ve
again8t the language schools of the Japanese. It immed1atel)" became
teasib1e tor any superpatriot to declare trom the platto~ or through
the press that the Japanese language schools were subversive, anti-
American, unhol,." and that the7 taught &tperor worship. Neither the
8peakers nor their listeners were in a position to prove or disprove
such statements. As was discovered earl,. in World war II, persons in
7000790-46-4 (45)
.. the United States, barring the Japanese themselves, a fair number of
mi88ionaries, and a very few 8cholars and diplOOlats, who knew more of
the Japaneee language than the word "kimono" were not to be found. iSome of the ais8ionaries and scholar8 protested that the assertions of '
the racists were falee, but their voices were not heard above the din
made by the agitators, and the missionaries! word was generally die-
credited because '0 many of them were th6Z8el ve8 conducting language
schools.
At this point it is pertinent to summarize the history of these
language schools. The first Japanese language schools in America were
set up in Christian missions. They were established for two purposes:
first, to help the newly arrived immigrant learn enough English to make
his way in the new country; and second, to help the few children of
that early period, whose parents might take them back to Japan to live
and attend school, to learn to read and write their parents' tongue and
to keep up with school subjects taught in Japan. The first Japanese
immigrants, like many other immigrants, came to America hoping to make
money and expecting to return to their na ti ve land to enjoy the rewards
of their labor. Like other immigrants, once they had established them-
selves, once they perceived their children' s future in America as Amer-
ican citizens to be advantageous, they began to doubt the wisdom of
returning to Japan. It was with the rise of the second generation'
citizen stock that the Issei changed their ideas about going back to
Japan to live.
The first Japanese language school in the United States was
established in 1887 at San Francisco. This school constituted a symbol
of nonsectarian Christian belief among the Japanese immigrant students,
who had organized this mission school as a project of the Japanese
Gospel Society. Two years later a Methodist mission for Japanese
opened a similar school, and other Christian churches followed the
example of these piopeers. It was not until 1899 that a Buddhist mis-
sion, patterned after the Christian, opened a school in San Fran- '
cisco.6-b In Los Angeles the Methodiets were first in the field,
organizing a mis sion and school in 1896. A Presbyterian mission sch&ol
opened in 1902, and in 1904 the Buddhists established a mission and
school.6-c
Invariably these mission schools which had been organized during
the period of mass migrations were used to teach the immigrants Eng-
lish, so that they might make a swifter adjustment to life in the
United States. It was later, as families began to be reunited, ae
nati ve Japanese children were brought to America and as American-born
children reached 8chool age, that classes were introduced which would
help to bridge the gap between the generations, classes to familiarize
the children with the language and culture of their parents.
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,Professor E. K. Strong, of Stanford University, who conducted
one of the most intenei ~ investig.tione of the lite and ways of the
second generation Japanese Americans, wrote in 1934 on the basis of
his findings:
"What are the arguments in favor of the Japanese-
language schools? First, the common language binds
the first and the second generations more closely
'together. 'D11s is important, since the tendency
Ulong all races that have come to America has been
for the second generation to break away fro. the
control of their parents, looking down upon thea as
ignorant of American waY8. * * * A second reason
for the language schooi is that it serves as a uni-
fying social organization in the community.* * * A
third argument for the 8chools is that knowledge of
the Japanese language is of help, in many cases a
necessity, in securing vocational opportunities."
To put it baldly, Japanese American citizens, highl.T educated in
American schoo18 and promi8ed full rights and privileges of American
citizens, could rare17 find employment in the lines of work for which
they were fitted because of the prejudice asainst members of their race.
Therefore, they had to resort to white-collar jobs in Japanese-con-
ducted businesses or professions confined to the little TOk70 of a
larger city. 10 work in importing busine8ses or in little Tbk70s
generally, where they dealt with either Japanese companies or old Iseei
customers, it was necessary for the Nisei to be able to speak, read and
write Japanese.
Arter the language schoo18 had been removed fram State control
and when the feeling against th- was running high, various scholars
investigated and reported on the schools. .A. Stanford University invee-
tigator made the following discovery:
" *' * * although legal requirem~nts were waived after
1927 as a result of the court decision, the local
language school board8 in most instance8 voluntarily
retained the 8tandards and requirements which had been
set. He found that the approved textbooks were being
used and that constant revisions to introduce new
, materials pertinent to the American scene were being
made. "l6-b
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-Another serious investigator of the ear~ thirtie8 reported:
"The strongest objection which has been raised in thi8
country toward the language schools of the Japanese
ba8 been that th-r foster anti-American ideas. Thi8
accusation is without basi8. A thorough study ba8
been made ot aU the textbooks to eradicate such
possibilitie8.-28
H. A. Milli8, a recognized authority on the Japanese American
probl_, wrote in 1932:
" * * * these schools are not intended to perpetuate
the traditions and moral coneept8 ot Japan. They are
suppleaentarT schoo18, and at the worst there is much
less in them to be adversely criticized than in the
pa~chial schools attended by so many children of
South and East EUropean immigrants. "29
The 8harpest criticism of the schools comes from a first gener-
ation Japanese scholar, for -117 'Tears prior to evacuation and current1l'
a professor at Stanford University:
"As a result of * * * studies, observations, and
experiences over a long period, the writer is willing
to vent\U"e the conclusion that generally speaking,
these schools have been unsuccessful in their primary
function-that of imparting a knowledge of the Japa-
nese language to American-born children of Japanese
descent.* * * In support of his conclusion the
writer wishes to present the following observations:
In the first place, the Japanese language scheele
have not escaped the usual tate Qf all attempts at
teaching the foreign language8~it has been impos-
sible to overcome the fundamental obstacle arising
froa environment. The mother tongue of these children
is ~ish, which they use eTery' aODlWlt ot their lite
in work and play except when they are in the class-
room8' ot the language schoo18 and when the" are
ab801utely forced to use Japanese at heme or when
8chool facilities are denied them. '!bey receive
their general education in the public schools, where
their English vocabul~ is easil" built up, but not
their Japane8e vocabulary. The children are consciou8
ot their master" ot Engli8h, and of their detective
knowledge of Japanese; they are intelligent enough
to use the language that they know, and haTe vanity
(48)
,
enough to conceal wba t they are ignorant ot" and thu8
wUl not use the 1anguage ot which they have onl7 a
detecti V8 knowledge. Bilingual success 1s yet to be
at all gen~ achieved. In the 8econd place,
children ot i_i grant race8 generally dislike to use
their parental tongues, concerning which they hear
Onl7 derogatory r8&rk8 trcm their American class-
mate8 and playmates. Their one desire seems to be to
lose their racial" national, or linguistic identitie8,
and to beCC8e an integral part ot the American people
as 80on a8 po8sible. In the third place, while .
8pokeD Japane8e i8 relatively eas7, having no compli-
cated sound8, written Japanese i8 difticult tor ter-
e1gner8 to acquire.* * * Aaerican-born Japanese are
toreigners, and they tind the foreigner's difficulty.
* * * ~ those .who are familiar with a We8tern lan-
guage and with Japane8e" it i8 urmecessarr to stress
the relative difficulty of the two tongue8; the
tor8er is written in simple alphabet. while the
latter _plOY8 cWlber8c.1e Chine8. ideograme. Primary
school children ot Japan are 8Upposed to acquire
.trom 1,,500 to 2,,000 of the8e characters, yet one who
is able to read or write Japanese intelligently must
possess the cnmmand of from 5,,000 to 6,,000 ot them.
Again, Japanese calligraphy is an art which requires
many year8 ot constant practice before one can exe-
cute it acceptably. * * * most .t the America~rn
Ja panese children are not able to attend the language
school long enough to overcome the attendant diffi-
cultie8. !he relative failure ot. the Japane8e
language 8chools in thi8 country to iapart a knowledge
ot that tongue se... but natural; the achievement ot
real 8ucce88 b7 thea is a hope beyond realization. "18-&
'lbe moat telling refutation ot the charges made by the West
Coast racists against the language .chools is to be found in the exten-
live use made of the graduates of these schools by the Ar8T and MaTT in ..
the war against Japan. In the summer of 1942, while the Ni8ei .ere
still being classified automatically as 4~ (reg18trants not acceptable
for military training and 8ervice becau8e of nationality or ancestry)
the War Department relaxed its regulations to the extent ot accepting
qualified Wisei for special a8sigraents. The Intelligence branch of
the United States Army periodically sent recruiting ofticers to the
relocation centers to interview aDd e~i~e candidates. Loyal Ameri-
can citizens of Japancse ancestry were badly needed to teach the
tundamentals of the Japanese language to otticers ot Military Intel-
ligence and also to serve as translator8 and interpreters. The libei"
perhaps the most commonly misunderstood group within the Japanese
(49)
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Aaer1can minority, suspect because they had part or most of their edu-
cation in Japan, and the Nisei graduates of Japanese language schools
in America answered this call and subsequently proved invaluable to the
ar.ed forces of the United States, both as instructors in the language
schools conducted by Military Intelligence for its officers and as
translators and interpreters with the fighting men in the Pacific
Theatre. The Navy, while refusing to induct Americans of Japanese
ancestry as eriristee!, nevertheless used them as ci T11ian instructorsin its language school for intelligence officers at Boulder, Colorado, ,
and later permitted the Marines to borrow Nisei in uniform from the .
, Army- to ease progress through enemy-held territory in the Pacific .30
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DIS'lRIBUTION OF JAPANESE AMERICANS
A t the outbreak ot war between Japan and the Uni ted States, or
shortly thereafter, much attention was given to the tact that Americans
of Japanese ancest~ and their alien parents were most heavi~ conoen~
trated in those areas of the Pacific Coast states which had attracted
the heaviest concentrations of the population as a whole.
Lieutenant General John L. ~Witt, Commanding General ot the
Western Defense CoDmBnd and Fourth A~, in a meDM>randum of Februa~ 14,
1942, addressed to the Secretary of War and recoJllllending the "evacuation
of Japanese and other subversive persons from the Pacific Coast,n31
presented one kind ot thinking on the subject of the distribution of
this small minority group. .
\
"'!he area 1)ring to the west of the Cascade and Sierra Nevada
Mountains in Washington, Oregon and California, is highly
~ crt tical not only because the lines of coumunication and
r supply to the Pacific theater pass through it, but also be-t cause of the vital industrial production therein, parti~r~
aircraft. In the war in whicll we are now engaged racial
affinities are not severed by migration. '!he Japanese race
is an ene~ race and While many second and third generation
Japanese born on united States soil, possessed of United
States citizenship, have be COIlS 'Auerican1zed', the racial
strains are undiluted. To conclude otherwise is to expect
that children born of white parents on Japanese soil sever
all racial affinity and become loyal Japanese subjects,
ready to fight and, if necessary, to die for Japan in a
war against the nation of their parents. 'n1at Japan is
allied with GerDS.rty" and I ta1y in this struggle is no ground
for assuming that any Japanese, barred f'"rom assimilation by
convention as he is, though born and raised in the United
States, will not turn against this nation when the final
test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, follows that along
the vi tal Pacific Coast over 112, 000 potential enemies, of
Japanese extraction, are at large~. Tbere are indica-
tions that these are organized and ready for concerted
action at a favorable opportunity. '!he v~ryfact that no
sabotaRe has taken place to date is a disturbin2 and con-
*Italics not in original. .
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1he Final Report on the Ja}:anes8 evacuation, published under
General DeWitt's signature, magnifies oonsiderably- the hazard to the
ipterna1 securi ~ of the United States whiCh the distribution of the
Japanese population supposedly constituted. 'D1e more: telling paragraJi1sof that report bear a significant resemblance to certain }:aragraphs oon- .
tained in a stateDSnt JZ'esented to the Tolan Committee in the spring of
1942 by California's Attorney General Earl Warren. 7he following para-
graphs are quoted from the former Attorney General's prepared statellSnt
for the record of the Tolan CoDUDittee:
"I do not mean to suggest that it should be thought that all
of these Japanese who are adjacent to strategic ~ints are
knowing }:arties to. some vast conspiracy to destroy our State
by sudden and mass sabotage. Undoubtedly, the presence of
JlS.ny of these persons in their present locations is mere
coincidence, but it would seem equally beyond doubt that the
presence of others is not coincidenc~. It would seem diffi-
cult, for example, to explain the situation in Santa Barbara
County by coinci den ce alone.
"In the northern end of that county is Camp Cook where, I
am informed, the only armored division on the Pacific coast
will be located. 7he only practical entrance to Camp Cook
is on the secondary road through the town of Lompoo. 1he
JlS.ps show this entrance is fianked with Japanese property,
and it is impossible to move a single man or a piece of
equipment in or out of Camp Cook without having it pass.
under the scrutiny- of numerous Japanese. * * * Immediately-
north of Camp Cook is a stretCh of open beaCh idea:lly suited
for landing purposes, exten~ing for 15 or 20 miles, on
which almost the only inhabitants are Japanese.
,t '!hroUghOU t the Santa }laria Valley and including the ci ties
of Santa Marla and Guadalupe every utility, airfield, bridge,
telephone, and power line or other facility of importance
is flanked by Japanese, and they even surround the oil
fields in this area. Only a few miles south, however, is
the Santa Ynez Valley, an area equally as productive agri-
cul turally as the Santa Varia Valley and wi th lands equally
available for purchase and lease, u~t without any strategic
installations whatsoever. '!here are no Japanese in the
Santa Ynez Valley.
"Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County
from Gaviota south, the entire plain, though naITow, is
subject to intensj.ve cultivation. Yet the only Japanese in
this area are located iuunediately adjacent to such widely
separated points as the El Capitan oil field, Elwood oil
(52)
rfield, Sunmerland oil field, Santa Barbara A.i.rport, and
Santa Barbara Lighthou8e and Harbor entrance, and there
are no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between
Il these points.
, "Such a distribution of. the Japanese p>pulation appears.
i to uanifest souething more than coincidence. But in any
case, it is certainly evident that the Japanese population
of California is, as a whole, ideally si tua ted with refer-
ence to points of strategic importance, to carry into
execution a treDSndous program of sabotage on a 1I8S8 scale
should any considerable number of them have been inclinedto do so."13-a .
Here are the paragraJils from General DeWitt's Final Report:
"It coUld not be established, of course, that the location
of thousands of Japanese adjacent to strategic points veri-
fied the existence of some vast conspiracy to WhiCh all of
them were parties. Some of them doubtless resided there
through mere coincidence. It seemed equally beyond doubt,
however, that the presence of others was not mere coinci-
dence. It was difficult to explain the situation i~ Santa
Barbara County, for example, Qy coincidence alone.
"'lhroughout the santa Maria Valley in that County, includ-
ing the cities of Santa Varia and Guadalupe, every utility,
air field, bridge, telephone and power line or other facil-
i ty of importance was flanked by Japanese. '!hey even
surrounded the oil fields in this area. Only a few miles
south, however, in the Santa Ynez Valley, lay an area
equally available for purchase and lease, but without any
strategic installations whatever. '!here were no Jajanese
in the Santa Ynez Valley.
"Similarly, along the coastal plain of Santa Barbara County
from Gaviota south, the entire plain, though narrow, had
been subject to intensive cultivation. Yet, the only Japa-
nese in this area were located immediately adjacent to such
widely separated points as the El Capitan Oil Field, Elwood
Oil Field, Summer1a.rxl Oil Field, Santa Barbara air port and
Santa Barbara lighthouse and harbor entrance. '!here were
no Japanese on the equally attractive lands between these
points. In the north end of the county is a stretch of
open beach ideally suited for 1a.nding purposes, extending
for 15 or 20 miles, on which almost the only inhabitants
'were Japanese.
(53)
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."Such a distribution of the Ja{anese population appeared to
manifest something more than coincidence. In any case, it
was certainly evident that the Japanese popllation of the
Pacif1 c Coast was, as a Whole ideally si tua ted with refer-
ence to points of s~rategic importance, to carry into execu-
tion a tre~ndous program of sabotage on a mass scale should
any considerable number of them have been inclined to do so."
In vieW of the cl1arges implicit in these {aragraphs, the strong
insinuation that there was something deliberate and sinister in the
distribution and concentration of the Japanese population, it is rele-
vant to present some of the facts behind the distribution and concentra-
tion of the Japanese Ausricans. To begin with, we can borrow a conven-
ient table from General DeWitt's report, compiled from 1940 census
fignres and showing the exact number of Japanese in each State contained
within the Western Defense Command.
JAPANESE POPULATION OF mE WESTERN DEmSE COMlAAND AREA
BY STA~S AND YI!!!~RY AREAS: --~~~~ _..~..
All Mili tarT Military Mili tarT
S TA'IE Areas Area Area Area
1 2 5-6-
~TAL WOO AREA 117.564 107.704 5.281 4.379
Arizona 632 362 270 Calif rnia 93,717 89,485 4,254 Oregon 4,071 3,845 28Washingto  14,565 14,016 549 . Id ho. . . . . . . . ,191 . . . . . . . . . . . 1,191
Montana 508 508
Nevada 470 470
Utah. .. . . . . . .'. 2.210 . . . . . . . . . . . 2.210
Interpreting these statistics, the DeWitt report contains the
fo11o1ring:
.. * * * It will be noted that the strategically important
Mili tary Area No.1 fihe coastal half of the three Pacific
Coast States and the southern portion of Arizo~7 had a
total Japanese population of 107,704, which was 84.6 percent
of the total Japanese population of the United States.
"Wi thin Military Area No.1 there were parti cularly heavy
concentrations in or at the edge of almost all the impor-
tan.t cl. ties, particularly the JX>rt cities * * *. In Los
Angeles County alone there were 36,866 Japanese. In the
iJrBnediate San Francisco Bay Area (San Francisco, Alameda,
(54)
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Contra Costa, Marin, Napa, San Mateo, Solano, and Sonoma
Counties) there were 14,362 Japanese, and in the ring of
nearby counties to the northeast, east and south (Sacra-
mento, Santa Clara, Santa Cruz, San Joaquin, and Yolo I
Counties) lived an additional 17,685 Japanese. San Diego
city and county had 2,076; King and Pierce Counties,
Washington (Seattle and Tacoma), 11,913; and ~ultnomah
County, Oregon (Portland), 2,390. Thus even within
Military Area No.1, 67,607 of the 107,704 total Japanese
population lived in or near 'tIbe five.. principal cities and
ports of embarkation."
'nle carefully considered explanatioo of the preevacuation distri-
bution and concentration of the Japanese offered by the Tblan Committee
in its Findings and H9commendations ~ Evacuation of Ene~ Aliens and
Others from Prohibited _ili tary ZOnes did not appear until May of 1942,
sone weeks after General DeWitt'had ordered the mass evacuation of all
persons of Japanese ancestry !'rom Military Area No.1.
"Limi ted occupational outlets have discouraged dispersion
of the Japanese from their initial ports of entry on the
west coast. Indeed concentration has become increasinglr
mart<.ed. '!he percen.tages of Japanese 11 ving in the Pacific
States, beginning with 1900 and for each lo-year period
thereafter are as follows: 75.1, 80.0~ 84.2, 86.6, and 88.5.
* * * '!he newly-arrived immigrants found a demand for their
labor in rai1roa~ construction and maintenance and in su~
beet work in the Mountain States. These sources of employ-
ment gradually disappeared as Mexicans and other groups
gained preference. 'nle Mountain States contained 2l percent
of the Japanese population in 1900 and only 6.8 percent in
1940 (though in absolute numbers these States now contain
more Japanese). 'nle withdrawal of the Japanese is strikingly
evident in Montana, where the number declined from 2,441 in
1900 to 508 in 1940. Except for the South A tlanti c di vision~
which contains. a very small Japanese population, all geo-
graphic divisions have shown de'creases between 1930 and 1940.
As compared with the national decrease of 8.6 percent in the
Japanese population jthe total Japanese population reached
its highest figure in 1930 with 138,834; by 1940 it had
decreased by 11,887, leaving only 126,947 in the continental
Uni ted State~ the Pacific States show a decrease of 6.6
percent, and the MOuntain States, 25 percent. Utah has lost
almost one-third. California lost least among the Pacific
Sta tes, 3.8 percent. 'nle corresponding figures for Washing-
t'on and Oregon are 18.3 percent and 17.9 percent.,,13-b
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.In view of the fact that a widespread public opinion had con-
victed the Japanese of establishing themselves in close proximity to
strategic points, particularly air fields, power lines, military instal-
lations and oil fields, with espionage their objective, the finding of
the Tolan Committee with regard to this serious charge is of consider-
able interest and significance:
"~~ ftJlai~ _2~g~~~~g--~~;~~.&g:.o1J~~~~~. ~~~~ti~~:!:QJrnia was pretty well fixed by 191Q.." c
Percentages quoted by the Tolan Comm1. ttee show clearly how truethis stateJlSnt was: .
"'!he 7 counties, Los Angeles, Sacramento, San Francisco,
Ala~da, Fresno, San Joaquin, and Santa Clara in 1940 con-
tained 67,157 or 71.64 percent of the State's Japanese
~pulation. In 1910 these counties contained 65.97 percent;
in 1920,67.49 percent; and in 1950,71.22 percent * * *.
This tendency toward geographic concentration is further
evident within individual States, indicating that the main
sources -of livelihood for the Japanese are to be found
, among their own people * * *. In 1910, 2 counties in
! California contained no Japanese; in 1940 there were 11
1 such counties. I.15-b
PERCEN TAGE OF CALIFORNIA'S JAPANFSE POPULA TION FOUND IN 7 LEADING
COUNTrES. IN 191~ -~~ IN 1940_13-c ,nAn ~
CO~ 'lY 1910 194~
Sacramento 9.57 ~ 7.22
Alansda. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7.9 . . . ~ .. . . . . . . .. 5.51
Fresno 5.4 4.85
San Joaquin 4.56 4.78
Santa Clara 5.56 4.52pan Francis o. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10.9 ~ . .. 5.65*
Los An e les . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..20.46. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 . 34
*percentages for San Francisco having been omitted from the paragraph of
the Tolan CoJTlJ1ittee Report which supplied the percentages for the 6
other counties, the San Francisco percentages were worked out for this
table from figures found in Table 6, p. 96 and Table 7, p. 97 of the
report.
Los Angeles County was the only one to show a gain in percent
during the SO-year period. That gain is approximately 100 percent, and
*Italics added.
(56)
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.on the face of the matter seems spectacular. However, it should be
~membered that the 2!neral growth of population in Los Angeles city and
county for the period between 1910 and 1940 was extraor~\nary. It was.
after 1910 that the harbor at Wilmington was developed to accommodate
large craft and to make it an important seaport for transoceanic trade.
It was early in that 3D-year period that 'World War I brought great ship-
yards to the harbor area and also an influx of defense workers, most of
whom elected to stay on after the war. It was after 1910 that the mov-
ing picture industry emerged from its embryo stage and Hollywood, wi thin
the city limits of Los Angeles, was transformed from countryside, sup-
porting s~all citrus groves and farms, to the capital of the film
industry. In order to see the growth of the Japanese population in
Los Angeles city and county in perspective, it is necessary to consider
it in relation to the over-all growth of population in that area; and
then to compare the over-all growth and the growth of the Japanese
population in ,that area with state-wide figures. lftee table on next
page.J
.
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-'!he table shows that in 1940 Los Angeles County alone had more
people than had in 1910 lived in the entire state of California. In
that 50-year period of 1910 to 1940 California had increased in popula-
tion 290 percent, but Los Angeles County had increased 552 percent. The
Japanese increase lagged behind the general increase with respect to
both state and county, being but 226 percent for the former and 455
percent for the latter. Whereas 40 percent of California's entire popu-
lation had settled in Los Angeles County by 1940, 39 percent of Califor-
nia's Japanese had settled in that county. However, whereas 55 percent
of the general populatton of Los Angeles Cotmty lived within the city of
Los Angeles, 60 percent of the county's Japanese population lived within
the city limits. Seen in relation to over-all population increases and
shifts, the growth of the Los Angeles Japanese colony falls into proper
perspective and loses the sinister appearance it had when seen in isola-
tion from the total picture. .
mne Tolan report sugges ted:
"'!he Japanese, as a whole, have become increasingly urbanized
in keeping with the general population trend. About 55 percent
of the Japanese now live in cities of 2,500 or rore, as com-
pared with 56.5 percent of the general population. '!he pattern
differs, however, for individual States. In Washington, the
Japanese are most highly urbanized (60.4 percent as compared
wi th 55.1 percent fo r the state I s total po pula t.i. on; this pro-
portion has declined somewhat since 1910).. Oregon also shows
a decline. In California the Japanese are much less urbanized
than the general population, 56 percent as compared with 71
percent. '!he trend of the Japanese toward the cities is pro-
nounced in California; this reflects in part the increasing
general urbanization of the State.,,15-c
Remembering that it was found by the committee that the geograPhicpattern of the Japanese in California was "pretty well fixed bY' 1910, II
it is pertinent to mention that in 1910 the person who had seen an air-
plane, let alone an airfield, was a rarity, that utilities were few and
far between, that the vast oil resources of Calif"ornia were largely
undiscovered, and that the placement of mi1ita~ installations on the
coast in any oonsptcuous number was a dream cherished only by the Native
Sons of the Golden West* and a few militarists. It was not a question
of the Japanese stealthily moving in on strategic installations, air-
fields, oil fields, and power plants, but of these modern phenomena
roving in on Japanese who had by 1941 been cultivating their land,
establishing their homes, rearing and educating their children, paying
.
*See '!he Grizz~ Bear, official organ of the N.S.G.W., May 1907, p. 19,
and August 1907, p. 8.
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their taxes and attending to their own business, the great majority of
them, "for u~ard of 30 years.
Since, by the spring of 1942, it was generally accepted that there
was a peculiar significance attaching to the concentration of the Ja~-
nese A~r1cans near key" points on the West Coast, it is appropriate to
investigate the question of how these ooncentrations came into being, of
what led the newcomers to these shores to the particular areas where
their presence many years later was to alarm General DeWitt, the West
Coast Dele~tion, and the component parts of the California Joint Immi-
gration Conmission.
In 1908 and 1909 the United States IDmigration Colmnission sent
its agents into the Western States to make a thorQugh investigation of
immigrants in agriculture, industry, city employments and business. The
reports made by these agents filled three substantial volumes and pro-
vide reliable information on the distribution of the immigrant genera-
tion of various races and nationalities found in the West at that time.
San Fran cis 00 was the first area of concentration of the Japanese
immigrants for the simple reason that it was at first the only Pacific
Coast port having direct steamship lines to and from the Orient. Be-
cause of that circwmstance, Japanese immigrants entered the United
States through the Golden" Gate. Even after Portland and Seattle opened
direct lines with the Orient, the majority of Japanese continued to land
at San Francisco. In 1910 the Immigration Commission reported that from
San Francisco
" * * .. IOOre Japanese laborers have been sent out. by contrac-
tors to work in various employments than from any other' place.
Because of its position in this respect, San Francisco has
'always had the largest Jay::anese population, the largest amount
of business conducted by members of that race and the largest
number of them employed as wage-earners of all the cities of
the West. * * * More recen~, with the further immigration
of ~borers discontinued, the strong agitation against them
in San Francisco, and a gradually diminishing number in the
Uni ted States, the number of Japanese has decreased. n6-d
In November of 1909 the Japanese population of San Francisco was
estimated at 8,746, of whom 6,958 were adult males, 1,187 adult females,
and 621 children under 16 years of age. The number varied from season
to season because 1,500 or more fanned out from San Francisco during the
spring and summer to work in agriculture or canneries. During the first
decade of the century San Francisco Japanese were recruited in fairly
large numbers to work during summer months in Alaska as fish packers.
In 1909,1,119 were taken to Alaska.6-o
(60)
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Maintenance work on railroads, unski~ed labor in factories and .
hand labor in the fields have always been the portion of the mass of new
immigrants. Foreigners with little if a~ knowledge of the language of
the new country, of its wage system or of its customs and practices have
commonly been underpaid and exploited in their .arly years in America.
Newcomers with only a few dollars in their poclcets'were obliged to take
what work they could find and to accept ~hatgyer wages were offered. As
they learned the ways of America, they could, if their services were in
demand and if they.had any talent for organizing their group, force
wages u~ard and shorten working hours.
Whatever the nationality of the most ~cently arrived group of
workers, these newly arrived immigrants have been condemned for under-
bidding on wages. In the early days of California, the Chinese immi-
grants who then performed most of the menial and hard labor, were
bitterly attaclced by labor unions and by unorganized white labor for
working for less than prevailing wages. When exclusion stopped the
influx of Chinese and the resident Chinese were shifting from the
migratory labor class to the tenant farmer class, tl1e need for hand
labor exceeded the number of Chinese workers available; when the supp~
was less than the demand,' the wages paid the remaining Chinese laborers
neared the level of those paid white farm laborers and section hands.
Italians, Greeks, Armenians, Austrians, Germans and Russians have
appeared and disappeared on the railroads, beet fields and fruit farms.
As the Chinese were beginning to vanish from the scene, the Japanese.
began to appear upon it, and as .had the longer-established foreign
groups, the Japanese took over the only work available to them, accept-
ing the low wages offered.
As the Immigration Commission agents repeated again and again in
the course of their reports, the Japanese iImnigrants were almost com-
pletely unfamiliar with any wage system, the great majority of them
haying been independent farmers or small business men--or boys helping
their fathers--in their native country. In general, only those Japanese
who came to the continental United States from Hawaiian sugar plantations
had had any experience in working for wages. A working day of 11 or 12
hours on the railroads, in the beet fields or in canneries, with a flat
wage of $1 a day was the first working experience of most Japanese in
the United States. At the same time, the more experienced immigrants
from other lands were making anywhere from $1.10 to $1.50 or even $1.65
for similar work. Whatever the baclcground of the worker or his monetary
reward, this type of work was back-breaking, the hours unthinkable, and
the condition of life migratory, offering the worker no possibility of
fami~ life so long as he remained in such employment.
Ear:J,z Japanese Railroad Laborers
In 1909 when the Commission made its investigation, the
Gentlemen Is Agreement had been opera ti ve for a year, and already,
700079 0-46,.--~ ( 61)
Iwithout a new crop of immigrants, the number of Japanese employed on
railrOads was dwin~ing. In 1906 Japanese employment with railroads
reached its peak, there having been in excess of 8,000 working for
various companies in that year. By 1909 employment rolls showed
between 6,500 and 7,000. 'lhe Commission agents reported:
"'!he decrease is explained largely by the desire of the
Ja}:s.nese to find more remunerative and more agreeable
employment. 'B1is they have sought in agriculture and the
ci ty trades. Though their wages have been increased in
some instances this has not been effective in preventing
the movement indicated."
Tbe Japanese began work on the railroads at a lower wage than was
paid at that time to any other group--except in some instances to the
Chinese. With the withdrawal of many other workers from railway mainte-
nance work during the prosperous years of the 'nineties, wages paid
Japanese increased, rising in one instance to $1.55 per day. Their
wages were usually less than those paid any other race "except the
Mexican, by whom alone they have been displaced to any extent," the
investigators of 1909 discovered.
Superintendents of the railway companies fell into one of two
categories: those who preferred Japanese laborars to those of other
na tionali ty, and those who objected strongly to the Japanese and
employed them on~ if no other workers were available. Both types
stated clearly the reasons for their attitudes. The former preferr~d
the Japanese because they "need less watching to prevent them from
I soldiering'; they are very peaceable and tractable, while the Italians
and Greeks are not; the Japanese camps are free from disturbance, while
the Italian and Greek camps are scenes of frequent fights; and the Japa-
nese are the IrM:>s:t adaptable of all the races now employed." Compared
with Greeks and Austrians, the Japanese were, in the eyes of the pro-,
Japanese railway superintendents: "more progressive and adaptable,
require less supervision, and are more tractable * * *. They learn more
quid<~ than any other race now employed; they are sober, tractable, and
industrious. "S-g Tbe other school of thought gave reasons that were
indubi tably cogent with the employer: one employer had discharged Japa-
nese be cause they were "JOOre diffi. cult to satisfy" than the other groups.
Those on southern or southwestern railroads who had been able to get
Mexicans preferred those to the Japanese because "the Japanese want too
much, are likely to make organized demands. The Mexicans, on the other
hand, are easi~ satisfied, and there is no fear of concerted action by
them. ,,6-h
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.Work in the Sue:ar-Beet Fields
Many of the Japanese iDlDigrants first worked for wages in the
sugar-beet fields of California. 'n1e industry dated from the 'seventies,
the first pernanent beet-sugar factory having been built at Alvarado in
1872. From the beginning, the De~rtment of Agriculture took a scien-
tific interest in the experiments with sugar-beet culture, and in 1897
new duties, levied by the 1ariff on imported sugar gave impetus to do~s-
tic sugar production. In 1908 there we're vast areas in the State of
California 'devoted to sugar-beets, and there were eight permanent
factories, scattered from the Sacramento Valley in the north to Ventura
County in the south.
Originally the work in both fields and factories was performed by
Chinese. After a time, the Chinese were 'ejected from the factories by
whi te labor, but tiley remained in the handwork of the fields until
exclusion, after which they were gradually replaced by other races,
principally the Japanese. In 1909 between 6,000 and 7,000 Japanese
workers were employed in the beet fields of California. Of these "fully
4,500 were Japanese, about 1,000 were Mexicans, probably 600 East
Indians and the remainder members of miscellaneous races, including some
Germn-Russians and Portuguese and a few Chinese." Mexicans were at
tha t time recent additions to the beet-sugar labor supply, and their
presence was accounted for "chiefly by an extraordinary denand for labor
or by the desire of employers to secure competition against the Japanese."
The Mexicans were rarely found outside the southern California districts.
At that time wages were higher in the beet fields than on rail-
roads, and consequently railroad section hands te.ded to desert the
railroads for the duration of the beet season. In general, work in the
beet fields, though dirty, uncomfortable and hard, offered more incen-
ti ve to the ambitious worker. Nornally, in these years &8 curren\ly,
the beet field worker was paid on a piece basis, and he could work as
long as he wished each day. The Japanese earn~d the highest average of
wages, more than half of them earning between $1.75 and $2 per day,
while .57..4 percent earned more, as agaipst 7.5 percent who earned 1:ess.
In all 91.4 percent earned between $1.75 and $5 per day. 'n1e Commission
agent had this -ro say of the superior earnings of the Japanese:
" * * * account must be taken of the fact that the Japanese
commonly work longer, hours than either the East Indians or
the Mexicans. '!he Japanese, moreover, are quicker workmen
and capable of closer and more continuous application than
the other races. Their greater desire to adopt American
svandards of life and especially their greater eagerness to
become independent farmers and business men, go far toward
explaining their greater industry.,,6-j
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In this field of labor as in others, while the Japanese began at
a lower-than-average wage, they were quick to realize that they were
, essential to the industry, and to make organized demands for increased
wages. Their employers in some instances praised them for "their indus-
try, quickness, steadiness, sobriety, cleanliness, adaptability, and
eagerness to learn American ways and customs," and in others condemned
them heartily and somewhat ingenuously for "the pursuit of their own
interests regardless of the cost to their employers." "In short," as
the Commission writer commented, "the Japanese are accused of the
tactics pursued by other mnopolists; that is, of local price cutting to '
repress competition, and of exorbitant increases in price when, for the
ti~ being, competition is impossible. "6-k
Investiga tion of 6 beet-growing districts showed that of an
aggregate of 854 growers under contract in 1909, controlling in all
41,746 acres, 106 growers were of alien race. Of the 106 aliens, 74
growers were Japanese, all of whom had acquired land, Chiefly on a
share basis, wi thin the years between 1904 and 1909; 17 were Chinese
and 15 Mexican. No East Indians had taken to independent farming.
Companies or large scale private owners were willing and indeed eager
to have the Japanese become tenant farmers, as suCh tenants relieved the
owner of the responsibility of procuring the labor. White farmers found
it difficult to compete with Japanese farmers for Japanese seasonal
laborers. Even though there was no difference in wages paid by the two
classes of farmers, Japanese laborers preferred to work for members of
their own race ~ who understood them and treated them with courtesy and
consideration. -1
~se _in ~he Hop Fi~~
Hop culture, the third major source of livelihood for newly
arrived Japanese immigrants, was introduced in California and Oregon in
the late' fifties, and its increase in importance was very rapid. In
1900 California produced 20.6 percent of the national crop and Oregon
29.8 ~rcent. Hop farms are found in well defined areas: in Oregon, the
Willamette Valley from Albany to north of Salem; in California, the
lowlands along the Sacramento and American Rivers, in Sonoma County and
in Yuba County near Wheatland.
'1he handwork of caring for the growing crop, pruning, stringing
and training the vines, was never performed to aQy extent by white men.
In most districts Indians were first used, then Chinese, and toward the
end of the nineteenth century the Japanese. The investigators of 1909
learned that Japanese had just begun to find their way into the hop
fields of Oregon, and were used substantially only near Salem, where 200
were found, a few of whom had become farmers in their own right. In
California, on the other hand, the Japanese "practically monopolized the
hand work and the picking," and on some farms they did the plowing and
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cultivating as well. Along the American River, the- Japanese had estab-
lished themselves as growers, and it was estimated that in this district
the Japanese controlled the production of 35 percent of the total output
of hops. 6-~
Wages for picking hops were--and are--on the piece basis. In
1909 it was learned that the Japanese earned the highest wages paid to
any race. About a third earned between $3 and $4 a day, about an eighth
of them earned lOOre. than $4 a day, and only one-fifth were found to be
earning less than $2 a day. Only five members of other groups were
found who earned $3 or lOOre a day, and half of the non-Japanese picker~
earned less than $2. The Commission report suggests in explanation:
"Much of this apparent superiority of the Japanese is due
to their ability and willingness to work intensively for
longer hours than dD the whites. They are in the hop
fields primarily. to make money and are not lured from work
by the social attractions which appeal to the whites who
com from the cities for a money-making vacation."6-m
From the three basic fields of employment, railroads, sugar-beet
culture and hop culture, the Japanese immigrants found their way into
seasonal work in deciduous and citrus fnlit, vineyards, berries, and
vegetable fams. In every section of the Pacific Coast where the Japa-
nese were found in a~ number, reports of the Immigration Co~ssion
show that the Japanese replaced the Chinese, beginning at a low wage,
that they soon became dominant in the labor supply and necessary to the
farm owners--a t which point, the Japanese made timely, organized demands
for higher wages and better working conditions.
"1hOUgh, so far as kno1fn, no union has been organized by
them, concerted effort, occasional strikes, and regard for
one another' s 'jobs' have become almost as characteristic
of the JaJanese laborers as of a 'trade union," reported
the Immigration Commission's investigators in 1909.6-n
From MiRra tory ~~o~er to Independe~nt ~~r
There was a common pattern of procedure for the average Japanese
migratory worker tD follow. He began life in America as a seasonal
worker; after a year or two, he remained in a vicinity where he had
worked in the harvest, retained by some farmer to prune and care ~or the
farm or orchard throughout the year; his next step was to operate an
orchard or farm for a share of the crop; the next was the payment of
cash rent; the goal was ownership of land. IVhereas men who had passed
to the stage where they could pay cash rent often paid higher rent than
the owner could h~ve extracted from members of other races, the Japanese
who had not yet lifted themselves from the wage-earning class were
- (65)
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willing, for the sake of getting a lease on land, to clear stumpage
after the lumbermen had felled timber, to clear brush from unreclaimed
land, or to drain swamps, for in return for the general improvement of
such lands, a man could often get land for a year or two wi thout paying
actual rent except in toil. He cleared "a SI!1&11 area and planted it,
cleared a little more and planted that section, and qy the tlme ,he
began to pay cash rent, he had harvested two or three crops. In
Washington and Oregon, Japanese tenants of the early days commo~
acquired the use of land in return for clearing it of stumrage. In
California in the delta of the San Joaquin and Sacramento Rivers, in
(PlAcer County, in the Vaca Valley, and in the San Joaquin Valley they
reclaimed much land and brought it to bearing. In the Florin area of
the lower Sacramento Valley they converted hay land into berry farms
and vineyards. Colonel John P. Irish* in 1921 paid tribute to the
contribution made by Japanese farmers to the development of California
lands:
"What influenced the two hundred and twenty-two thousand
California voters to vote against the anti-Japanese -
initiative? L:The initiative alien land act of 1920~1 The
truth was what they ~d seen, their experience and contact
with the few Japanese who are here. They had seen the
Japanese convert the barren land l~e that at Florin and
Livingston, into productive and profitable fields, orchards
and vineyards, by the persistence and intellig~nce of their
indust~. They had seen the hard pan and goose lands in the
Sacramento Valley, gray and black with our two destructive
alkalis, lie; cursed wi th barrenness like the fig tree of
Bethany, and not worth paying taxes on, until Ikuta, the
Japanese, decided that those lands would raise rice. After
years of persistent toil, enduring heart-breaking losses
and disappointments, he conquered that rebe+1ious'soil and
raised the first commercial crop of rice in California. Due
to the work of that great Japanese pioneer this state now
has a rice crop worth sixty IlI1llion dollars a year, and the
land that he found worthless now sells for two hun~ed dollars
per acre.
"Or these voters had seen the repulsive 'hog wallow' lands
in the thermal belt of the west slope of the Sierra, avoided
*An editorial note attached to the article quoted above identified Col.
Irish as follows: "President of Dir.ectors of the State Industrial Home
for the Adult Blind. for 30 years; Director for 35 years of the State
Development Board, an organization devoted to the material development
of the State'; President of the California Delta Association, represent-
. ing 250,000 acres of marsh land reclaimed by the skill and industry of
the Japanese.,,32
(66) .
by white men, so unproductive and forbidding that tlley defaced
the scenery, reclaimed by the genius and toil of the Japanese
Sakamoto, and now transformed into beautiful vineyards and
ci trus orChards from Seville to Lemon Cove. They had seen
\ that 70 percent of the total seventy-four thousand acres owned
by JaISnese, was these lands that disfigured the state until
they had been reclaimed by JaJ8nese genius and industry. "S2-a
Of the Japanese in the rural parts of ~s Angeles Coun.ty, the
Immigration Commission agents reported in 1910:
" * * * the Japanese have taken up for the greater part land
r . theretofore not used unless for producing hay. 'lhis land
they have improved and brought to a high state of cultiva-
tion * * *. It appears, too, that the Japanese, beginning
early in the decade as berry growers and frequently beginning
later on at other places, have taken up truck gardening after
the fall in the price of strawberries or as the rotation of
crops beca.~ necessary.n6-o
Because of the large amount of land held for speculative plrposes
by nonresident owners in regions close to the city of Los Angeles, the
Japanese did not at the time of the above investigation own as mucll land
as in other areas. These speculative tracts were held in expectation of
the boom assured by the rapid increase in population. In the interval
of waiting, agents leased large tracts, installed an irrigation system
and then sublet the land at a higher rent, charging extra for water
used, and made considerable profit. Land held in this way "naturally
passed into the hands of a migratory class who are willing to 'squat'
for a ti~ and live under the simplest conditions and with the fewest
conveniences.,,6-p
The Japanese farmers of Los Angeles County, in this first decade
of the country, like the rural Japanese found elsewhere on the Pacific
Coast, had come to Ansl;"ica as very young men. The najority of them had
been well under SO, and those who had passed their thirtieth year were
usually men who bad emigrated first to Hawaii and spent some years there
before continuing to the continental United States. Most of the men
came to the Un! ted States in hopes of economic advance~nt and had ve~
little money when they arrived. Yore than two-thirds of them had lessthan $100 to their names. . Begirming as ranch hands, section hands or
~ouseboys--if they wished to attend school--they had progressed within a
few years of their arrival to the status of independent farmers.
The- investigators of 1909 found that JOOst of the Japanese farmers
in this county had decided to renain permanently in the United States,
and that those who had not already brought their wives to America were
planj-nng to send for them in the near fu 'b.1re. 'nte Japanese who had had
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bad ludt with crops and lost their inves~nts or had been obliged to go
back into the labor ~g after having ~merged from it were the ones who
were .uncertain about staying pennanently in the United States. 'D1e
geographic pattern had been established in Los Angeles County; after
that year, 1909, the increase was in terms of wives j9ining husbands in
accordance with the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement and of natural
increase of American-born children.
Imperial Valley, in the southeastern corner of the State of
California, was not opened to settlement until 1901. It received
Japanese among its first pioneers. At that titre settlers did not have
absolute title to their land, and the Japanese, being aliens, could not
file on land or buy up relinquishments. Thus, until there were citizen
children in whose name title could be taken, the Japanese leased from
resident owners. The entry of the first Japanese to Imperial Valley
was unique in that the first three members of that race, who went in in
1904, went not as laborers but for the express purpose of leasing land.
A few months later, more of their count~en appeared, and these too
leased farms.
By 1909 there were about 200 Japanese permanently located on
leased land. Origina~ producing barley or vegetables, the Japanese
were among the experimenters who first set out cantaloupes, in 1906.
In 1909 Japanese farmers ventured into cotton production, pioneering
in that crop. Because the first Planting of cantaloupes was profitable,
1907 found 1,200 acres planted. This crop, too, was very profitable_.
In 1908 many other farmers turned to cantaloupe growing, with the result
that 10,000 acres were Planted. This mammoth crop put too great a
strain on the uarketing system then in use, and many farmers lost both
their money and their enthusiasm for cantaloupes. ~ 1909 the acreage
planted with cantaloupes had decreased to 5,000. As the Commission
agents reported: "It was notably the white ranchers who abandoned the
industry, for in 1909 approximately one-half of the acreage devoted to
can taloupe growing was land leased by the Japanese." It was these
Japane.3e growers who first brought in laborers of their own race during
the pidting" grading and iBdting season which ran through June and July,
and in 1909 they were requiring 400 seasonal wo rkers for their canta-
loupe acreage alone. All told, Japanese at that time leased 2,500 acres
of farm land in the valley., practically all from resident farmers.
Aside from producing about half of the valley's ~taloupe crop, the
Japanese grew nearly all miscellaneous vegetables. The white farmers
were not interested in intensive farming With its requirement of heavy,
tedious stoop labor to be performed beneath a broiling sun; they
preferred dairying and hay production.6-r
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Concen~rations of Japanese in Ma.1or Cities
o;fthe West Coast
San Francisco
As the oldest substantial community of Japanese in the United
States, the San Francisco Japanese colony of 1909 has special interest.
Al though San Francisco at that time contained the largest segment of the
Japanese population of the West Coast, the number was found to be de-
creasing--and thus the findings of the Immigration Commission once again
affirm the corr~ctness of the Tolan Committee statement that the geo-
graphic pattern of distribution of the Japanese was "pretty well ~et"
by 1910.
'Dle Comnission agents found in 1909 tha t there were in San Fran-
cisco 482 Japanese business establishments, whiCh employed between 1,800
and 2,000 persons. The establishments were varied: book, curio and art,
drug, fruit and vegetable, importing and exporting, meat and fish,
grocery, "sake," watch and jewelry, bamboo fumi ture, magazines, news-
papers, photograph galleries, rice mills, shoe repair shops, "tofu"
(bean curd) factories, tailors and dressmakers, cleaners and dyers,
barber shops, bath houses, hotels and boarding houses, laundries,
lodging houses, restaurants with Japanese meals and restaurants with
American mealsl banks, pool halls, and shooting galleries.6-s
Investigation of these early businesses produced some interesting
fac~al information that has commonly been disregarded in most consider-
ation of the Japanese question then and since:
1. MOst of the Japanese businesses were conducted on a small
scale.
2. Ja panese were employed almost exclusively in these estab-
lishments.
3. Opposition encountered by the Japanese in some branChes I
of business had made progress slow or had, in a number of
instances, frozen out the Japanese altogether. At that
time, 1909, for instance, the city licensing bureau refused.
Japanese proprietors permits to operate steam laundries.
Hence all Japanese laundries were forced to remain in the
hand-laundry class.
4. Except in restaurants serving American meals, shoe repair
shops and laundries, the competition with white business
was of little importance.
,!;:;j~
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5. The majority of business establishments conducted by
Japanese w~re patronized exclusively or principally
by the members of tha trace.
6. Most of the wants of the Japanese minority were pro-
vided for by Japanese establishments and professional
men; the shops and services were established in answer
to a real need resulting from unwillingness of white
establishments to serve members of another race.6-t
Here as in the rural areas, 1t was discovered that very few of
the JaJ:e,nese immigrants had been. wage earners in Japan. The older men
had been in business for themselves, while the many very young men and
boys had been in school up to the time of emigrating to the United
States--or in so~ cases they had simply helped their fathers in, the
family business. The great majority of Japanese city dwellers in
America, had been city dwellers before theyemigrated.6-u
In 1909 there were about two thousand Japanese women in San Fran-
cisco, most of whom had reached the United States after 1902. Very few
had corne with their husbands; it had been necessa~ for most wives to
wai t until their husbands had established thernsel ves in business in the
new country. Those married couples who had reached San Francisco to-
gether had usually not come directly from Japan but had migrated from
Hawaii to California. Generally speaking, a' ns.n could not maintain
family life in an American city unless he had the ability to establish
himself in independent business. As a business man, he could maintain
a house or an apartment suitable for family living. As a wage earner,
he lived under .conditi ons that would not permit family life. It was
customa~ for the Japanese employer to shelter and feed his workers
within his own house; if the employer were not able to do this, the
employees conducted a cooperative household of 4 to 8 or perhaps 10
members, an arrangement that allowed them to exist within their meager
financial means. Just as it was necessa~ for a field hand to acquire
land and become an independent farmer if he Wished to have a wife and
family, so it was necessa~ for the city wage earner to get into
business for himself before he could hope to enjoy fami~ life. 6-v
The keeping of boarding and lodging houses and hotels was, in the
days before immigration was curtailed, a peculiarly important branch of
Japanese business enterprise in San Francisco. It began with the first
immigration of the laboring class and expanded or contracted according
to the current size of the city's Japanese population. San Francisco's
posi tion as the principal port of arrival and departure and as a distri-
bution center for immigrant labor dictated the kind of system whiCh
developed around these insti tutions. In the winter of 1908-09 the
Commission's agents found 55 hotels and boarding houses and ab'out as
. many rooming houses, most of which were located in one of two districts,
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.either in the section west of Van Ness Ayenue along Gea~ and Sutter and
the intersecting streets, or on South Park Place, near the wharves. A
few were in the business district, skirting Chinatown. The section
beyond Van Ness Avenue had escaped the great fire of 1906; the boarding
houses there had once been private residences. In the other locations,
all of which had been swept by the fire, the buildings were post-fire in
construction and had been designed for the purpose for which they were
being used" with nany sJlall rooms. Even though the investigation was
carried on in the winter months when the greatest number of Japanese
were in the city between seasonal jobs, the agents reported that there
were ve~ few cases of overcrowding in these houses. They.stated also
that "the number of Japanese had already begun to diminish;" the
dwindling of immigration under the Gentlemen's Agreement was being felt
by boarding house and hotel keepers.
Proprietors of large boarding houses and hotels were organized
as the Japanese Hotel Keepers' Association, Which had existed since the
late 'nineties. It had undergoDe reorganization into a pennanent form
and under a definite, if simple, policy in 1905. The Commission offered
the following translation of the only written agreement or regulation of
this association:6-w
"We, the members of the Japanese Hotel Keepers' Association,
will maintain in good faith the following agreement:
1. Patrons shall not be charged less than 25 cents
per night for lodgings and not less than 15 cents
per meal.
2. Storage: Trunks, 25 cents each per month; baskets
and valises, 10 cents eaCh per month.
S. Commissions to be charged as labor agencies: $5 oneach Alaskan laborer, $5 on eac~ railroad laborer, .
$1 on each ranch laborer."6-x
The associa tion was in effect a trade union with its primary i
object the elimination of the strong ~ompeti tion which existed between i
large boarding house keepers whose patrons were transients and laborers !
available for employm~nt.
Hotel keeping and contracting for labor were very close~ related,
each of the 12 contractors in business in San Francisco at that time
being also a boarding-house keeper, and in most cases deriving the
greater profit from the commissions received for supplying laborers.
Of this business, the Commission reported in 1909:
(71)
,
,;;
t;
I;~
~;i:c
..
"Wi th the exception of the proprietors of the 1 sailor boarding
houses " the proprietors of the larger establishments have
established connections with construction companies, railway
companies, Japanese bosses supplying ranch laborers, and fish
cannery companies. If the boarding-house keeper, who is a
member of the .Hotel Keepers' Association, receives an order
for a gi van number of men and does not hav~ them immediately
at his command, he draws upon those at the command of other
members of the Hotel Keepers' Association. In other words,
the boarding-house keepers pool their men and cooperate in
filling positions which come to them as labor agents. From
this pooling arrangement the members of the association derive
a gain not second to that resulting from maintenance of uniform
rates and prices.
"'Ihe business of the Japanese' con tractors' is much less
extensive and less profitable than formerly, however. Prior
to 1907, when many Japanes~ were arriving in San Francisco
from Japan and the Hawaiian Islands, their business was very
extensi ve. Employment was found by the contractors for most
of the new arrivals. In 1906 the several contractors supp~-
ing laborers for railroad work kept from 216 to 1,500 men each
employed--several thousand all told. In 1909 the number of
railroad laborers supplied from' San Francisco varied between
200 and 800. nte number 'of fish cannery hands and agricultural
laborers employed through and controlled by these contractors
is also smaller than before immigration was restricted. As a
'result of the restrictions ~hiCh have been imposed, several
finns have discontinued the contracting business. * * * Because
of alliances with employers of different kinds 'of labor, the
classes of laborers found in the larger boarding houses differ.
Practically all the laborers found at so~ are sailors, at
others Alaskan cannery hands, at others railroad laborers or
ranch hands. .Moreover, in many cases most of the patrons of
the boarding houses were found to have come from the same
provinces as the proprietors and labor agents.
"Besides the 'contractors' still in business, there are several
employment agents * * * engaged chiefly in supplying Japanese
domestics and in connection wi th their labor agencies frequently
conduct billiard }:arlors and fruit and cigar stands."S-y
The Japanese cobblers of San Francisco were prompt to organize.
nte first cobbler shop opened in 1890. With rapid growth of the Japa-
nese community and of the city in general, the number of cobbler shops'
increased until, in 1909, there were 72. As early as 1892 the cobblers
organized as Nihojin Koko Domei Kai, or the Japanese Shoemaker's
Association, with 20 members. Ey 1909 the association had on its lists
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virtually every master journeyman, journeymn, and apprentice engaged in
the trade. 'nle stated objects of the association were' "to promote a
friendly association amng the Japanese shoemakers,. to provide mean~ for
their mutual assistance, and to ,limit and to control competition among
themselves." '!he association maintained a supply house in San Francisco
and a substantial business fund with whiCh it assisted those needing
capital to conduct their business and those of its members who met with
accident, illness or other misfortune. The organization gave examina-
tions to apprentices .after the latter had had a year's experience, and
determined on the basis of those examinations whether the apprentices
were qualified to open their own shops .6-z
.
'!he situation of Japanese restaurants which served American meals
was significant in that these restaurants, after the great fire of 1906,
became a focal point for agitation and considerable violence--a condi-
tion which led many Japanese to leave San Francisco and settle in Los
Angeles. Pestaurants serving Japanese meals appeared early in every
10 cali ty where Japanese settled. '!he newly arrived iJIlDigrants craved
familiar food, and it was up to their count~en to provide it. '!he
next step was the establishment of restaurants serving American meals;
these were patronized by the mixed irnnd.grant and low-wage earning class
of whites. Of this latter type of Japanese restaurant, San Francisco
had eight in 1904. After the fire, the number of Japanese restaurants
'serving American meals quickly increased to 50. '!hese were scattered
through the devastated area and catered to the great masses of laborers
engaged in removing debris and in rebuilding the city. '!hey s~rved
meals at 15 cents and up and were popular with the laborers of all races.
"At this time there was a strong agitation against the Japanese
* * * directed largely by the Japanese and Korean Exclusion
League and the various labor unions, many of which had laws
forbidding their members to patronize Japanese or Chinese places
of business. At a meeting of the Exclusion League, held June 25,
1906, complaints wer& made that many white wage-earners, includ-
ing some union men, were patronizing Japanese restaurants, and
the league requested the labor organizations to enforce the
penal ties imposed qy their rules for violations of the prohibi-
tion mentioned. Among the unions at the meetings of which the
members were urged or'directed to refrain from patronizing the
Japanese restaurants was that of the cooks and waiters. A
boycott was kept in force by this organization from October 3
to 24, 1906, and the destruction of property of the proprietors
of restaurants by rioters followed peaceable appeals to patrons
by the representatives of the organization. The appeal took
the form of a label bearing the words 'White men and women,
patronize your own race.' (Senate Doc. No. 147, 39th Congress,
2d Session),,6-A
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The close of 1908 found only 17 of these restaurants left; these
were located in the poorer residence districts of the city. Investiga-
tion revealed that while the employees received slightly lower wages
than the union employees of white-staffed restaurants, the Japanese
received in addition to wages both board and lodging, whereas white
restaurant employees provided their own lodgings. It was discovered
also that very- few of the white employees were union members; those who
were not did not receive union wages. The living quarters of the Japa-
nese restaurant workers were found to be "adequate and satisfactory,
save in one instance where the room occupied was poorly furnished and
inadequately lighted and ventilated."6-B
.
To round out a picture of live in the Japanese community in the
area of heaviest concentration in the early days of this century, it is
necessary to consider their cultural and social life and their efforts
to become assimilated.
It has been shown that a strong tendency toward organization was
.
revealed ear~ among the business men. The agitation of the American
labor unions of the day ~uld appear rather farfetched, since the Japa-
nese always showed a strong inclination to organize and, having organ-
ized, to abide by the rules of the organization. Denied admittance to
the regular American trade unions because of race prejudice, the Japa-
nese lost little time in vain regret, but set about developing their own
trade organizations which successful~ performed the functions of the
average American trade union..
In San Francisco as in other cities where the Japanese settled,
the interest of the newcomers in learning or improving English was
marked. In 1909 there were 15 schools for Japanese immigrants in San
Francisco. Four of them, conducted by American women~ were places
where prosperous business men of considerable education or prospective
college students were tutored. The others were designed for two types
of students, adults needing to learn Ehg1ish and children whose parents
wanted them to study the Japanese language. At this period there were
usually a few classes for children recently arrived from-the Orient and
needing to learn English quiCkly so that they could attend the public
schoo1s.6-C Some of these schools were maintained qy private individ-
uals, but most of them were conducted by missions. In 1909 the combined
membership 'of the Christian Missions (the earliest of which was estab- ,
lished in 1889) was between 700 and 800, while the Buddhist Mission had
about 400 members wi thin the city, the greater number of Japanese having
been Buddhists in Japan.6-D
Of 77 households surveyed ion 1909, "all had at least 1 newspaper
and 58 had from 2 to 10 papers and periodicals printed in the Japanese
language, some printed locally, others in Japan." Roughly "one-third of
the households had from 1 to 5 newspapers and periodicals printed in
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English and published in San Francisco and other ci ties. Among the sub- '
scriptions to periodicalsqy those investigated were 3 to the Pacific'
Monthly, 9 to the Literary Dtgest, 1 to the Independent, 4 to Colliers'
Weekly, 1 to 'n1e Outlook, and 1 to the North American Review.6-E
In 1900 there was a threat of bubonic plague in San Francisco.
'n1e plague had struck the princi~l Chinese section of Honolulu, and the
entire section had been burned by order of the health authorities. Fear
of the ptague drove a number of people' from Honolulu to San Francisco,
among these many Japanese. In San Francisco one Chinese plague victim
was discovered in Ol'tnatown. 'n1is was the only case to appear in the
ci ty, but the health officers became panic-stricken, assumed that
orientals were peculiarly susceptible to the disease and like~ to
spread it, and set out on a campaign to inoculate every oriental on
sight. The method employed was violent and brutal, the victims, whether
men or women, being handled with rather less consideration than would be
shown a herd of sheep in an anthrax epidemic. To combat this special
treatment meted out to orientals, the Japanese Association of America
organized and presented the grievances of the Japanese residents of San
Francisco to the Consul, with the result that an injunction was obtained
and the practice was discontinued.l8-b 6-D
Because of rising agitation against the Japanese in San Francisco
and reverberations of that agitation in other West Coast localities, the
Japanese Association continued in existence, reorganizing in 1905 aQ~
extending branches throughout the state. I t gradually came to be a
federa tion of local organizations that were formed wherever any consid-
erable number of Japanese settled. Its constitution set forth the four
objectives of the organization:
.
1. 1b elevate the character of the Japanese immigrants;
2. 1b promote association between Japanese and Americans;
3. 1b promote commerce, agriculture, and other industries;
4'. 1b further the interests of the Japanese immigrants.6-D
'n1ese objectives were quoted in the Immigration Commission report
with the comment:
11 'n1e indefiniteness of this shows the general and elastic
character of the association. It interests itself in what-
ever concerns the Japanese. In addition to this, the
~ssociation has recently received recognition from the
Japanese consulate, and has become an administrative orBBn
of the consulate in issuing certificates of various kinds
and in related matters. Its members number about 400.n6-D
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The belief that the Japanese Association of America was an admin-
istrative organ of the consulate was readily subscribed to and exploited
by the anti-Japanese pressure groups of the West Coast. Professor
Ichihashi, who came to the United States close to the 'turn of the centu-
ry and who might be said to have grown up with the organization wrote in
1952:
nAt no time, as far as he Lthe write!:? knows, have these
Grganlzation~ had any connection with the [japanes.!7
government. Moreover, these bodies have never enjoyed a
membership sufficient to warrant such a statement as that
'these are the princi~l agencies through which the Japa-
nese immigrants come into contact with the people of
America. ' LA statement made by a Nisei college student
in a paper on Ja~ne8e organlzations~7
nOn the contrary, the Federated Association, by the very
nature of its organization has been confronted with the
numerous difficulties so conlDK)nly experienced by trade
unions. There has been the difficulty of jurisdiction,
that of sectionalism, manifested 'by the local associations,
which in turn have never been free from serious internal
di ssensions caused by petty jealousies--to wit, the diffi-
cul ties which have always attended the election of their
officers. For a number of years even the annual convention
of the member associations has failed to materialize; the
position of the Federated Assod.ation has been precarious,
although a number of local assod.ations have been function-
ing very successfully in looking after the intereste of
their respective members. I
"Another interesting aspect of the Federated Association
is its finance. The sources of its revenue have been
l~ membership dues, paid by the local organizations, and
r voluntary contributions; but during the operation of the
Gei1t~emen's Agreement it bad an additional income from
what. are known as certifica te fees. Dues have never
proved sufficient and have been largely supplemented by
contributions lIl&de by those who were willing to have an
official status in the or~ization. Certificate fees
require a word of explanation, for it was this source
of revenue to the organization that caused misunderstand-
ing as regards its alleged connection with the Japanese
government.,,18-c
Japan's military conscription law required any of its nationals
living abroad who were between 20 and 57 ye~s of age to request defer-
ment on an ann~l basis through the local consulate.
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it '!he consulate," oontinues Professor I cbihashi, "finding
this work too cumbersome because of the scattered residences
of the Japanese in this count~, delegated it to local Japa-
nese Associations along with the right to oollect the custom-
ary fee of fifty cents each in issuing the certificate of
notifi cation. When the Gentlemen' s Agreement wen t into
effect, which, among other things, permitted the re-admission
of those former~ domiciled here, those who desired to visit
Japan temporarily usually secured from the consulate 'the
certificate of residence' needed to facilitate their re-
admission into this country. This work, too, was turned
over to the Japanese Associations, which were better informed
on their local personnel, and the organizations, in turn,
charged the regular fee in issuing the cer~f1cate. Beyond
this there has been no official connection between tile Japa-
nese consulates and the JaJanese Association."l8-c
Japanese prefectural societies developed ear~ in the new oountry.
'!here were, in 1909, 27 different prefectures represented in the San
Francisco Japanese community alone. This type of organization has been
coDlDOn in the motley popu1ation of California for D8.ny years. Whether
the Japanese imitated the Iowans, Missourians, Ohioans and the -~
other groups who gather according to the place of their pre-California
residence, or whether these groups imitated the JaJanese, it would be
hard to prove. The prefectural societies were created to bring together'
people of the salle badcground for social plrposes, and once formed they
assumed the function of rendering assistance to those of their members
who encountered hardship.6-F
The Japanese Benevolent Society cf San Francisco, organized in
1901, is another organization worthy of men~on. The Immigration
Commission conmented:
"Its object was to Bake DDre oomplete provision for the care
of the sick, injured, and unfortunate than had been Dade by
the several missions, the Japanese Association, the prefectural
societies, and trade associations. During the eight years,
1901-1908, its expenditures for the sick and for sending persons
back to Japan amounted to $7,000. This does not indicate the
importance of its work, however, for in its methods it is more
a charity organization than relief society. One of the more
important branChes of its work lies in securing reduced rates
from steamship companies for those who are sick or in need in
order that they may return to Japan. As a result of the efforts
of this society and of the other institutions to which reference
has been madeL no Japanese become public dharges in San
Francis 00 ."6-!'"
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'ftle I;8ttern of life aIOOng the Japanese of San Francisco in that
first important decade of this centu~ has been described in detail
because it was typical of the urban Japanese wherever they formed colo-
nies on the West Coast; also San Francisco was the first Pacific coast
city to receive any substantial number of this minority group. However,
remembering the stigma placed upon concentrations of Japanese, conditions
favoring the concentrations in certain other cities need b~ief consider-
ation.
Los Angeles
Until 1899, when railway companies with terminals at Los Angeles
began to employ Japanese in large numbers, the d ty of Los Angeles had
only a minute Japanese population. After that date, several years were
to pass before the Japanese became conspicuous amng the agricultural. -
laborers, tenant farmers or owners of farm property in the area surround-
ing Los Angeles.
'ftle first Japanese to appear in the city drifted up from San
. Diego in 1885. These were a few men who had served as cooks on a
sailing vessel, which they left at San Diego. Upon reaChing 108 Angeles,
they opened a restaurant. Between working seasons in agriculture, some
members of labor gangs stayed in Los Angeles, but very few of the
immigrants settled there until the turn of the century. In 1897 the
b~st Japanese sources could find no more than 500 Japanese in Los
Angeles. However, with the increasing demand for Japanese labor on the
railroads of Southern California and the increased use of them in agri-
culture in Los Angeles and neighboring counties, the Los Angeles coloQy
knew a sudden and rather spectacular growth.
The Japanese American Year Book for 1905 estimated the Japanese
population of Los Angeles at 3,358. At the end of 1906, the year of the
San Francisco earthquake and fire and the first violent agitation
against the Japanese in that city, as a result of a minor exodus of
Japanese out of San Francisco to the southland, Los Angeles increased
its Jal;8nese population to more than 6,000. During the next two years
the number decreased. Some returned to Japan; others found business
; unprofitable and sought employment elsewhere. The total number of
Japanese in the stable population of the ci~ at the end of 1908 was
estimated by the secreta~ of the Japanese Association to be 4,457,
representing a loss of nearly 1,500 in the two-year period. "Of these,
3,925 were adult males, 427 adult females, and 105 Children under 16.
The number of males had increased somewhat between 1904 and 1906, and
the number of women and children had increased almost threefold." 'n1ese
figures were for the settled population; it was reported that there were
''as many. as 20,000 Japanese in Southern California doing seasonal work,
and during intervals when many are unemployed they come to Los Angeles
in large nwnbers, crowding the lodging houses with transients .6-G
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TWo colonies of Japanese developed in Los Angeles prior to 1910.
The older and larger community spread out along East First Street and
be came known as "Little 'lbkyo. " '!he other, whi ch in future years was to
be displaced by blocks of modern office buildings, took shape along West
Sixth and Seventh and the interlocking streets of Hill, Olive, and Hope.
While certain bazaars and curio shops operated qy Japanese were located
in the general shopping district, the majority of Japanese business
houses were in segregated districts and ~ere patronized almost exclu-
si ve~ ~ the Japanese themselves and' qy the Mexicans and Negroes of the
vicini ty. 6-H The Commission agents of 1909 observed:
"Practically all save do~stic servants live in one of the
two colonies, and in many cases are not welcomed in desir-
able places conducted by other races. 'nlis is true of
hotels, lodging houses, restaurants, barber shops, pool-
rooms and similar places ."6-1 .
In Los Angeles, too, it was found that the large majority of the
Japanese business men had come from cities in Japan, where they had con-
ducted their own businesses, while a comparatively small percentage had
been wage earners in Japan. The average Japanese business man had been
in petty trade, he had come to the United States when young, bringing
li ttle or no capital wi th him, he had had his first experience in .
America as a wage earner--only about 18 percent were able to gp into
business immedia t~ly after arri val--and rapidly lifted himself out of
the wage-earning class, setting up in business f.or himself in from one
"to three years. They were able to do this because the amount of capital
required was small, because of the phenomenal growth and development of
Los Angeles and the consequent increase in opportunities for naking
profi t, and because of their own powerful desire to get clear of the
wage-earning system which kept them in migrato~ status, sheltering in '
men's bunk houses or cheap rooming houses with no possibility of main-
taining a wife and children.6-K Here, as in ma~ of the communities
investigated, the agents learned tha t Japanese were not allowed member-
ship in American societies or fraternal organizations, were not wel-
comed in American Churches but were consigned to segregated Churches and
missions, were not given personal serVice in American shops, and ~hat,
as a result of such conditions, the Japanese had organized amon~ the~
selves for trade, for social life and for cultural pursuits, and finally,
tha t, in spite of the fact that they had achieved a greater assimilation
than could be found among the Mexicans, Russians, and some other races'
of recent imrnigration--because of the eagerness of Japanese to adopt
American ways and their desire to improve themselves and their lot in
life--"associations between the Japanese and white races are limited,
and, with few exceptions, not upon the basis of equality.n6-L
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Sacramento
Sacramento, the h~ of the Sacramento Valley, was predestined to
be a distributing point for the kind of agricultural labor neeqed for
the crops produced on the rich farm lands of the valley. By 1889, when
the Chinese labor force was diminishing because of- exclusion and the
increasing age of the resident Chinese, a demand for Japanese labor
arose. A network of electric and steam railroads connected the state
capi tal wi tb towns to the east, north and northwest of Sacramento,
Orovi11e, Marysvi11e, Newcastle, Woodland and Vacaville, and with
Stockton, Fresno and other towns to ,the south. River boats calTied
laborers as far south as Antioch and the islands of the San Joaquin
River. Throughout this great area deciduous and citrus fruits, berries,
grapes, vegetables, sugar beets and hops were produced in quanti ~, and
in the last decade of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the
twentieth, Japanese ,laborers were dominant in the labor force. Between
jobs, the. laborers spent their time in Sacramento, and to serve their
needs and the needs of those who worked nearby, an increasing number of
Japanese entered business in Sacramento. Gradua1~, in this city, the
more progressive Japanese tradesmen entered lines of b.usiness which were
calculated to secure the patronage of other races.
7he Immigration Commission agents of 1909 reported that hotel and
lodging house keeping was the mo~t extensive single business of the
Sacramento Japanese. '1hey discovered that "almost without exception
the buildings are patnted and in good repair, and the premises are well
kept. ,t Furnishings were of good quality, the beds good, the bedc:f1ng
clean. "Both the exteriors and the interiors of these places are
superior in appearance to those conducted by Orientals .and most other
foreign races in other c1 ties investiga ted."6-M
By 1909 the Japanese business men of Sacramento had beoome highly
organized and unionized, having seven local organizations. The shoe-
makers belonged to a State-wide organization. Locally effective were
t~e Boarding House and Lodging House Keepers' Association, the Express-
men's ,union, the Japanese Barbers' Union, two Japanese restaurant
keepers' associations, the watchmakers' Union, and the Carpenters'
Union. The Barbers' Union was a powerful organization operating on a
basis of monthly dues of 50 cents. It fixed time for opening and clos-
ing shops and set a scale of unio~ prices, imposing fines for violation
. of regulations. It controlled apprenticeship. It also stood ready to
give financial assistance to any member needing to return to his family
in Japan because of ill health, paying his fare from the treasury. If a
member was ill for more than one month, the other members contributed $1
a month each toward his support. Upon the death of a union member, his
family received from the union a sum equivalent to the fare from San
Francisco to Japan. The white barbers complained bitterly of the Japa-
nese barbers although the Japanese Barbers' Union fixed prices at a
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were based on the assertion that the influx of Japanese barbers had
ruined the Chances of making a profit in this field of enterprise. The
CoImDission's re~rter commented: "It is interesting 'to note in this
connection, however, that most of the shops conducted by white men have
been established in recent years and while the Japanese shops were in
process of becoming .more numerous. Moreover the majority of them are
being conducted with profit.n6-N
As an indication of both stability and prosperity among the
Sacramento Japanese busin~.ss men in 1909, six-sevenths of them had been
able to send for their wives and families. English classes for adults
and recently arrived Children from Japan were ~pu1ar and were conducted
principally by missions. 'Dle educational level of the business men was
high, with eight percent of them belonging to a university club. One
Japanese was a member of an association for industrial conciliation,
three were members of the Sacramento Gro cers' Union, and three more
belonged to the Chamber of Commerce. Except for these few organizations,
however, the general business and fraternal organizations of 'the city
did not admit Japanese residents to membership.
Portland. OreRon and Vicinity
'Dle first appearance of Japanese in Oregon antedated the mass
migration era, and the first Issei was no merchant, student, or laborer
but a woman, M~o Iwakoshi. In 1880 she went to Portland as the bride
of a Scotch sea captain, Andrew McKinnon. 'Dle couple took with them the
bride's yopnger brother Rikigo and her adopted daughter]ama. The
captain established a sawmill just east of Gresham, and "in honor of }ds
bride he called it 'Orient Mill. '" The coJDrmlnity that later replaced
the mill is still known as Orient. In 1891 Tama' s was the first Japa-
nese wedding to take place in Oregon. Her husband had first reaChed
Oregon in 1885, a boy of 18 Charged with the res~nsibi1ity of encour-
aging trade between Oregon and Japan. For sev~ra1.years he shuttled
back .and forth between Oregon and Japan, returning to Oregon penrs.nently
in 1889 and opening the first Japanese business establishment in Port-
land, a restaurant. This was Shintaro Takaki. The author of the
article from which the.se details were gathered interviewed Shin taro and
~ma Takaki in 1940~ At that time they were living at Orient and look-
ing forward to celebrating thei~ golden wedding anniversary in 1941.33
Aside from this family group of McKinnons and Takakis, the only
Japanese to reaCh Oregon prior to 1887 were 40 or 50 cooks who were sent
up from Ca1ifvrnia to become domestic servants. In 1887 direct ste~
ship service was established between Kobe and Portland, and i~grants
began to arrive at Portland.
The Oregon Short Line was the first railroad in the United States
to employ Japanese, beginning in late 1890 or early 1891.6-P
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Consequently Portland became the earliest center of distribution for
Japanese railway laborers, supplying considerable manpower to lines
operating in the other Western States. Because of its proximity to
centers of the salmon industry, Portland was the principal source of
Japanese cannery workers employed during the swmners from the Columbia
River on north to Alaska. In 1909 the estimated number of Japanese in
Portland was 3,872, a figure t~t inCluded those who stayed in Portland
during the winter but went to Alaska or Washington to wQrk in the salmon
canneries during the summer months. In that year about 500 had been
sent out by corporations from Portland to Alaska and an equally large
number had crossed the Columbia River to work in oanneries on the
Washington side. 6-0
While the city's importance as a distributing point for laborers
unquestionably stimulated the expansion of Japanese business in Portland
in the 'nineties and in the first decade of this century, the Japanese
business men of that city showed early a tendency to compete for the
patronage of other races. 'n'le Immigration Comnission agents found the
unusual number of white patrons served by various lines of Ja:panese
business a distinctive feature of the Japanese business picture in
Portland. 'n'ley cozmnented also on the fact that very few Portland Ja:pa-
nese had ever engaged in domestic and personal services. Fifty percent
. or more of the patrons of Japanese barber shops were non-Japanese,
principa~ of the laboring class; one of these shops had 96 percent
whi te patronage. The Japanese barbers were organized into a union whiCh
set the prices (25 cents for a haircut and 10 cents for a shave) at the
i figure charged by the ~jori ty of sns.ll shops co~ducted by Caucasians.
. It was found that practically all the patrons of JaISnese restaurants
, which served American meals were Caucasians. These restaurant keepers,
too, were well organized, and had been as early as 1896. The Japanese
Association of Oregon was not organized until February of 1909. There
were only two Japanese Churches, one a Methodist Mission, established in
1893 and having in 1909 a membership of 70, the other a Buddhist Mission,
established in 1903 and having in 1909 a membership of about 57o--though
only 270 of the members lived in Portland.6-Q
Until the twentieth century was well underway, the majori ty of
Japanes~ laborers who went to Portland engaged in maintenance work on'
the railroads in preference to fam woIk. Oregon, in a day when starva:'
tion wages were the rule in agriculture, was notorious for underpaying
farm laborers. Japanese, if they worked for hire on the land) could not
get more than 40 or 50 cents a day ~!thout board. As section hands on
the railroads, however, they could earn $1 or $1.10 per day. As late as
1909, the Immigration Commission agents could discover only about 400
Japanese in agricultural work in the Portland vicinity; 150 to 200 were
employed around Salem, 300 in Hood River Valley, 400 in the Dalles ,and
perhaps 125 near La Grande, this in the busy summer season when much
hand labor was needed. By this ti~ the wages for fam labor had risen
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ei ther line of work were lower than in other States, and perhaps because
of the 11 ttle incentive to work for hire, the first decade of the new
cent~ saw an increasing number of Japanese laborers taking up land on
their own account, much of it unreclaimed and necessitating heavy labor
to clear it of forest and brush.
In 1904 the first Japanese farmers "made good and stayed on the
land" in Oregon. Before that year there had been a number of unsuccess-
ful attempts. The first Japanese farmers to acquire land in Hood River
Valley established themselves in 1907; in 1909 the Commission agents
found eight operating their own fanns in that valley, four of whom owned
their land. Except Salem, Where at that time hops were the principal
crop, most of the Oregon Japanese farmers grew berries and vegetables.6-S
Italian vegetable growers complained of Japanese competition, but the .
agents were unable '00 find -that increased production of vegetables and
berries had had any perceptible effect on prices.6-T -
1b show what developed from these small beginnings, the following
excerpt from a survey of Japanese life and work in Oregon, made in 1940
by the first Nisei lawyer to be admitted to the Oregon bar is quoted:
"Most of the inmigrant Japanese were you ths of 16 'to 20 when
they ca~ to this western world. To. them it was a land of
strange new faces, unfamiliar customs, foreign philosophies
and religions and puzzling tongue * * * and for many years,
no Japanese women. It was 1903 before the first Japanese
women began to arrive in any considerable numbers.
"These were hardships to be expected. Wha t may not have been
expected were the outbursts of anti-Japanese feeling, often
. violent, which plagued the early Japanese, and even found ex-
pression in discriminatory legislation. Much of it sprang
from race hatred, stubborn, bitter and Unreasoning. And some
of it, of course, was prompted ~ the fact that the ear~
Japanese worked for less, lived on less, and, frequent~,
. prospered more.
" * * * On July 12, 1925, anti-Japanese In"ejudice in Oregon
flared into the famous Toledo incident. A mob of 300 1bledo
townspeople routed Japanese sa'Wlnill workers from their homes,
loaded them into trucks, and forcibly evicted them from the
town. A group of loggers attempted to defend them, but it
~d no good. Many were denied even the opportunity to collect
their personal belongings.
"But the Japanese are a tenacious people, and those of Oregon
are no exception * * *. ~y industry and thrift and perseverence,
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\ they made the most of the opportunities which contributed
much to the bulld~g of a state. And we of the second
generation are proud of them.
.'We are proud, firstly of their contributions to agriculture,
which Claims 60 percent of all Japanese in Oregon. Mr. TBkeoka
Jjresident of the Japanese Association of Oregon7 has assembled
figures which show the Japanese accomplishment in this field by
counties and communities * * * Hood River county-Here the
Japanese engaged first in the raising of straWberries, and by
1920 they produced 75 percent of the total gi-own in the valley.
In 1923, they deve.loped the asparagus industry, which had been
commenced earlier by John Koberg, and by 1928, they were ship-
ping 50,000 crates annually to all parts of tlle country. Today
the Japanese of Hood River county produce an annual crop of
$509,000. This inCludes 90 percent of the county's asparagus,
- 80 percent of the strawberries, 35 percent of the pears and
20 percent of the apples.
"Salem--'nle Japanese colony here played an important i'.art in
the development of the Lake Labish area into the .richest
farmland in the world.' In 1910 Roy K. FUkuda, an ex-sectionhand, cleared the first tract of land in the Lake Labish .
swamp. By 1913, he had developed 'Golden Plume' celery,
forerunner of the choice varieties of today. Last year the
Japanese marke ted 625 carloads of celery in 53 states. By
intensive dulti va ti on they D&de 250 acres produce 200,000
crates of celery, 50,000 sacks of onions, 25,000 crates of
lettuce and 5,000 crates of carrots. 'nley used fertilizer
to the extent of $150 per acre, paid $160,000 in payrolls,
. ~ and bought materials worth $100,000.
"Washington county-In 1939 Japanese farmers here cultivated
about 1,400 acres on which they ~ew 2,800 tons of berries,
which were sold largely to eastern markets for $280,000.
'nley paid $190,000 for labor. TWo-thirds of all berries
in the county were grown by Japanese.
!'Gaston-After heartbreaking failures, the Japanese here
reclaimed 500 acres of the bottom lanas of Lake Wapato,
which last year produced 80,000 sacks of onions and a
gross income of $80,000.
"MultnoD&h and ClackaD&s counties--Seventy-five percent of .
the vegetables sold on the Portland D&rkets now are pro-
duced by Japanese. In the two counties they now farm 4,500
acres, producing an annual crop of $2,000,000. * * * It is
estimated that Japanese of the two counties spent $875,000
last year for labor.
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individual districts, and even more impressive in the
a ggre ga te. * * * the total crop of Japanes.e farllBrs in
Oregon averages $3,500,000 annually, of which two-thirds
is shipped to other states, bringing back to Oregon some
$2,000,000 per year. tbtal payroll of labor is around
$1,500,000. 'Ibtal expenditure for farm supplies is
around $1, 000, 000 .
"Oregon Japanese business men have had a major part in
building up a large and profitable trade with Japan. In
1938, Portland imports from Japan amounted to $226,301
while Portland exports to Japan totaled $1,532,641. 'lbe
Japanese trade in past years has been the lifestream of
Oregon' s lumber indust~, and until 1937, Japan vied
closely with the United Kingdom as the best customer of
Portland.
"In Portland alone Japanese pay many thousands of dollars
in taxes, but not a single Japanese ever has asked for a
cent of relief from the state!"33
'lbus, just as the mass of the second generation Japanese Ameri-
cans were reaching maturity, a Nisei summed up the contribution of the
first generation in Oregon, ooncluding: "We of the second generation,
we 'nisei', only hope that we can do as well. Undoubtedly our J;8th in
Oregon is going to be a great deal easier. Much of the old race
prejudice has disappeared. In general this land which so reluctantly
adopted our parents has been most friendly and cordial to us. 1120
A year later war sentiment was to thrust this entire generation
of Japanese American citizens, together with their alien parents, out of
their hard-won holdings and behind the barbed wire fences of relocation
centers.
Seatt~e and Tacom. Washinrlon
. 'lbe state of Washington, eventually to become second in density
of Japanese population in the whole United States, was slower than
ei ther of the other Pacific Coast states to acquire Japanese residents.
In 1884, there were only four or five Japanese in Seattle; these were
men, working in restaurants or hotels. By 1888, Seattle had 7 Japanese
business establishments, but o~ 10 Japanese. 'lbe 1900 census reported
2,900 Japanese in the city and 50 places of business. By 1909 the
number of Japanese business establishments had increased to 496.6-U
During the 'nineties, Washington underwent a spectacular develop-
ment and rapid increase in population. Previous~ there had been a very
(85)
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conjunction with Washington's remoteness from the port of ent~ for Japa-
nese immigrants accounted for the paucity of Japanese in the state.
From 1895 until 1899 a Japanese consulate was 'located at Tacoma, Tacoma
rather than Seattle drawing the consulate because it was headquarters
for railroad laborers and sawmill hands. According~ Japanese shops and
businesses sprang up in Tacoma to serve the needs of the consulate and
of suCh Japanese laborers as worked in the vicinity. In 1899 the consu-
late was moved 'to Seattle.
Seattlets growth, once it started, was prodigious. In 1890, its
population was only 42,857; by 1900, it had grown to 80,671, and in 1907,
it was estimated at about 240,000. Tacoma had grown from 36,006 in 1890
to 90,000 in 1907. Neighboring Pierce and King Counties had more than
trebled their population in the 17-year perlod.6-V 'nlis phenomenal,'
growth in population obvious~ created a market for agr:J,cultural produce
which in turn drew Japanese to the State. However, other factors con-
tributed to the Jlarked increase in Japanese lX>~lation.
In 1896 direct steamship connections were established between
Seattle and. the Orient, and a little later gold was discovered in Alaska.
At about the same time railroad companies of the region began to employ
Japanese. News of the gold discovery sent hordes of seekers to Alaska.
Seattle became the port from which supplies-lX>tatoes, eggs, butter,
cannery produce-were sent to the gold fields and boom towns of Alaska.
'nle .sudden heavy de nand for dairy and agricultural produce s timula ted
agriculture, lX>ultry raising and dairy farming in the country adjacent
to Seattle. In the first decade of the twentieth century immigrants
constituted the greater part of the population of King and Pierce
i counties. 'nle Immigration Commission agents discovered that an ever
increasing number of immigrants, whether Japanese, Italian, Scandinavian
or Deman, were farming in their own right.6-V .
The Japanese were engaged principally in growing strawberries,
blaclcberries, potatoes and green vegetables, in dairying and lX>ultry
raising. The first leasing of a farm by a Japanese occupred in 1892.
In 1909 the agents of the Commission, in the general district near
Seattle, including South Park, Renton Junction, Orillia, O'Brien, Kent,
'nlomas, Christopher, Auburn, Fife, Sumner, Puyallup, Bellevue, Vashon
Island and Green Lake, found 509 Japanese farmers with a total acreage
of 6,546 acres, and holdings varying in size from 3 to 100 acres. Be-
cause Washington State law denied to aliens the privilege of buying
land,' the Japanese of that generation and period were all tenant farmers.
It was learned that nnlch of the land leased by the Japanese imnd.grants
had had to be cleared of stumps and undergrowth or reclaimed from marsh-
land before crops could be raised. 'nle landowners generally pref~rred
Japanese tenants because the latter required little outlay and were
willing to grain marshes and clear stumpage to reclaim part of any land
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~ey leased, or-in their eagerness to obtain land, those who could
afford to lease improved land would pay hi8ber rent than could be
,obtained from members of other races.
Complaints made a~inst the Japanese by farmers of other origins
were not on the score of underselling but were on the grounds that the
Japanese increased the acreage devoted to small farming and made suCh
enterprises unprofitable. Too, the Japanese of Washington had by 1909
organized farmers' associations wherever they had settled. These
associations were formed for promotion of mutual interests and to facil-
i tate the marketing of crops. They also included or~nized cooperative
purchasing of fertilizers, seeds, plants and supplies. No such ~oderrl
organization existed arrongthe white farmers, who ,complained resentfully
that the Japanese through their progressive cooperative were able to b~
for less.6-W
In 1942 the Tblan Committee reported that Washington Japanese had
become more hig~ urbanized than the Japanese of any other State, 60.4
percent of them living in cities, principally Seattle.13-c This urban-
ization was due in part to the fact ,that the alien land law of Washing-
ton was more consistently enforced than that of California, and in part
to the fact that the oncoming second generation shared the common tend-
ency of second generation stock to turn from rural to city life and
occupa tions. Nevertheless, at the time of evacuation, Japanese operated
706 farms in the State, with a total acreage of 20,326. They special-
ized in truck crops, cherries, berries and potatoes, and the produce
was estiuated at &4,000,000 annually. "According'to the Agricultural
Marketing Service, they operated 56 percent of the acreage devoted to
truck crops in King County and 39 percent of the beets and carrots,
80 percent of the asparagus, cauliflower, onions, and late peas, and
over 50 percent of the cabbage, celery, lettuce, spinach, strawberries,
snap beans and cucumbers. II13-d
* * * * * ~ *
In the light of cold fact, the charges _de in warti~ mood by
certain West Coast militarists, politicians and professional racists,
implgning the JOOtives of the Japanese iJmn1grants in settling where they
did, lose substance and credibility. The most intent and extensive
examination of historic fact reveals that nothing more sinister than
economic necessity determined the pattern of geographic distribution of
the Japanese immigrants upo~ the West Coast of the United States, and
tha t that pattern had been set in such commonplace fashion for more than
30 years when the count~ of their ancestry and the country of theiradoption 'went to war.. .
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"CBAPl'ER YnI
!9~: PRE-D:ix:~g 7
The nation was D>ving toward war. Not very many J.mericans could
bring themselves to admit that global war _s inevitable and that the
United States must soon become directly involved in it. A considerable
number of Americans thought it probable that the United States might
event.ually be "dra1lD into the war" t.hat. was raging in Asia and in
Europe, but not. yet, not .for quite a long time. Jlany Americans strung
along with the 18olat.ionists, 'Who at that time were considered respect-
able and even admirably ~triotic members of American society, and
believed that it. ..s ctirely unnecessary .for the United States to get
involwd with the destruction and carnage then convulsing the older
countries .far across the oceans.
At the year's beginning, the men of the nation who were between
the ages ot 2l and 35 had alread;'3' registered under the Selective Ser-
vice Act, am thousaxns of them. were being sunmoned from home and jobs
or colleges to be trained for military service. Defense industries
were mushrooming around the port cities of the United States. WPA
began to shrink. It became easier to get jobs than it had been tor a
long time. The cost ot living -, rising. Lend-Lease was growing in
volume, but there was heavy opposition to extending its .full benefits
to Russia. Detense appropriations were being asked of Congress which
made the ordinary citizen's head swim, for .the requests 1Iere for
billions of dollars, even tor hundreds of billions o.f dollars.
And what of the Japanese American population in these days be-
fore the attack on Pearl Harbor by Japan inaugurated war between the
country of their choice and the country of their ancestry?
By 1941 the Issei were showing their age. As a matter of fact,
, they looked considerably older than the,. were. Most ot the men had
been ii1 the United States for 30 years or longer. They had spent
their youth in back b:realdng work, in drudgery, to be able to establish
homes in the new world. When they achieved the land and the home, they
had to work just as hard, just as long hours, to support a family, and
they went on for years and years working very hard to provide their
American citizen children with the education that could lead to all
good things in the United States.
The 18sei 'aDen were younger than their husbands, but tbey too
bad worked hard all their lives. It they were tamers' wives, they had
kept house, .tended their children, cooked, sewed, washed and ironed and
at need had helped in the fields, especially in the seasons when a
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,ear' s labor could be lost if crops wre not tended or harvested against
t1D8. If they were city wives, they had tended their houses and their
children am in addition bad helped their husband8 in the small busine8s
that supported the famUy.
The citizen children of the Issei were coming into maturity& 1J1
194.1 the greatest number of the Nisei 1Mre in the 17-21 age gI"Oup. A
fair number had finished school and were beginning to take over family .
respon8ibilities from their parents, who were tired and wi') ing now to
take a rest and to let their grown chUdren take over. '!'heN were
fewer SM.1l chUdren in the Japanese coDmunities than there had been in
1920--or in 1930. By the close of the fourth decade of the century,
there were not very many of the Issei women who were YOW1g enough to
t-.r m~1 and not very man.)" of the Nis~i who were old enough to be
establishing homes of their own. In 1940 the birth rate among the
Japanese minority had been lower than that of any other group in the
United States. Indeed the Japanese American group had lost more than1l,CXX> of its ntUDber since the 19.30 censu8.' -
Where were the Japanese Americans, and what were they doing in
this year? MOre of them lived in cities than had back in 1910. This
shift could be accounted for partly in tenDS of the alien land laws
and partly in terms of the natural tendency of young Americans, once
they have been exposed to higher education and city living, to leave
the fann for city lite. However, about 45 percent of the people con-
tinued to live on the land.
An I8sei, looking back upon the past 20 years, said in 1942:
"During the years 191,3-3:> there was considerable growth,
from the economic view, for the Japanese. There was a
shift from common labor to the mDa.'), businesses; first
these busineS8es catered primarily and sole17 to fellow
countrymen. Soon they were expanding over to a Caucasian
clientele * * *. For t he Japanese who ~re already resi-
dent here L!n 1924 at the time of the Exclusion ACY the
years from 1924 through 1931 are marked as an era of
Americanimtion, generally. There was no more iDlDigration. .
)fen bad their fAMi-.1ies here. The Japanese were finding a
place in society, maybe not an enviable one, but neverthe-
less a place. The Japanese were consciously begiIU1ing to
assimilAte into American life * * *. This was a period
of the growth of Japanese democracy, of liberal govern-
ment in Japan, of a general acceptance of the weetem
spirit of dsnocracy. This was reflected in the United
States among residents here. Good evidence is found in
the Japanese language newspapers. The labor movsent, .
for instance, 'MaS treated with a degree of open-mindedne8s
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/and tolerance impossible to detect in later years.
"JcD 1931, a vitallY' significant event occurred, changing
the tide and trend of iDlnigrant Japanese development.
'1'h1s was the year of the Manchurian incident, when the
Japanese military, breaking the bonds of liberal govem-
mSlt, invaded 1Ianchuria. This was the start of the
aggression that was to eventually lead to Pearl Harbor.
. "From 1931 on, the Japanese g0'Y8rnment launched a very-
active and pronounced campaign to indoctrinate colonists
abroad. The military' was again on the march * * *. Cer-
tain decided changes in strategically important facilities
for indoctrination took place. This was the period when,
for instance, the t'ffO major Japanese news syndicates
(Rengo and Dentsu) were merged by the government into a
single sem1-o.f'ficial Domei Japanese News ~gency. The
d1.f'.f'erences in Japanese national attitudes soon e:xpressed
themselves in magazines and publications which reached
overseas.
"Immigrant Japanese in America, ruled by law as ineligible
to American citizenship, began to feel, I-Well, perhaps
there is something to Japanese nationalism. }faybe Japanese
destinY' is written as the Tokyo government spokesmen, the
extrS8 rightist military men, say. 1
"There was also a revival of the emphasis upon ritual in
connection with ancient Japanese sports-jiu jitsu, mndo.
~, Y\1mi. The Japanese virtues were endowed with halos
* * *. The Nisei, or second generation, had come a long
way toward assimilAtion into the American way of life
through this all. Differences in degree of progress, of
course, are recognized; but generally ~eaking they are
more American than they are Japanese. "34
At the same tiD, a Nisei, who had been 'Valedictorian of his
. high school class in Los Angeles, who had graduated from the UniversitY'
of California at loa Angeles and who, until evacuation was employed in
the Los Angeles County civil service, explained to the new teachers at
- Jlanzanar Relocation Center something of the problem of his generation:
"To know something of us, probe our background. Our
whole lives' have been bld1t around inconsistencies. Our
early years, preevacuatlon, were centered in the public
schools and in the ,home. At sch.ool we acquired everything
American. We leamed to talk, think, write, act as our
playmates and classmates of Caucasian parentage. We
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~joined clubs, played baseball and football, went on
picnics and hikes, acted in school plays, exchanged valen-
tines, dressed up for Hallowe'en parties; in short, we did
, all the things that are a part of what we !mow as American
life.
"At the ~ time, however, we always returned home to
our folks and suddenly discovered each ~y the. fact. we
. were in the presence of Japanese customs, of Japanese
ways and manners, Japanese traditions. We celebrated
Japanese Girl's Day on March 3, Japanese Boy's Day on }fay
5; we spoke in Japanese to our parents.
"At an age when our college classmates were finding their
place .in the economic life of our country, we who were of
Japanese ancestry again discovered a sanewhat disillusion-
ing thing. There were the unusual limitations of oppor-
tunities for job-finding--because of our race. Thus it
was that a good number of the second generation Japanese
with abilities. education and talent, turned westward
across the Pacific for their life work. I never did.
"Most of us, please remember, have never been outside the
United States. We have believed in American principles,
had faith and confidence in the ideals which we learned
in school. We've stepped out into the world about us-
and there wasn't anything for us. Evacuation lent shock-
ing confirmation to this.
"Before evacuation, our cormnunities were a curious mixture
of both American and Japanese influences. In our religious
acti.ities, we were divided equally between Christians and
Buddhists. In political activities, we had both Democrats
and Republicans. There were such organizations as the
Japanese American Citizens League and the Young Democrats.
The Japanese influence was marked in sports, language, cus-
toms, traditions. But equally there was the balance of
the American influence.
"I have recently read a book, 1:!!.! :fsland Wt~b~~ by L.
Lewisohn. I feel that we at Jlanzanar and in aU these i
relocation centers, are on an island within. I feel that i
you ~eachers are faced with some sort ot a challenge to
buila planks back to the mainland from this island-back
into American lite." 34
The Japanese American minority.divided into two major groups,
each of which in .turn fell into two categories. Primarily there were
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have completed less than the _dian number ot years and halt of the
population more than the median number of )"I8ars.
Median years of school completed as of 1940 for per.ons ot
Japane.e desceQt 25 year. old and over is as follows:
AJlERICAN-~RN FOREIGN-a:>RN-
Calitornia 12.2 8.1
Washington 12.3 8.6
Oregon 12.2 8.3
Thi. average is not available tor the population of Japanese descent ~
in the total United States, but since the overwhelBing proportion of j
this population ~s in California, Oregon and washington, the figure.
above are sufficiently complete to represent the entire group.
For purpose. of compari.on, the median years of school completed
as of 1940 for the entire population 25 years old and over in the United
State. and the West c.&st States is given below:
. '!'OTAL AMERICAJ.J-~RN FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION WHITE WHI'rE c
(Including Non-White)
Tetal United States 8.4 8.8 7.3
California 9.9 10.8 7.8
Washington 9.1 10.0 8.1
Oregon 9.1 9.6 8.1.
One Nisei doctor expressed the opinion: "The Japanese, like the
Jews, have & bad tendency to overeducate their children. It's like
baving a Cadillac and not enough money for its upkeep. )i)re Nisei
should go where tecbnicallabor is required."35
~~
~ 1941 the Hisei were getting to an age, 8ame of thea, to
8~L'1e "th_selve8 and their status rather searchingly. An optometrist
wrote:
"The Risei are toe id8&l1stic, dreaming of success
that CCBes only to the best-and only after Y'ears of
hard labor; they are too confident and egotistical,
plunging into studies without taking a personal
inventor)" of theBsel yeS; theY' do not figure the
mathematical chance8 tor success in cho8en vocations,
especially those who plan to become psychoanalysts,
plaY' directors, etc. Engineers in particular fail to
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1take into account racial preference and discrimination.
Parents .eem to encourage sons beyond the point ot
absurditY', because theY' do not want th. to follow in
the line ot domestic work.-35
.
A Nisei personnel officer said:
"~ ar mind, one ot the greatest ob.tacles which the
Hisei must overcome is lack ot self-confidence. Con-
fidence can be gained onl,y through a realization ot
his own ability--not necessarily- ego--and through
what I deem essent~al courses such as public speak-
ing and English. * * * Frankly, the time-worn
lemotion-rouserf--racial di8crimination--is very die-
tasteful to me * * *. To. otten, it is used to
excuse one's own shortcomings. It is almost axio-
matic that there is always roam tor those with the
ability to 'produce the goods.' * * * The average
employer wbe has his own welfare at stake is not
going to let a bit ot color prevent him trom hiring
a person, it he thinks that he can profit by it."35
The tact remained that the adult Nisei, fresh from college and
tired with enthusiasm and such confidence as a good record in school
~ had given th.., round little use for their training and education in
their chosen fields. A first class medical man could hope tor nothing
better than the limited practice ot a Little Tokyo or ot a slum dis-
trict ot mixed immigrants. A lawyer was no better ott. Teaching was
Yirt~ a closed pretession to qualified Japanese Americans, though
~t tho college level there was limited opportunity in oriental civi- .
liBation and history courses. It was a sore peint with some Issei and
.lc-~ Nisei scholars who had high qualifications in economics or philosophy
~... or mathematics that they were shunted into teaching oriental ci vilt-
. zation and language it they wished to teach at all. Ch-aduate engineers
teund it almost impossible to get any sort of job in t-heir oWn line--
though, by 1941, with the National detense program advancing, there
were possibilities in the Eastern States where anti-oriental prejudice
was less strong than in the Western States. Scientists round the
laboratories ot the We.t Coast firmly closed to Japanese Americans.
Calitornia State and County Civil Service boards were a little more
9 triend1y, but advanc.ent was especially slow tor the Hisei, and it
~ was harder for them than for other candidates to receive appointments
in the first place. A college graduate who had been forced by economic
pressure into the laundry and dry-cleaning business, wrote ot the civil
service .situation:
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"For the nisei a civil service career for the present
se_s to be the least discriminatory. Such a career,
if possible, affords him the most steady and best paid
position. There may be a certain amount ot discriai-
nation against him in this field. For exaaPle, about
two y~rs ago I took a postal clerk-carrier eX8ll in .
817 hcaetown. With a grade ot 92.2% I was notified I
was number one on the eligible list. Up till now I
have not received any otter of a position, and I am
resigned to the fact that I have been passed by.
. Likewise, tor the positien ot Lay 1nsp8ctor I received
a grade ot 90.6% and was certified to three different
federal positions. I may have an otter from one ot
these certifications. The lot of the nisei is net an
enviable one but this is to be expected. For he is a
81nority and all Jainorities ot ewry nation must
undergo hardships unknown to the majority. There is
this consolation, however: the hardships will either --J
make him er break him; if he is strong they w11l
make hia."35
1n the prewar era, the high17 educated Nisei were with monoto-
nous regularity forced back into the Little Tokyos which they had
thought to escape. Political science and econo.ics majors had tG r.-
sort to jobs in the grocery and produce businesses, or in importing
stores--it they knew sufficient Japanese to deal with old Issei
customers and with representatives of Japanese firms. Farmers sons who
turned out to be intellectuals had to go back to the farms to stoop
labor. However, in 1941 the majority of the Hisei were still in school.
This generation of American citizens suffered additional embar-
rassment because of their imperfect bilinguality. Talking Japanese at
home and English everywhere else was contusing. At least in their
grade school years, maQy or them attended the Japanese language schools
after regular public school hours. )lost of them went reluctantly. The
Japanese school was harder, with its complicated writing, and besides,
the two hours spent there deprived them of the play time that their
non-Japanese friends enjoyed after public school let out and before
dinner time. The two-hour daily period was not adequate to give them
a sound knowledge of the parental tongue. Their parents were often
critical or the children's imperfect Japanese. Teachers and 8chool
fellows were critical of imperfect Englisb--or in many instances
laughed at the mistakes. The two languages warred against each other.
The mi8takes that the Nisei made in English were different fram the
errors common to careless average Americans. On the playgrounds or in
the clas,s roam, other students rarely raised eyebrows or laughed at a
fellow who confused number and tense of verbs or left oft a final fIg" or
even said "ain't". But let a Hisei become understandably contu8ed
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oyer collectiye nouns, and there was considerable attenti~J often
humoroue, focueed upon th, contusion. Japanese has DO differentiation
between singular and plural. A Japanese learni,ng to speak Eng1:I,sh
quickl7 learns that in English an "8" is added to a singular noun to
make the plural. It is a little hard to r_eaber at first, but the
principle of adding "s" to .ean more than one i. so deepl,- ingrained
that there is no latitude left for exceptions. Consequentl,- .ost
ot the I1sei, college-bred or otherwiee 8&7 "machineries," "equip-
Mnts," "furnitures," and even "popc°n1s."
B)" the time the Nisei finished college, they .ere handicapped .
b7 lack of tunde. 'lbeY' h.8.d not the opportunity accorded lighter
skinned graduatee to ac~e experience, and the7 lacked funde to Bet
out in businese for themselves. 'lbe majority of Ja~nese faailiee had
etrained every resource to get their children through school; theY' had
nothing to otter the graduate ~ond the chance to acquire a degree, a
certificate or a diploma. It was the exceptional famii.v who could
support a bright son or daughter for a year or so whUe he or she job
hunted in his own field. Usually, then, the search ended in comproa1se.
A political scientist became a dr7 cleaner; a would-be school teacher
became an accountant; a plant pathologist got a job in a nursery; a
trained secretary became a nursegirl or a housemaid. 'lbose who bad
fathers in business or on faras dropped back into the family pattern.
A tew fortunate ones who had unusually prosperous parents were able to
get financial assistance that would tide them over the first few -rears
while the7 were establishing themselves in business, trade or a pro-
fession. Others, realizing that theY' must look to importing or other
Japanese bueiness, went to Japan to polish up their Japanese speech.
In 1941 it had occurred to very few of the adult Nisei that the~
were other parts or the country that might be more hospitable to them,
offer th- a better opportunity than the hCD.e town, the hCD.e city, or
the little farming district on the "est Coast. 'nle7 were young,
idealistic, sensitive to rebuff, some of them a little defeatist, but
they were a1aost totally unaware, it se.ed, that the West Coast was
really a verY' S8&]] part of the United States, and that it was possible
to get on a train or a bus and trY' a different state. The older Nisei
who had Sansei, or third generation children, were growing philo-
sophical about the future of this rising generation: the Sansei would
be spared the handicaps that the Nis,ei had known, for the Sansei had
English speaking parente, American stY'le homes that were no different
from the average home of Caucasian neighbors. 'nle Sansei children
would be accepted &S real Americans. Hard work, education--and the
future was bound to be bright. America promised all things to all
comers, regardless of race, color or creed. The Constitution of the
United States promised these things; so did the Declaration of Inde-
pendence.
Such were the Nisei in 1941.
. .
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CHAPTER I
IN THE BEG INN ING
Prompt17 on December 7, 1941, in metropolitan areas of the
Pacific States, representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
began a round-up of Japanese aliens thought to be dangerous to the
Nation in time of war. As ear17 as September 6,1939, there had been an
instruction from the President of the United States to the Department
of Justice on the functions and obligations of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation in relation to national securit1, covering surveillance
of German, Italian and Japanese nationals~ In accordance with the
instruction, FBI officers in each district "educated" the local police
and other law enforcement agencies in the conduct of their relations
with enemy natio~s in time 01 war. Lectures were given b1 FBI repre-
sentatives to the various police departments, and formal classes were
held in all police departments for the dissemination of detailed
instructions. The FBI had approached the pro bleB of Japanese nationals
J from a somewhat Ps1chological angle, and, in classes for local law
enforcement personnel on the West Coast, had emphasized the Bureau's
decision that no phyaical force was to be used on Japanese suspects; it
had been determined oftici~ that "dominatioon of Japanese suspects
must be on a "mental" plane. It had been anticipated that operation of
the program would be on an individual basis for questioning or arrests,that there should be no mass raids.36 "
Al though there were intermittent raids and isolated single
arrests throughout the period that preceded the mass evacuation of all
persons of Japanese ancestr1, the majorit1 of the Japanese who were
r detained were picked up in the first few weeks of the war, some 5,000.
In addition to gathering up all suspects whom the Federal agents had
had under observation prior to the outbreak of war, the FBI represent-
atives acted promptly on &n7 report from any source that cast suspicion
upon any Japanese alien, detaining the suspect for questi-oning and
thorough investigation.
At the same time that the FBI launched its drive on aliens,
borders were "closed to all persons of Japanese ancestrr. Japanese
residents who were unable to prove their American citizenship were
prohibited from transferring or registering motor vehicles; all assets
ot Japanese nationals were frozen; Japanese banks were closed; the
Federal Government revoked all general and specific licenses issued to
aliens to o~rate business establishments and placed guards aroW¥i the
places ot business. The alien. were left with whatever cash they"
happened to' have on hand as of Sunda1, December 7.
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As one result ot this sweeping revocation ot all general and
special license8 that had been issued to Japane8e aliens, the local
produce market. by DeceBber 11 were reduced in volume to 30 percent ot
normal. On that day the Secretary ot the Treasury under Executive
Order No. 8389 ot April 10, 1940, issued General License Ho. 77 and a
press release, the tormer permitting certain Japanese nationals to
engage, under strict banking controls, in "the production, marketing
and distribution ot tood products in Continental United State.," the
latter advi8ing the Japanese nationals to "bring their products to
market as evidence ot their loyalty to the United States and a88Uring
them that these products wo~d be received by American tirms tor
marketing."39 A day later volume ot produce in the markets had in-
creased to 75 percent ot the no~ and within a tew days was back to
normal. A turther liberalization ot regulations W&s granted on Decem-
ber 15 by the Secretary of the Treasury in General License No. 68&,
which allowed a number ot Japanese national8 to resume control of
produce hou8e8.3~ BT the first ot the year it was p08sible tor theI8sei to draw a hundred dollars a month from his bank account ~o pro- ~
vide tor the needs of his family.
.
In the early weeks of the war the West Coast population .uttered
hypertension, living in constant expectation ot attack trom the air or
from the sea. Air raid alarms were frequent. Blackout materials were
exhausted in most cities and towns the day after the attack on Pearl
Harbor. It was discovered that air raid sirens co~d not be heard 'at .
th~ required distances. Ci vilian defense agencies, which had been
organized during the previous summer, rushed into action, rapi~ ex-
panding the scope of their activities and in some instances duplicating
work which had already been performed by the Red Cro8s or other
agencies.
Genuine fear ot attack and uncertainty about what had happened
at Pearl Harbor bred rumors. A whispering campaign suggested that
Japanese truck farmers in California were inoculating their produce
with poison in order to dispose of their customers. The Los Angeles
Times on December 11 captioned an article: "Vegetables Found Fre. ot
Poisons" and labeled "rumors ot possible sabotage ot California through
poisoning or other means" as "simplY' malicious and unfounded," stating
that more than 2,000 samples ot Japanese-grown produce had been ch~ '
ically analyzed and found to be pure. At a later date chemical anal-
ysis disproved a rumor that Japanese canned crab in stock in the markets
had ground glass in it. The Seattle Post Intelligencer ot December 11
carried the headline: ffFitth Columnists Set Plane Beacon Fires Near Pt.
Angeles," and described flaming arrows pointing toward Seattle that had
presumably been planted by "fifth columnists seeking to guide Japanese
air invaders." On an inside page of the same edition was a s-ll item.
in which the Assistant Governor stated that the fires had been set by
white men who were clearing the land of brush and that the arrow shape
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ot the beds of coal. was in all probability coincidental. Ev8r1Where
on the West Coast, bru8h tire8, flashes of light of any de8cription,
and 8tray gleams in a blackout were given a sinister con8truction.
Both official. and ordinary civilians saw signs and'portent8 with 10-
crea8ing ease.
However, throughout these weeks of December there was no con-
certed move to OU8t the Japanese American minority tr<ml the We8t Coa8t.
It i8 true that the San Louis Obispo Independent, a minor paper, was
fir8t in the field with a recommendation to evacuate the Japane8e--on
December 12--but the item was not picked up by other paper8. On the
whole the pres8 was con8ervati ve in attitude toward the people who
8hared ance8try with the en--r across the Pacific. Many paper8 were
inclined to U8e feature stories which, if not SJmpathetic toward the
wartime situation of the re8ident Japanese, were at least objective.
Radio c~entators and the pre88, generally speaking, appeared to be
under the influence of Attorney General Biddle, who on December 8 began .
his plea for fairnes8 and the avoidance of witch-hWlting,.37 and on the
lOth stated: "The great majority of our alien population will continue
to be loyal to our democratic principles if we, the citizen8 of the
United States, permit them to be."37-a On the 8ame occa8ion he prom-
ised: "No alien was apprehended, and none will be, on the score of
nationality alone." Every few daY8 he i88ued statements to the pre8s
or spoke over the radio, assuring the public that the FBI had the die-
. loyal eleaents identified and under control, warning that the defense
of our country would be hurt, not helped by anT per8ecution of noncit-
izens. Until Christmas the Pacific State governors echoed the senti-
ment8 of the Attorney General, affirming their confidence in the abil-
ity of the FBI to de~ with all subver8ives. It might be 8aid that at
thi8 ttme the voice of the Attorney General was the voice of reason,
of faith in the democratic tenets, and for a short time that voice
dominated public sentiment.
Even during those days, however, factors and figures and even
a Cabinet member's verbal ineptitude were stimulating the racists to
action and spreading the kind of confu8ion that was bound to enlarge
the following of the racists and thus allow the voice of prejudice,
hysteria and hatred to swell and soar above the voice of reason.
On December 15 Secretary of the Navy Frank Knox reached Wash-
ington, returning from a hurried flight to Oahu to inspect the scene
of the December 7 attack. On the day of his return he held a large-
8cale press conference, in the course of which he stated that "the
most effective fifth column work of the entire war was done in Hawaii,
with the possible exception of Norway." On the same occasion he paid
tribute to the heroism of workmen of Japanese ancestry at Pearl Harbor
who "deserted their benches to help the marine defense battalion man
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.machine gun nests. Two of them with hands blistered from hot gun
barrels reqUired emrgencY' treatment.tl3S
Under the date of December 20, 1941, Curtis B. Munson, Special
Representative of the State Department, reported from Los Angeles in a
final inst.allment of the comprehensive report which he had been sent to
the West Coast aM to Hawaii to make. on the Japanese question:
"We desire respectfullY' to call attention to a state-
ment of the Secretary of the Navy evidently made to
sane reporter on his return to Washington after the
Pearl Harbor attack as printed in the los Angeles Times
of December 18th and the Los Angeles Herald and EJq)I'8S,S
of December 16th. Thi. release was a U. P. and A. P.
release.
"We quote, t I think the most effect! ve Fifth Column
work of the entire war wa,s done in Hawaii with the
~possible exception of NorwaY', t Secretary of the Nav,-
Knox said. We suggest that this paragraph creates
the wrong impression in that it uses the tenn t Fifth
Colwm. t This tenD is loose and has been widelY'
abused. Should not the term. 'complete physical
espionage' have been used instead? 'Physical espio-
nage' is supplied unwittinglY' by the gabble of Navy
wives, bY'tt18 gabble of loyal second generation
Japanese, bY'the gabble of the postman and the m1lk-
nan and classified bY' defin1 te agents of a foreign
government. To this maY' be added years of photo-
graphing, sounding and 'look seeing' by ~sloyal
and paid American people for the last twenty years.
Fifth Column activities, such as in NpBWaY', impugns
the loyalty of a certain large proportion of a
population. Your observer still doubts that this
was the case in Honolulu.
. *********
"Some reaction of an undesirable nature is alreadY'
apparent on the IVest Coast due to this statement of
the Secretary's. In Honolulu your observer noted
that the seagoing Navy was inclined to consider every-
body with slant eyes bad. This thought stems from two
sources: sell-interest, largely in the economic field,
and in the Navy usuallY' from pure lack of knowledge
and the good old 'eat 'em up alive' school. It is
not the neasured ju~nt ot 98% ot the intelligence . ""4- - "'"
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services or the knowing citizenry either
on the m~inl~nd or in Honolulu. * * *
" * * * Your observer suspects that Secretary
Knox' s comparison to the Fifth Column in Nor-
way st_s frC81 either of tw things: First, a
very buq man being caught by the coattails by
a ,reporter; and second, from the unknowing
teat' 'ea up &li'Ve' element amongst wh~ of
necessity he. was largely exposed in his hurried
'Visit to determine responsibilit1~n39-b
Slightl1 more than 4 years later, in the course of the hearings
before the Joint Committee on the In'Vestigation of the Pearl Harbor
incident, Mr. Munson' a report was introduced to establish the fact that
the late Secretary Knox had meant, not ftFifth Column work" with its
iaplication of deliberate and planned sabotage b1 resident Hawaiian
Japanese, but "espionage," chiefly by paid consular agents.
In the 4-year interval between the Secretary' s semantic slip and
its official correction, 120,000 people were excluded from their homes
and sources of li'Velihood under a cloud. The majority of these people
li'Ved for the better'part of 3 years in barrack communities in the
wastelands of the interior behind barbed wire fences that were patrolled
b1 a~ed military guards. Roughly 35,700 of the people had left these
barrack cOD8lunities, by the time that the War Depar~ent revoked the
mass exclusion order, for resettleBent in midwsstern or eastern COD-
munities or, in the case of more than 10,000 of the young men, to pro'Ve
their loyalty to the United States by offering their intelligence anq
their li'Vea in defense of the country of their birth. Then the War
Department authorized the return to the West Coast of all except a few
. thousand who had rejected ,the American way of life.
Back in December of 1941, other happenings were influencing
public sentiment away from reason. On December 20, Admiral Gfoeenslade,
of the 12th Naval District, in an appeal for the end of a'welders'
strike ,in the shipyards stated that Japanese submarines were attacking
shipping off the West Coast. The very day of his announcement an
American tanker, A~worlq, was fired on off Cypress Point, near
Monterey, but got to port on its own power, and a second tanker, the
F.lidio was sunk off Eureka. Fi'Ve of the crew were lost, the remaining
~;urvi'Vors being picked up from life boats.40 On December 22 an
en.., subBarine fired on the freighter H. M. Storey off Point Arguello,
near Santa Barbara, but missed.4o-s. On the twenty-third, the Union Oil,
Tanker, !2ntabello~ was hit by a torpedo "off California," and the
&!£rY Doheney was shelled but escaped.4Q-b The West Coast residents
were convinced that the coast was blockaded by a fleet of enemy sub-
aarines. However, after Christmas Day, when an Army bomber sank one
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8ubBarine off the California coast,4l the submarine attack8 on Coa8tal8hipping cea8ed. -
As Christmas DaY' apProached, an uneasY' feeling spread among the
coa8t population that Japanese militarists might well think that the
Christian holidaY' was an appropriate time for an attack on the West
Coast. There was no attack, but the day brought neW8 of the loss of
Wake Island. It brought, too, the fir8t 8hipload of wounded together
with women and children refugee8 fro. Oahu to San Francisco, offering
California visual evidence of the fact of war and some Hawaiian-bred
rumors. The refugee8 fran Hawaii brought unverified report8 of 8abo-
tage perfor8ed bY' ISland Japanese on December 7: it was said that on
that SundaY', Island Japanese blocked the road to Pearl Harbor .~th .
trucks to prevent reinforcements and ambulances from getting through,
that they had ramm.ed planes on the flying fields, that they had entered
Hickam Field in a milk deliftry truck just before the attack, and when
the first bomb8 fell theY' had let down the sides or the truck, reveal-
ing a machine gun nest, from which they shot down the American flY'er8 .,
as they tried to run to their plane8. These 8torie8 circulated quic~,
received wide8pread credence and 'produced a marked change in the public ~
attitude toward the Japanese American population in California and the
other coastal States. too, they gave 8upport to the interpretation
which had been given SecretarY' Knox's use of the term "Fifth Column."
In the last daY's of the Y'ear, with the darkening war picture, prejudice
and suspicion increased. The daY' after Christma8 the capture of Hong- I
kong was confirmed by London. Daily the news from the Philippines
grew worse. There were 8poradic attacks upon local Japanese, chieflY'
bY' Filipinos. The first of these was reported bY'the LoB ~lg;l~e Tim~~
on the day be.:(ore Christmas. The victim happened to be a Nisei who had -
been honorably discharged fr(D, the United States Arm,y Medical Corp8
earlier in the Y'earj he was found stabbed to death in a Los Angeles
street earl7 in the morning of December 23. On Chri8tmas Day a Japa-
nese was killed in Stockton.4l-a In the next week or 10 da7B there
were attack8 upon Japane8e in San J08e,4l-b Gilro,vl.l-e and Sacra-
aento.42
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~CHAPTER II
-
~ RALLYING OF THE RACISTS
ar JanuarT the voice of the racists, the old pressure group.,
lifted again in clarion fuhion, with slogans and arguments and battle
cries. Until war between the United States and Japan provided condi-
tion8 favoring a reinterpretation of certain guarantees contained in
the Con8titution of the United States, the Exclusion Act of 1924 had
remained the greatest victor7 achie.,..d b7 the West Coast anti-Japanese
forces. It was not that the anti-Japanese forces had been content
after 1924 but that between dr88llS of depriving the Nisei of their oit:J...
. zensh1p and ridding the coastal state. of the Japanese already in resi-
dence and the realization of those dreams stood the substantial ob-
etacle of the Constitution. Certain organizations, comprising the anti-
J&panes~ front passed 78ar17 re.olution8 recommending amendment of the
Constitution to permit denial of citizenship to the American-born on
racial ground8 and to s1mplit7 procedures for deportation, but the
resolutions were produced and reproduced without &n7 real expectanc7 of
; their achieving their objectiV8~--until war between the United State.
and Japan presented the raci.ts with a golden opportunity.
It took the pres.ure gro.ups of the West Coast approxiaate17 a
! month to recover sutficient17 froa the shock of the attack on Pearl
Harbor to realize the advantage which the nature of that attack had
&i Ten theBe For eo long, on so many occasions, the7 had cried "Wolf,
Wolfl" without a wolt on the horizon, that the sudden materialization
of one m&7 have robbed thea of speech. Whatever the reas9n, this
uauall,y vocal element was not1ceab17 silent on the subject 'of the Japa-
nese Aaerioans until after Christmas of 1941.
On December ,30, the General Hunter Liggett Chapter 100 of the
Kilitar7 Order of the Purple Heart "voted a letter to President Roose-
velt asking that all Japanese be removed to inland points froa Cali-
fornia coast counties."4l-d On January 16, 1942, there began in the
California Senate the first whittling awa7 of State civil liberties
guarantees. Senator John Harold Swan of Sacramento introduced a re.o-
lution urging specialloyalt7 investigations of Nisei State civil-
service employees. Mr. Swan stated that he believed that 50 percent ot
Japanese Aaerican citizens in the state were disloyal., He and Senator
Jack Metzger of Red Bluft produced a photostatic copy of a payroll
8heet of the Motor Vehicle Department which showed only Japanese names;
Mr. Swan "contended this was a systematic plot to get Japanese on the
state payroll and allow them to bore from within." Mr. Metzger,
defending the proposed resolution, enlarged a little on the original
milk-truck story, saying: "Japanese fifth columnists in milk wagons
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~drew machins guns instead ot milk botUes out ot 2l wagons in Honolulu
the morning ot DecMber 7 and turned th- 011 Pearl Harbor barracks. "42811&
An editorial appearing in the Sacramento Union on Januar,. 18 W&8
sharPlY critical ot the plan to investigate the lisei personnel:
"line aonths ago, however, when war was in the
- . otting and Swan was still a great one tor ciYil
liberties, he voted in favor ot a bill provid-
ing that in applying the State ciYil service
act, 'it is unlawful * * * to permit or sutter
I &D7 notation or entr,- to be _de (in civil
"& serYice records) indicating or in any wise
~ suggesting or pertaining to the race, color, ,
;: or religion ot aD7 persons whatsoever.'
.."
~ "!his bill was subsequent~ passed and bec&88
r the law of the state--the law under which the
t State personnel board now administers the ci vU
r service act.
t "Prior to December 7 that attitude was known as
C gU&rante.i,Dg the civil libertie8 ot aU Ameri-
cans. And since December 7 the President and
the Justice Departaent have appealed urgent~
tor tolerance among the peoPle ot the nation
with those fello..citizens who chance to be
descended troa the natives ot the countries
with whom. we are at war.
"This appeal, ot course, has fallen rather
flatly on S08.e ears that have' been deafened by
the h7steria of war.
"It is utterlT deplorable, however, that th1.
~.teria should be reflected in demands on the
part of our elected representatives tor legis-
lative inve.tigations ot the racial background
ot American citizen..
"Senator Swan and all his colleagues know verT
well ,that citizens of Calitornia cannot be
barred from state employment simplT because
, their parents are Japanese nationals.
"So what good purpose could possiblT be served
bT bringing 'the matter up and trying to launch
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an inTe.tigatioD that could only .tir up the prejudices
of people Doee emotions &1.ready are near the boiling
point?
n * *. * 'ftle Swan reeolution, as finally passed was
aod1tied considerably. We hope the investigation it
may touch off will not be a witch hunt.
"'1he idea of e1mply making an inTestigation into the . -
racial composition of the state's personnel looks like
a plain example of racial persecution.
"It Senator Swan, the ex-champion of ciY1l1iberties,
still doesn't get the point, we might refer him back
to a bill which he hi88elf introduced in the regular
session of the legislature last spring:
"'EYery person who maliciously and wUfuily harasses,
disturbs, annoTs, injures, or molests another person
becau8e of his race or ancestrT is guilty of a II1s-
demeanor and upon conviction shall be punished bT a
fine not lese than $200 or bT imprieonment in the
county jaU not le8s than 90 daTs, or bT both such
tine and 1aprisonaent.'
I - . "In the present instance, it would seem that Sacra mento's enator s fortunate that this great piece
of civil liberties legislatiop which he introduced
last Tear. failed to get out of committee."42-b
HoweTer, the TerT dq that this editorial appeared, the chairman
of the State Personnel Board said that the board' s hands were tied un-
le.s the legislature gaTe the board power to abolish civil-service
lists, adding that it was his opinion that the legislature would be
giving the board "too much power" in that event.42-c A feature story
which appeared a few daTs later in the Sacraaento Union contained the
opinion that the Personnel Board probe into the 10yaltT ot Nisei State
emploTees was a "hot potato.n The writer pointed out that the board,
before it could act, had two preliminary steps to take: first, it would
haTe legal sanction for eRploy1ng such a measure against American citi-
zens of Japanese ancestry who might hold dual citizenship; and, second,
it would have to formulate a policT for determining .the loyalty ot such
citizens and procedures tor trying and di8m1ss1ng those accused of
disloyaltT.42-d
.
On January 2l, Congressman Leland M. Ford of Santa Monica,
California, announced in Washington that he would urge Government offi-
cials to mOTe all. Japanese, whether native-born or alien, to
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concentration camp8.4l-e He was the first ot the West Coast Delega-
tion to propo8e maS8 evac,uationo Prom this time on demands from organ-
sationa, municipal authoritie8 and individual8 tor e:vacuation or evacu-
ation and detention of the Japane.e American minority increa8ed in
number and urgency.
On January 25, the San Franci8co E~~iner , which 8ince Chri8t-
ma8 had been carrying more am aore anti-re8ident-Japanese article8,
stories and letters to the editor, warned ot a new submarine menace.
"A griE wa~ that the We8t Coast be on the lookout
tor an attack on merchant ves8els 8imilar to that
8taged the last tew daY8 on the Atlantic coa8t, was
80unded by the Navy ye8terday.
"Enemy 8ubnarines have recently appeared off the
Pacific coast and unidentified vessels off Alaska, .
the 13th Naval Di8trict announced in Seattle. Should
the enemy 8trike, it would be ,the fir8t resumption ot
h08tilities oft the Pacific Coast since Christmas
week.* * *
"The thirteenth Naval Di8trict expressed appreciation
tor the action of British Columbia in removing all
en-.r aliens tram the coa8t. It said that the prov-
ince i8 extremely important in the defense of the
. 13th Naval District, which includes Alaska * * * the
exodu8 of aliens will be of inestimable value in the
defense ot the Northwest."4l-f
Further on the same item included rather vague hints ot Navy
report8 ot tlare8 at sea and blinker shore light_. ~ January 26,.
Senator Hiram W. Johnson of Calitornia, announced in Washington that
he was going to call an immediate conference of the Pacific Coast Dele-
gation to survey the entire problem of West Coa8t deten8e8,4-g while .
Los Angele8 County supervisor8 passed a. resolution for the remoTal ,ot
the 13,000 Japanese aliens from the Lo8 Angeles &rea and the California
Department of the American Legion, in a more 8weeping resolution,
demanded that all of California'8 93,000 Japanese, whether citizen or
alien, be interned for the duration.4-h At the same meeting, the Lo8
Angeles County supervisors ordered the discharge ot the 56 Japanese
American county employees, saying it was "impossible to distingui8h
between loyal and di8loyal members and it is not feasible to detail
Americans to 8hadow all the Japanese employee~o" The city of Los
Angeles followed suit and dismissed its 39 American-born Japanese, but
permitted them to apply for leaves of absence tor the duration of the
war. Wi thin 24 hour8 of the issuance of these orders by Los Angele8
official8, the State Personnel Board took action to bar, pending
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10yalt7 inveetigation, all "obvious" direct deecendants of enemy
nationals from taking future civil-service examinations in California,
and voted also to 1aunch an investigation into the 107alt7 ot current
State ..ployees, with emphasis upon cases ot presumed dual citizen-
ship--.as Boon as funds were made available to the Board.~t Senator
Metzger, an inaugurator ot the legi8lati ve resolution" behind the State
board' 8 action, prompti7 assured the board that the legi8lature would
"reimburse the emergency fund for any sums spent i~ investigating the
loyalty of state eaplo7ees." The Sacramento Union commented:
"Ofticia1l7, the board's orders will apply to direct
and immediate descendants of Germans and Italians, as
wen as Japanese. Wide discretion will be gi yen the
board' e administrative statt, however, and the use ot
the word 'obvious' made it apparent that the action
will be concerned primarUy with those of Japanese
extraction, particularly since descendants ot German
. and Italian nationals cannot be readily identified."42-g
Senator Metzger said 8Weeping1y: "1 do not believe there is a
single Japanese in the world who is not pulling for Japan regardless
of where born. They will spy, commit sabotage, or die if necessarT."
His friend and the resolution's co-author, Senator Swan, said that he
believed that. "most, rather than all, Japanese are sympathetic with
Japan. "42..g
There appeared on January 29 the first ~f a series of syndicated.
articles Written by the eastern columnist, Henry McLemore, during hie
brief vieit to California. In the San Francisco Examiner, the ~icle
was captioned: "Wh7 Treat The Jape Well Here?" In the Sacramento
Union, it was introduced b7 the etatsent: "AMERICANS ARE NUl'S: The.,.
should move Japanese from California. it Writing from Loe Angeles, Mr.
McLemore proteeted:
. "The only Ja~ese apprehended have been the ones the
FBI actually had something on. The rest of them, so
help me, are as free as birds. There isn't an air-
port in Calitornia that isn't flanked by Japanese
farms. There is hardly an air field where the same
eituation doe.n't exist. The7 run their store.. They
clerk in stores. The7 clip lawn.. They are here,
there and everywhere.
"You walk up and down the streets and '1'°U bump into
Japanese every block. 'nley take the parking positions.
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The1 get ahead of 1Ou in the stamp line at the post
office. They have their share or seats on. the bus and
street car linea.
******
"Eve~here that the Japanese have attacked to date,
the Japanese. population has risen to aid the attackers.
Pearl Habor, Manila. What is there to 8&ke the govern-
ment believe that the same wouldn't be true in Ca.1i-
fornia? Does it fe.1 that the lovely California
climate has changed them and that the thousands of
Japanese who live in the boundaries of this state are
all staunch and true Americans?
"I .. for the immediate removal of every Japanese on
the West coast to a point deep in the interior. I
don't mean a nice part of the interior either. Herd
'em up, pack 'em off and give 'em the inside room in
the badlands. Let 'em be pinched, hurt, h~1 and
dead up against it.
"SUre this would work an unjustified hardship on 80
percent or 90 percent of the California Japane"se.
But the remaining 10 or 20 percent have it in their
power to do damage--great damage to the American
people. 'ftley are a serious menace and you can't
tell me that an individual's rights have any business
being placed above a nation's saret1.
"If making one million innocent Japanese uncomfortable
would prevent one sch8ldng Japanese from costing the
life of one American boy, then let the mi]1ion inno-
cents surrero
" * * * There are sure to be 8OIne Americans who will
howl and scream at the idea of inconveniencing
America' s Japanese population in order to prevent
sabotage and espionage.
"Okay, let them howl. Let them howl timber-wolf type.
Our government has told us we face war. All-out war.
It has told us that we are up against the roughest
da1s in our history. It has demanded of us sacrifice
. and sweat and toil and all or the other of Mr.
Churchi+l ~ s graphic words.
!
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'"'!bat's all right" we will answer. &It let us have
no patience with the enemy or with any one whose
veiDa carry his blood.
"Let us in this desperate time put first things first.
And, who is to say that to the men and women of this
country there is anything that comes above America?
"Personally, I hate the Japanese. And that goes for
all of th8D.
"Let's quit worrying about hurting the en8m¥ls feel-
. ings and start doing it. "4~h
On January 29" 1942, the Attorney General of the United States,
acting upon recommendations made by General DeWitt" began designating
prohibited zones" small areas which surrounded electrical plants, dams,
and other vital installations. These areas were known as "spots." In
the course of a few days, 99 such spots were designated as prohibited
zones for aliens of enemy nationality. The largest areas were along
the water fronts of San Francisco, San Diego and Wilmington--the
Wilmington area included Terminal Island, the Japanese fishing village.
February 15 was set as the deadline for evacuation by enemy aliens of
the, prohibited spots, with the exception of a few of the larger and
last designated areas, principally a 4O-square~e area which embraced
a goodly portion of Los Angeles City and County. These exceptions were
to be cleared by FebruarY' 24.
The plan to clear strategic "spots" of aliens of enemr nation-
ality had been shaping since the first week in JanuarY'. During that
week Li-utenant General DeWitt and his Assistant Chief of Staff" Major
(later ~lonel) Karl R. Bendetsen, conferred with Attorney General
Biddle's s~cial representative, Assistant Attorney General James Rowe,
who had be~n sent out to San Francisco, and with Mr. N. J. L. Pieper of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The conferences, continuing from
January 2 to 5, led to an exchange of identical memoranda on January 6"
1942.
These memoranda l id down specific principles and procedures for
sateguarding the West Coast against espionage and sabotage which might
b. performed by aliens, and at the same time they showed, or implied,
that the Attorney General did not in all instances see eye to eye with
the Commanding General of'the Western Defense Command and Fourth Ar~.
The first principle set forth was that of the designation of restric-
ted or prohibited zones: .
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" * * * The Attorney General will designate restricted
areas. He will entertain Army recommendations. He will
re~e the ~ to determine the exact description ot
each restricted area. What further requirements he will
make will depend in large measure upon the nature ot
the area involved and the extent of. alien en.., popula-
. tion in such area. Indications are that, should Army
recommendations include areas in which there is resi-
dent a large number of alien enemies and evacuation will
thereby be rendered necessary, he will also require the
submission ot detailed plans tor evacuation and reset-
tlement. The Army has expressed disinclination to
compliance on its part with such a requ1r8Dent tor the
reason that the Justice Department will undertake an
alien enemy registration and will have in its poS8es-
sion all the information essential for planning pur-
poses once the proposed restricted areas have been
made known to that Department by the ~."3l000d
The memoranda cOOlBlitted the' Justice Department to registering
alien enemies "with the least practicable delay," to acquire photo-
graphs, tinger prints and tull personal data on every alien of en-.y
nationality who was be70nd the age of 14. The memoranda established
the fact that alien premise8 could be searched and alien person8
apprehended in emergencies without the formalit7 ot a warrant, and
the7 established the tact that dwellings 8hared by citizen8 and ali.ns
could not be 8earched without a warrant signed by a United States
attorney. The sixth principle set forth the Attorney General's regu-
lations for conducting broad scale searche8:
"The term 'mass raid' will not be employed b7 the
Attorne7 General. Instructions which have been or
will be i8sued to United State8 Attorneys and to
F. B. I. Special Agents will permit' 8pot raids. r
That i8 to say, if lists of known alien enemies
with the addres8es of each are prepared by the
F. B. I. and warrants are requested to cover such
lists, a search ot all the premises involved may be
undertaken s1mu1 taneously. Thus all of the alien
enemy premises in a given area can be searched atthe same moment. "3l-d .
As military and popular pressure for mass evacuation of Japanese
. residents from the coastal region increased, the Chief of the EnemT
Alien Control Unit of the Department of Ju8tice recommended to the
Attorn~y General that a spokesman for the Department of Justice should
be. sent to the West Coast to supervise the "spot" clearance program
and to convince California officials that the security of the West
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Coast was being safeguarded by the present system of FBI raids, seizure
ot contraband, and arrest of suspects, and that mass evacuation was un-
desirable and unnecessary. The Attorney General acted upon this rec-
ommendation, selecting Thomas C. Clark, of the Anti-Trust Division of
the Department ot Justice, to be his special representative to the
West Coasto -
Just arrived in Los Angeles, Mr. Clark was quoted in the preas
as stating on January .'30, that all Aaerican-born Japanese would be
placed under strict s~~.nce and those who tell under suspicion
would be sent to concentration camps in the Midwest.42-i
&ck in Washington.. D. C., Attorney tieneral Biddle, on Sunday
evening, February 1, the eve of the alien enemy registration, broadcast
over CBS a warning against the persecution of alien enemies, promising
that, the Department ot Justice would "continue to be on the alert in
protecting the internal security of the country," and concluding: "I
want to point out that the persecution ot aliens--economic or social--
can be a two-edged sword. Such persecution can easily drive people,
now loyal to us, into tilth column activities."38-a
At dawn of February 2, the first day of the alien enUly' reg1s- .
tration progr~, the FBI launched a series of spot raids on the Japa-
nese fishing village at Terminal Island. The Los Angeles Times gave
the number of arrests made in the first raid of the dawn series as 336,
and described the occasion in some detail:
"Armed with Presidential warrants--issued only in time ot
war, FBI, aided by Police and deputy sheriffs, .launched
the raid shortly after dawn, finding many of the aliens
still in their beds. * * * MOst of the Japanese taken in"
to custody were sped to the U. S. Immigration Station on
Terminal Island. Others were taken to outlying city and
county jails. The aliens will be held for investigation.
those considered dangerous to the national safety will be
!nterned for the duration, it was explained. The others
. are expected to be released.
" * * * Army patrol cars bristling with machine guns 1
threaded the narrow streets throughout the congested
Terminal Island res;idential district during the harbor
raid. There was not a single instance of any resistance
,being offered the otticers.
"As an additional precaution, however, soldiers were sta-
tioned at the drawbridge leading to the island, and at
the terry hou8e, the only other means of entrance and
exit.
i
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."Operatil's with .-chine-like efficiencY', the FBI
agents " hea~d bY' J. W. Vincent, in charge of opera-
tions, had prepared lists of the names and addr~s8es
ot all those for whoa warrants had been issued.
"'!he entire island was divided into areas of one or
two blocks, with a dozen or more men being assigned
to each distric't. In each instance an FBI agent,
accompanied bY' two polic_en or deputY' sheritts,-
rapped at the door ot a home ot an enemy' alien..
Alter being admitted theY' informed the occupant he
was under arrest and proceeded to take him to the
IIIIdgration Station. "38-b .
On Februar.,. 2, too, the Los Angeles Count1 Detens8 Council
recommended ~hat all dual citizen. be interned, while the countY'
manager urged ~h8 board ot supervisors to "clear the waY' tor use ot
temporarY' camps tor interned Jape in Antelope ValleY' and o~her loca-
tions," and the board applied to the Director ot the Bureau ot the
Budget in Washington tor tund. ~o care for the internees.38-b On the
same daY', in the Nation's Capital, washington and Oregon members ot
Congress joined in the plea ot their California colleagues tor speeding
up evacuation machinerJ. In San Francisco, on that daY', State AttorneY'
General Earl Warren opened a conference ot 100 California law entorc...
aent otticers with the declaration that (;alitornla was ttwide open" to
any kind of sabotage or fifth cC?luam activitY', and the oonterringotticers ~ted to ask the Federal Government to r8Rove at once all '
alien Japanese traa a 2~e-wide strip of Calitornia coastline for
the duration ot the war; theY' decided too to launch a tresh investiga-
tion ot land titles and tile ciTil suits tor escheat to the State ot
land which theY' .hould consider to be held illegally b7 Japane.8.* At
the sa.e t~e that the State attorneY' general was going on the record .
as ta~ring 8&SS exclusion ot Japanese aliens froa virtuallY' the entire
state, the State Governor in Scacramento was working in conference with
military and Justice otticials to reach a solution ot the problea ot
national securitY' without resorting to mass evacuation ot the Japa...
nese.38-c The reports ot the two conference., appearing on the same
page of the Los Angeles Times, highlighted the difference in attitude
and objec~i ve ot the two highe.t otficials ot the State ot Calitornia.
*The question ot the right ot Japane.e alien. to purchase land in the
naae ot their citizen children had been threshed out in tes~ caees dur-
ing the 'Twenties, with court decisions atfirming the righ~ ot .alien
paren~s unable to purchase land in their own right to bUY'it in good
tai~h tor their citizen children.
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In addition to the prohibited spots, the U. S. Attorney General
designated as Restricted Area No.1, a 500-mile-long strip of coastline
from the Oregon border southward, and" varying :1nwidth frcm 30 to 150
miles, including Sacramento. Designated "spots" within the restricted
area would be cleared of Axis aliens at the time prescribed, but the
area as a whole was not to be cleared: Axis aliens could continue to
live and work there, but after February 24 were to observe a 6:00 p. m.
to 6:00 a. m. curfew, and could not, without special permit, travel
more than five miles from their homes.
Tom Clark promised the peopl,e who" were faced with eviction that
everything would be "all right" and indicated that "farm colonies will
be established for the evacuated aliens and their families." Govern-
mental agencies were becoming aware of the problem of alien desti tu-
tion, and were, beginning to hold conferences on the subject .38-d
In the Nation's Capital, Pacific Coast Senators and Representa-
tives were becoming more and more agitated, and there was conflict in
attitude and opinion among them. The Los Angeles Times representative
in Washington wrote under dateline of February 3:
-"'"
"Heads of the Army, NaV1' and Department of Justice
today were asked to supply Pacific Coast Senators and
Representatives with a full account of measures taken
thus far to defend the West Coast against enemy attack
and also to supply detailed information on steps that
that have' been taken to solve the alien and native-
born Japanese situation.
"Divergent views of Coast members on both subjects
became more pronounced as Senator Downey of California
delivered a nation-wide broadcast tonight in defense
of Justice Department plans for handling the Japanese
evacuation problem and other Californians promptly
took issue with his contentions.
"Regarding Downey's remarks as inspired by Justice
Department spoke_en who are themselves unacquainted with
the real issues presented by the Japanese dual citi-
zenship situation, several members of Congress from
the Pacific Coast States prepared to take public issue
with his two principal assumptions.
"The first of these is that there is danger of popu-
lar uprisings against the Japanese of the Pacific
Coast, and the other is the Sena~or's assertion that
'Attorney General Biddle has acted with speed and
decision.'
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"RepresentatiTe Costello (D.) ot Hol~ood, was the
tir&t to challenge Downey'e poeition.
"'I have no tear whatsoever,' said Coetello, 'that
the people ot California will take the Japaneee
eituation into their own hands. But I do feel that
the people on the Pacific Coast understand their
peril and are absolutely justitied in demanding
proapt, intelligent and viaorous action trc:8l Wash-
ington authorities.'
"On the subject ot the adequacy and expedition ot
Biddle's procedure, Costello was equallY' emphatic.
'I don't agree with Senator ~wne7 that Attorne7
General Biddle has acted either with 8peed or
decision.* * * TWo months have p&8eed since the
Pearl Harbor incident, and onl7 now, alter two ot
the most critical months in our hietory, hae any'
action been taken. The prograa ot registering
aliene, ot barring aliene troll certain prohibited
zones, ot attempting to maintain a watch on Aaeri-
can-born Japaneee who 11&7 or 11&7 not contemplate
. acte of sabotage, won't prevent sabotage.I"38-e
Two c<8mitteee were appointed within the We.t Coast Delegation-,
one to investigate defenee preparation., the other'to exalline the Japa-
neee situation. On the latter collm1ttee were Senators Bone and Walgren
ot Washington, Senator Downe7 of Calitornia, Representatives Costello,
Welch, Elliott, Anderson, Voorhis, Leland M. Ford, Gearhart, Sheppard,
Thomas F. Ford and Rolph, allot California; Representative Pierce ot
Oregon, and Representatives Hill and Angell ot Washingto~ Senator
Walgren was made eh&i~ ot the committee and expressed the hope that
American-born Japanese would aid in the solution o.t the probl_,
saTing:
"As to the native-born Japanese, I know 8Ome ~ople
believe there are legal loopholes through which we
can work to remove them .tr~ the zone o.t danger.
I'm inclined to the idea of asking their cooperation
on such a proposal. I think i.t we ask .tor it and put
it in the right light, theY' will want to leave .tor
their own protection. "38-t
Paul Vo Mclt\ltt, Administrator of the Federal Securit1 Agency, in
response to Senator walgren t s recommendation that the Government should
pro~de dislocated Japanese with housing and work opportunities, an-
nounced that his agencY' was taking steps to meet this obligation.38-t
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Representative Martin Dies, of Texas, a few daTs before the
que8tion of allowing his Committee on Un-American ActiYitie& to con-
tinue another Tear came up before Congress, released to the press
detailed summarie8 ot his "Yellow Report," which at that time had not
been published. He maintained to the preS8 that if tne Administration
had allowed him to publish this report on un-American propaganda activ- .
i tie8 of the Japanese American8 the previou8 September, thu8 disclo.ing
hi8 Yiew of the operation8 ot the Japanese e.pionage 8T.te., "Pearl
Harbor couldn't have happened.n38-g Prom Februar,. .5 on, the Dies
material provided 8care 8tories for the yellow pre8S and kept cropping
up in many ot the more responsible news sheets of the West Coast. The
Lo8 Angeles Times hea~ined the tir8t disclosure ot the Dies Committee
findings: "DIES 'IEI.LOW PAPER' REVEALS JAP SPYOO A'rrEMPTS, PROBAII.Y
SUCCESSFUL, TO LEARN LOS ANGELES AQUEDUCT SECRETS DISCLOSED."3s-g 'lbe
next daT the paper headlined: "WATER PLOT CONFIRMED BY VAN NORMAN;
CORRESPONDENCE SHOWOO JAPANESE AT'lF.MPT O GET DATA GIVEI OUT.n There
followed a reproduction ot a photostatic cOPT of a several-year-old
letter from the Japane8e consulate to H. A. Van lorman, chief engineer
and general manager of the Los ~eles Water &reau, asking information
about the local water 8T8t8a.38-b An editorial in that i88ue of the
paper pointed out that there were some inaccuracies in the Die8 Report,
citing two:
.
"The committee implies that the Federal Bureau of
Investigation was somewhat at fault, since it did not
investigate the Japanese request to Van Norman but
passed the buck to the Army, whose San Francisco
office expressed disinterest in the matter as beTond
the scope ot the Ar~' s peacetime functions. But the
FBI had no 8pecific duties in regard to national
defense prior to 1939, though enforcement of the
Espionage Act of 1917 was part ol its work.
"The Dies committee is in error as to the official
post of Kiyoshi P. Okura, whom it describes as chief
examiner of the pitT Civil Service Bureau. He was
merelT one of 10 junior personnel technicians; but
it is admitted he could have influenced the obtain-
ing bT Japanese of ratings entitling them to be
considered tor appointment to citT jobs.N38-i
~e )faTor ol Los Angeles was advocating over the radio that all
Japanese, alien and native-born, should be removed to a distance of
.everal hundred miles from the coast and that they should be put to
work raising food for freedom, with the final admonition:
"EverT person of Japanese blood, whe~ever he be
residing in this country, should be made to understand
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that one single act ot sabotage-e.nyt.hing that might
assist the Japanese goyenment in this tiae of war-
will brand the entire Japanese popJ1ation not onl7
during the existence ot a state ot war but tor at
least a generation.n38-j
On the S8me da7 the Los Angeles Count,.. grand jurY' ftuna,niaoUSl7
adopted a resolution to Federal authorities urging ~ediate oust~
of all alien Japanese frOB the Pacific Coast cO8bat zone to avert tilth
column acti~ties and sabotage," adding that "serious consideration be
given to the removal ot Japanese other than aliens * * * in the inter-
ests ot 8aret7 * * * and protection of lite and propert7 and national
detense'. "38-k .
Back in Washington, D. C., Attorn..,. Gerieral B1ddle was still .
opposing the idea of interning all enemy aliens, protesting that such
a step would be "protound17 unwise and profoundl7 un-Am.erican," and
warning that it would cause retaliations on Americans caU&ht in en-.y-
occupi.d terri tor:y .38-1
,
General DeWitt issued sabotage alert orders to all officers, on
Februar7 6, and the newspapers of the coast carried the .essage next
day: KYou are instructed to be on the alert for sabotage and subver-
siye acts particularly in areas where defense activities exist. Report
immediately to this office occurrences of a suspicious nature." The
Los Angeles Times placed on the front page beside the news of the
sabotage alert a summing up of the latest changes in the Japanese
American situation:
"The alert came after Tom C. Clark, alien control
. administrator in San Francisco, announced that be-
tween 200 and 300 citizens of Japan, Germany and
Italy will receive written notices b7 next MOnd&7
to leave prohibited areas.
"He said other groups totaling 10,000 in Calitornia
and including 1,800 in the Los Angeles area must
. obey the Federal ouster order b7 Februar:y 24. Clark
aaid that while it was not intended to impose addi-
tional evacuations from agricultural areas after
Februar7 24, the Army is resurveying city territor:y,indicating 'possible further movement fro. those '
zones.
"The notices the aliens will recei ye through the maU
will instruct them to go to the Social Securit7 Board
office. in their communities. They will be given
information and access to attorneys to learn their
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ci vil rights, it theY' desire, and will recei'Y8 lunda
it thq cannot finance their enforced moves.
"Eftorts will be made to get th~ jobs in the in-
terio~perbaps in Utah, Clark said. '
"Possibilities ot detaining alien and other danger-
OU8 Ja.panese 111 the CountY" s string ot mountain
road camps and the jail honor tara at Casta1c were
explored yesterdaY' bY' Supervisor Roger Jessup and
Sheriff BiscaUuz. "3s...
. On an inner page ot that 'ebruarY' 7 i...e ot the Times there
was the tirst 8ign ot public awareness that Japanese residents were
. being victiadsed:
"Det~ed to halt asserted racketeering bY' junkaen
and secondhand furniture dealers upon the con!u8ecl
and panicky tandlies ot alien Japanese sei.ed bY' the
Federal Bureau ot Investigation at Fish Sarbor,
Captain Basil StarkeY' ot the San Pedro police d1 vi-
sion assigned a detail ot ti'Y8 men to the Terminal
Island area.
"StarkeY' quoted K. Higashi, president ot the Japa-
nese-American C1 tiseDs' League, as c~plaining
junkmen and used furniture dealers .ere telling
wive8 ot arrested aliens that the Federal govern-
.ent inteded to .ei.e their household belongings.
"Through this technique theY' were buying retriger- ,
ators, radi08, stoves and other furniture C08ting
trCml. $.50 to $200 tor from $I. to $5, loading their
purchases on their trucks and dri'9ing away', Higashi
complained.
.
"The police were instructed to aid Higashi in
warning his people not to 8acr1tice their belong-
ings.
"Higashi was aiding Y. SakaDK>to, head ot the
. Southern Calitornia Japanese Fishermen's Associa-
tion, to register aliens at the local post offices.
'!bey als9 were attempting to prevent hunger or
destitution among tAmilies ot aliens now in custody.
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MSakaoto said h. was obtaining power. ot attorneY'
. troa alien owners ot jigboat. to permit their sale to
prorlde tunds to support the tishermen' s t_of 1 of es
pending receipt ot Federal aid. About 45 ot the
s...ll tishing boats are involved.".38-n
Personal attacks made upon AttorneY' General Biddle through press
and radio were getting increasingly rlol~t. ~. Los Angeles Times
Washington representative reported that. the delaY' in Goverrment. action
t.o effect the removal ot the Japanese population from the West Coast
was caused bY' the Attorney General'. concern tor the guarantee. con-
tained in the to\1rteentb amendment ot the Federal Constitution. 'Dds
man wrote, under dateline of February 7, tr~ the Capital:
"It Lihe question ot American-born Japanea17 is hung
up in the Department ot Justice and ... Biddle hia-
selt hung it there.
"~e AttorneY' General ot t.he United States is not
o~ a lawyer, he occupies an ea1nent position as
one ot the co~'s foremost liberals. Ther. are
s_e who teel that. his news eXtend slightly beyond
the ro.eate horizon. ot Merica'. traditional brand
ot liberali-.
*********
"'ft1e ArJB7 and 1aV7 want the Japane.. rMOved tr~
Terminal Ialand and trom all other areas to which
the security and the national defense ot the count~
are related. Obnously Mr. Biddle represents a
bottle-neck, so tar as they are concerned.
"In the opinion ot Mr. Biddle ardin the expressed
~ews of Secretary ot war Stimson, the Attorney
f General has taken all steps ne.cessary to control
enear aliens in the United States and to so cir-
cUll8cribe their acti'dties as to greatlyldnimize
the danger ot sabotage bY' them.
"On the other pha.e ot the probleB--.h!ch realistic
citizens and otticials on the Pacitic Coast regardas even more perilous-Mr. Biddle has not been con- .
: . tent with bis own refusal to act. .
!
"He has sought to .discourage those who demand prompt
measure8 to ert ect the removal or the American-born
Japanese; and other depart8ents or the governaent
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at the request of the Department of Justice have
att_pted to 80rt pedal the whole thing.
"Kember. of Consre88 who haft their own duties and
responsibilitie's to consider and who are also
po.se8sed of a knowledge of the humanitarian as
.ell as the legal issues involyed, say that the
Attorney General can act at once in this matter it
he choose. to ac\."38-0
. Henry McLemore, alter a week in California, wrote his column
trc:a San Diego crying out upon the Attorney General for giving alien
re.idents of the larger "spot." untU February 24 to move out; and
concluded:
"lfr°. Biddle i. the Attorney General in Washington,
but he could run tor office in California and not
even win the po.t of third as.i.tant dog catcher in
charge of liver spotted airedale..
"'!bat's the way they feel about Mr. 'Bl.ueblood'
Biddle out here.
"Maybe the teeling is all wrong. Maybe they have
the man pegged incorrectly. I wouldn't know about
that. All I know is that Calitornians haye the teel-
ing that he is the one in charge ot the Japane.e
menace, and that he is handling it with all the
.everity ot Lord Fauntleroy plaYing squat tag with
his maiden aunt.
"I've been here a weelf now, and have traveled a tew
hundred mile. up and down the coast, and have yet to
,meet a man, woman, or child who doe.n't think tha.t Ifr.
Biddle'. handling ot the bow-legged sons and daughters
of the Rising Sun is Blight)" ridiculous."4l-i
FBI raids continued, with more .pot raids on communities in the
Salinas ValleY', the Vallejo area, and other parts ot the northern
di.trict and in the harbor areas of Los Angeles and San Diego in the
. south. In the meantime General DeWitt and Attorney General Biddle had
come to open disagreement on the des,ignation ot additional prohibited
areas. In a memorandum addressed to As sistant Attorney General Jame.
Rowe, Jr., on January 5, 1942, General DeWitt stated that the "Army- has
no wi.h to undertake the conduct and control of alien enemies anywhere
within continental United States. Impressions to the contrary notwith-
.tanding, the Armr would accept transrer ot such responsibility and
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authority with the greatest reluctance.")l.. In r~terence to excluaion
areas, he said:
"In order to aTOid absolute corituaion in the matter,
ArJlY' authorities strongly urge that the Departm,ent ot
Justice undertake to establish immediate liaison and
coordination with all appropriate relief agencies
prepared to alleTiate hardship resulting tram com-
pulsory change ot residence on the part ot alien
enemies residing in Category A, restricted areas
fjhose areas within, or through which no alien may
be permitted under any circumstance.!?- As the De-
partment of Justice has requested permission to
announce that the establishment of restricted areas
has been made by the Attorney General only because
the commanding General of this theatre bas so requested,
military authorities desire it to be unequivocally clear
that they desire that everything possible be done to
eliminate unneceasary hardahip and the need tor plan-
ning and coordination along this line ia strongly
emphasized. ")l-t
Some weeks later, after making recommendations for the estab-
lishment ot prohibited spots in Californ1a--and these were accepted by
the Attorney General-tbe ColID&nding General ot the Western Detense
Command made recommendations for the establishment of prohibited zones
in Arizona, Oregon and Washington- To quote tram the general's tinal
report:
"upon receipt of these supplemental recommendation * * *
the Attorney General refused to act until further study-
In the ca~e of Washington State, the recommended pro-
hibi ted zone included virtually all of the territory
lying west of the Cascades - A general enemy alien
evacuation from this area would have been required.
More than 9,500 persons would have been aftected. No
agency was then prepared to supervise or conduct a
mass movement, and the Attorney General was not con-
vinced of the neceasity_"31-g ,
The Attorney General's reply to the Secretary of War on the
aubject of General DeWitt's large scale recommendations, dated Februsry
9,1942, contained the following:
"Your recommendation of prohibited areaa for Oregon
and Washington include the cities ot Portland, Seattle
and Tacoma, and therefore contemplate a mass evacua-
tion of many thousands* * * No reasons were given for
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Lieutenant General DeWitt ha. been reque.ted to SUPpl7
the War DeJBr't.aeDt with further details and further
material b8to~ aay action i. taken on the.e reco.-
aendatioD8. I .hall, therefore await 7Gur further ad-
nce.
"* * ~ ~e e'Y&CU&tion * * * t~ thi. area would, ot
course; present a probl- ot very great "~itude.
'ft1e Departa~t ot Ju8t.ice i8 not. ph.Y8ica117 equipped
to carry out &D7 8&8S evacuation. It would mean that I
onl7 the War Department has the equiJment and per-
.omel to 8&n&ge the ta.k.
"'Die proclamations directing the Department ot Justice
to apprehend, and where necessary, evacuate alien
en81e., do not, ot cov.e, include American ci tizena .j
ot the Japane.e race. It the7 have to be evacuated, ~I " I belie" that this would have to be done as a 11111- !'
tar7 neces8it7 in these particular areas. Such action,
therefore, should in 87 opinion, be taken by the War
Departlaent and not b7 the Departaent of Justice. "3l-.oi1
nte DeW! t t report cCMDments:
"nte Commanding General thereafter sut81tted a resume :1
ot the llilitary considerations which prompted his 1
rec~endation tor a prohibited zone in Wa.hiI1gton
and Oregon _bracing virtually the .esterl7 halt of
tho.e states. The Department of Justice, however,
concluded that it was not in a position to undertake
any mass evacuation, and declined in any event to
admini ster such gene~al ci vi1 control aeasures. "3l-d
It states further that at thi. time there were "hundreds ot
reports night17 ot signal light. visible frOB the coast, and of inter-
cepts ot unidentified radio. tranam1ssions. Signaling was otten
observed at premises which could not be entered without a warrant
because ot mixed occupancy. The problem. required imediate solution.
It called tor the application ot measures not then in being.")l-i That
statement was tootnoted as follows: "It is interesting to note that
toll owing the evacuation, interceptions of suspicious or unidentitied
radio signals and shore-to-ship signal lights were virtuall7 elimi-
nated * * *"
Governor Olson at Calitornia, at that time in trequent conter-
ence with General DeWitt, began to share the lat~er's w°rrT about
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shore-to-ship signal~ and radio diablerie as the day for clearance
of Axis aliens rr~ the designated spots drew near ~ but he continued
- to resist the idea of 8&8S e~cuation~ over the radio and in press
conferences; he appealed to young li.ei representatives in conference
to cooperate in handling the evacuation of Axis nationals from the
spots and to assist the war effort. He was quoted in the Sacramento
Union as sayi~ to the Nisei: "'&ere isn-t any middle grouM for Jap&l-
nese JAmeric&D! citizens. Loyal Japan,se will have to make sacrifices,
but i1 you are not prepared to go all the -:ay, you ought to be con-
centrated." He ended this conterence by declaring that he was "quite
heartened" by the attitude of the Japanese Aaericans.42-k
On February 7, Representative Martin Dies intormed the press in
Washington that he had ninforma~ion" which he be~eV8d to be "reliable"
that Axis forces would attempt to land simultaneously on the United
States East and West Coasts within the ftext 12 months.U-j The
announcement rated scare headlines in those days when the Nation was
suffering a fairly bad attack of nerves. ~ the saae day the same
Congressman said that his cO8dttee- had "decided tentatively to pro-
pose that all Japanese in Pacific coast .tates be removed at least 500
miles inland and interned," that Justice Departaent moves designed to
protect the Pacitic area had not been fully ettective and that the
Japanese had taken advantage ot "protection ot civil rights" to "pro-
mote syst888.tic espionage such as prepared the w..,. for the attack on
Pearl Harbor." named the Central Japanese Association as an instrument
ot espionage and bestowed upon it 150,000 members, a number consider-
ably in excess of the total number of Japanese and Japanese Americans
in the entire continental United States of either sex and any age, and
ended by an assertion that '~en Pearl Harbor was attacked, Japanese
truck drivers ran their machines into United States planes on the
ground, others disabled aut~obiles ot army and naVT officers and still
others threw furniture into the streets to blockade them."42-l
Tom Clark was assuring a jumpy populace- that if the designated
spots could not be cleared by the deadlines of February 15 and 24, he
would recooaend the establishlaent ot restricted 8artiallaw.42.-
Representative Leland 'ord~ trom Santa Monica, California, .
delivered a radio address on February 9 to advocate evacuation of both
alien and citizen Japanese, assuring them and the public at large that
their removal could be managed in orderly and h1_~!,~ tarian fashion, and
called upon the American-born to take the initiative in this program,
prOidaing them that other citizens would applaud their loyalty and
sympathize with them tor their plight. He said:
"Thi~ inland placement and the handling ot these people
. to be so placed, certainly would * * * be an exsn-plUication showing the ditterence in the way people .
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ar. handled 1D a d80cracy, &s against the W&Y' they
are handled under Axis dictatorship.
"'ft1ese people would be treated with the greatest
consideration, kindness, justice, courtesy and human-
itarian understandiD8. 'ntey would be well housed,
, wen t ed, well clothed and r80ved from &D7 ot the
daDgers of war activity whatsoever, with no pos81-
bilitY' of being ~bed or exposed to shell tire.
In other words, theY' would be safe.
"It the loyal Japanese would yoluntarUY' cUrT out
the program as outlined above, theY' would surely be
makin& sOm. sacritices, but certainl,y, this contri-
bution and sacrifice, which I hope theY' will make
TOluntarily~ is not nearl,T as great as the sacri-
I\r fice and contribution that the man makes who gi yeS
his lite, or the tamil7 makes, who give their
closest kin * * *"38-r
On Ta1esday ~ Febmar7 10, 1942, po.ters were put up on Termi na 1
Ieland by Department ot Justice order, warnin& all Japanese aliena that
the deadline for their departure was the following Monday, FebruarY'
16.38-p HoweTer~ on Februar,. 11, Without warning, a Presidential order
transferred Terminal Island to the jurisdiction ot the H&~, and Secre-
tary Knox instructed Rear Admiral R. S. Holmes, CoJIIIandant ot the 11th
laval District in San Diego to notit,.!!! residents ot Terminal Island
that their dwell~s would be condemned and that they would be evicted
within 30 da,.8.3~ 'Ibis arrangement automaticall,y cancelled .the
orders of the Department ot Justice, and on the face ot the matter, it
seemed to constitute a reprieve ot eviction sentence. Betore a week
had p&sse.d, the residents of Terminal Island were ordered to be out
within 48 hour. ot notification.
Aliens required to mOTe out ot a prohibited spot b,. Justice
received individual mail notice. which stated that the,. could get
information and, it they needed it, assistance tro. their local Social
Securit,. Board. 'ft1e Federal COvemment, using Tom Clark as coordinator,
had arranged with the SOcial SeC~itY' Board that the latter would loan
to the Department of Justice, personnel from the &reau of Public
A,s81stance to register and as~ist aliens affected by the spot clearance
orders. These people functioned in the USES offices within each count,..
The,. were supposed to be ready to serve at the t~. that the registra-
tion ot aliens in the post otfic,e~ began, but they were slow to get
.tarted, and the Los Angeles office was not set up until February 9.
On request, theY' provided vans, transportation and even grocery orders
to affected aliens. The spot evacuation of aliens was a comparati T8~
simple it personallY' distressing matter J for in general onl,. the
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individuals left, moving over the line with friends or relatives; some-
tiaes only the father of a family would be an ali~n, sometimes onlY the
mother. It both ~nts were aliens but had a citizen child old enough
to take over the re8ponsibili ty of the home and business, only the
parents went. According to the persona who worked in the hastily set
up offices in the USIS stations, ver7 few Japanese asked assistance.
The case of the Te~ Islanders was different. Theirs was a
small scale mass evacuation which involved everybody on the island,
whole families. Because of the change in jurisdiction and the cancel-
ing of Justice orders, the evicted received no notices of instruction
by maU to inform them where they could get help fran the Gove~ent.
They were simply told to get out within 48 hours. It they were aware
that they might expect assistance from an office an hour-and~half
ride fram home, there was no time to go and spend more time standing in
line and being questioned all over again. They packed what they could,
and church groups which had been interested in the problems of the
Japanese Americans took over, borrowing, renting and begging farm and
delivery trucks to move out as much movable property as time allowed,
and transferring the people with their belo~ to hostels, quickly.
set up in churches and language schools in outlying communities. MUch
property was left behind, stacked on porches or in yards, because theresimply was not tiRe to get it out. .
The Los Angeles Times on February 11 mentioned that Tom Clark
and Mayor Bowron had gone to confer with General DeWitt and California
At torney General Earl Warren in San Francisco, "to try to get together
on this business." This was on the front page, along with the announce-
ment that the Congress group from the West Coast was 8UI8~ting that
there should be a system of permits issued to all persons living in .
defense areas to allow them to continue living there; it was proposed
that the defense areas be expanded to i,nclude the entire three coastal
States and Alaska..38-e Had this proposal been adopted, everyone living
in. the coastal states and Alaska would have needed a formal penlit,
whether he was lineal descendant of Pocahontas, John Alden, John
Hancock, or even a California Bear nag Riot hero. The progl'-am would
have been time consuming, and little more was heard of it. After con-
ferring with General DeWitt, the State attorney general announced that
he felt that this was a "military problem, not civil," and Mayor Bowron
said,. "I feel that DeWitt is awake to the situation and doing all he
can. "38-t
The Mayor of Los Angeles, back in time to make a Lincoln's
Birthday address over the radio, posed the question: "It Lincoln were
ali ve today, what would he do * * * to defend the nation against the
Japanese horde * * * the people born on American soil who have secret
loyalty to the Japanese Emperor?" And he answered his question in
this fashion:
7000790-46--9 (125)
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"There isn't a shadow ot a doubt but that Lincoln, the t~l ~
mild-laannered man whose memory we regard with almost lor
saint-like reverence, would uke short work ot round-
ing up the Japanese and putting th- where they could
do no hu..
*********
"'Die removal ot all those ot Japanese parentage must
be ettected betore it is too late. Those little men
who prate ot civil liberties against the interest ot
the nation and the safety ot the people will be tor-
gotten in the pages ot history, while an executive
in Washington who will save the nation against in-
vasion and destruction will be entitled to a .ecure
place beside Lincoln.-)8-u .
Wart1ae tear and hatred of the people associated in the e)"es of
other Americans with the enemy were not lessened by the news fr~ the
Pacific. ~ the end of the second week in February, the Allied force8
in the Pacific Theatre had, with the single except~on ot a naval raid
on the Gilbert-Jl&rshall Islands, been continually on the detensi ve and
might have been considered to be fighting a losing battle. Japan, on
the other hand, in addition to inflicting heavy irdtial 108ses on both
American and British forces, had taken most of the Philippines, Hong-
kong, 'l11ail&nd, Wake and Guam Islands, Sarawak, Tarakan, and other
8ections of Borneo, Koulaein in D.1rma, outlying ~tch and Australian
po8sessions, and the Malay peninsula up to Singa~re Island--and
Singapore was to surrender on the fifteenth of February.
. At this critical tille, a nationally known and respected col\8-
nist, walter Lippmann, had just arrived in Calitornia to look into the
Japanese question. In the first week of hie stay, his column written
in San Francisco on February 12 and titled "The Fifth Column on the
Coast" was syndicated throughout the Ration. The tone ot the article
was one of grave concern. His concern was so great, in view of the
danger. he had been told about, that he advocated .etting a8ide the
ci vil rights of citizens of Japanese ancestry, and produced an argu-
ment that was used by General DeWitt, by State Attorney General Warren
and many others. It was a convenient argument because it could not be
disproved except in the event of actual invasion by the araed forces of
Japan while the West Coast Japanese ainority was in residence: " * * *
since the outbreak of the Japanese war there has been no important
sabotage on the Pacific Coast. Fr<*. what we know about Hawaii and
about the fifth column in Europe, this is not, as some have liked to
think, a sign that there is nothing to be feared. It is a !~~hat
~h. ba:ow - is we!! organized and that it .is held back until it can be
struck with ~y..imul!! eff.!~~." He concluded with the paragraph:
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"What Washington has been trying to tind is a policy
tor de&ling with aU eneay aliens everywhere and all
potential titth columnists ever,where. Yet a policy
which 8&Y be wise in most parts ot the country m&¥
be extremely foolhardy in a combat zone. Theretore,
much the best thing to do is to recognize the western
combat zone as territorY' quite difterent fr<B the
rest of the countr7, and then to set up in that zone
a special regime. This has been done on the J.-taan
Peninsula, in Hawaii, in Alaska, in the Canal Zone.
WhY' not also on the threatened West Coast ot the
United Statee?"38-uu
Atter reading Mr. Lippaann's column on the subject ot the West
Coast Japanese menace, numerou"s other eastern columnists took up the
issue, many of th- referring to LipJD&nn's article, and stating out.;.
right that the7 had been keeping oft the subject deliberatelY', on the
a8sumption that the western agit&tiOl1 was just a further example ot
California's rugged anti-oriental spirit, but that it a man like Walter
Lipl'lB&r1n said the menace was .erioUs and that the Japanese population
s~ould be moved out of house and home, the7 would go along with him.
Its effect was perhaps most pronounced upon Westb~ook Pegler, who ha..-
. mered h<Be the points made by Lip~, from Chicago on Febru&r7 16,
cl~Yi"1g his column with the statement that if what Lip}D&1m said wae
true, "the Japanese in California should be under armed guard to the
" last man and woman right now and to hell with habeaa corpus until the
danger is over."38-T
In the opinion of some persons who have studied t~ factors whim
brought about the evacuation, Walter LipJ8&lm's article pld,.d an 18-
portant role. Alter hie brier inT8stigation of the coast Jap3Dese
eituation, 1Ir. Lipplann returned to the East and expressed no further
Tiews on the subject.
t ..
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CHAPTER III
FIRST 2)UND TO THE RACISTS
'D1e West Coast Congressional Delegation, on February 13, for-
JIIall7 rec0J8ended to the President "the iDIIled1ate evacuation of all
persons of Japanese lineage and all others, aliens and citizens alike,
whose presence shall be deeaed dangerous or inimical to the defense of
the United States from all strategic areas." A Washington press
correspondent reported:
"Members of the cO81ittee expressed confidence that
they will be able to persuade President Roo.evelt
that the danger of disastrous sabotage operations
in vital defenae areas is so great that prompt
action should be taken.
"IWe are aware of the gravity of asking a President
of the United States to order the evacuation from
any area of thousands of men and w~en who enjoy
the rights of American citizenship, f said a COB-
mittee member I 'but we feel the situation justifies
our position and will warrant al1)" action he may
take;'
"Lawyers on the committee, it is said, will go to
the White House with argwsents to substantiate
their contention that the evacuation plans as recom-
mended to the President today do not infringe the
c~ v1l liberties of any person who may becCD.e subject
to an evacuation order. "38-VY
.
The day after this recommendation was delivered to the Presi-
deut, Tbm Clark left Los Angeles by airline for Washington to confer
With the Attorne.,. General and to recaIBlend the removal of "all persons
deeaed inimical to the defense efforts." The Associated Press story
read:
. "Clark pointed out that there are about 60,000 Nisei
or American bom to Japanese parents and that while
the loyalty of m&n7 of them is unquestioned, it is
difficult to determine who can be trusted. 'The fact
that a citizen has rights under the constitution
presents a legal problem,' he added, 'and means that
the Risei cannot be evacuated except under eaergency
orders.' He mentioned other probl8Ds such as housing
and f eeding .
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"Declaring that all known dangerous enemy aliens
already have been placed in custody, Clark said:
'I intend to further rec~end that all persona who
are deemed inimical to the detense ettorts be re-
moved traa 'Vital areas already designated, and troa
such additiOnal 'Vital areas as may be designated by
the war and naV1' departments.' "42-81
On this s811.e day, February 14, 1942, the Co~ding General of
the Western Detense Command forwarded, to the Secretary ot War, his
tinal reca8aendations on the subject ot the "Evacuation ot Japanese
and other SUbversive Persons tram the Pacific Coast." Arter pointing
out the probabUity ot attack on shipping, coastal cities and 'Vital
inst.&11£tions in the coastal area, air raids, and sabotage ot vital in-
stallations, he explained hie convictions abOut the nature ot Japanese
Americans in this paragraph:
"The area l1ing to the west ot the Caacade and Sierra
Nevada Mountains in Washington, Oregon and California,
is highly critical not only because the lines ot COD-
munication and supply to the Pacific theater pass
through it, but also because ot the rltalindustrial
production therein, particularly aircraft. In the war
in which we are now engaged racial aftinities are not
severed by migration. The Japanese race is an enemy
race and while many second and third generation Japa-
nese born on United States soil, possessed of United
States citizenship, have become 'Americanized', the
racial strains are undUuted. ~ conclude otherwise
is to expect that children born of white parents on t,
Japanese soil sever all racial affinity and becaae
loyal Japanese subjects, ready to tight and, if nec-
essary, to die tor Japan in a war against the nation
ot their parents. That Japan i8 allied with Ge~
and Italy in this struggle is no ground for assuming
that any Japanese, barred frCB assimilation b'1' con-
vention as he is, though born and raised in the
United States, will not tum against this nation when
the tinal test of loyalty comes. It, therefore, fol-
lows that along the 'Vital Pacific Coast over 112,000
potential enemies, of Japanese extraction, are .. t
large today. 'nlere are indications that these are
organized and ready for concerted action at a favor-
able opportunity. The very tact that no sabotage
has taken place to date is a disturbing and contira-
1ng indication that 8uch action will be taken. "31-3
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His formal reccx-.endations were!
"(1) That the Secretary of War procure from the Pres-
ident direction and authority to designate military
areas in the combat zone of the Western Theater of
Operations, (if necessary to include the entire com-
bat zone), from which, in his discretion, he may
exclude 'all Japanese, all alien enemies, and all other
persons suspected for a~ reason by the administering
military authorities of being actUal or potential
saboteurs, espionage agents, or .fifth columnists.
Such executi Te order should --power the Secretary of
war to requisition the services of any and all other
agencies of the Federal Government with express direc-
tion to such agencies to respond to such requisition,
and further empowering the Secretary of War to use any
and all federal facilities and equiJDent, including
Ci vilian Conservation Corps Camps, and to accept the
use of State facilities for the purpose of providing
shelter and equiJDent for evacuees. Such executiT~
order to provide further tor the administration of
Id.litary areas for the purposes of this plan by. appro-
priate militar,- authorities acting with .the requisi-
tioned assistance of the other federal agencies and
the cooperation of State and local agencies. The
executive order should further provide that by reason
of military necessity the right of all per SODS,
whether citizens or aliens, to reside, enter, cross
or be within any military a~s shall be subject to
revocation and shall exist on a pass and permit basis
at the discretion of the Secretary of War and im-
plemented by the necessary legislation imposing pen-
alties for violation.
"(2) That, pursuant to such executive order, there
be designated as military areas all areas in Wash-
ington,Oregon and California, recommended by me to
date for designation by the Attorney General as
Category 'A' areas and such additional areas as it
may be found necessary to designate hereafter.
"(3) That the Secretary of War provide for the e»-
clusion traa such military areas,. in his discretion,
of the following classes ot persons, vis:
(a) Japanese aliens.
(b) Japanese-American citizens.(c) Alien enemies other than Japanese aliens.
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(d) An7 and all other persons who are
" suspected tor any reason by the administer-
ing military authorities to be actual or
potential saboteurs, espionage agents,
fifth columnists, or subversive persons.
"(4) That the evacuation ot classes (a), (b), and (c)
frQm such mil1~ areas be initiated on a designated
evacuation day and carried to completion as rapi~
as practicable.
"That prior to evacuat.ion day all plans be complete
for the establishment of initial concentration points,
reception centers, registration, rationing, guarding
transportation to internment points, and the selection
and establishment of interment factii ties in the
Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Corps Areas.
"That persons in class (a) and (c) above be evacuated
and interned at such selected places ot internment,
under guard.
"That persons in class (b) above, at the tiRe ot
evacuation, be otfered an opportunity to accept yOl-
untary internment, under guard, at the place of intern-
ment above mentioned.
"That persons in class (b) who decline to accept vol-
untary internment, be excluded from all military
areas, and left to their own resources, or, in the
alternative, be encouraged to accept resettlement
outside ot such military areas with such assistance
as the State governments concerned or the Federal
Security Agency may be by that time prepared to otfer.
"That the evacuation ot persons in cla8s (d) be pro-
gressive and continuing, and that upon their evacua-
tion persons in class (d) be excluded from all mili-
tary areas and lett in their own resources outside
of such military areas, or, in the alternative, be
offered voluntary internment or encouraged to accept
voluntary resettlement as above outlined, unless the
tacts in a particular case shall warrant other action.
"(5) The Commanding General, Western Defense Command
and Fourth Army, to be responsible tor the evacuation,
administration, supply and guard, to the place ot
internment; the Conmanding Qenerals ot the Corps Areas
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~concemed to be responsible for guard, supply and
administration at the places of internment.
"(6) That direct communication between the Command-
ing General, Western Defense Command and Fourth Army
and the Corps Area Commander. concerned for the pur-
pose of m~ necessary arrangements be authorized.
"(7) 'ft1at the Provost Marshal General coordinate aU
phases of the plan between the CoJimanding General,
Western Defense Command and Fourth Army, on the one
hand, and the Corps Area Commanders on the other hand.
"(8) That all arrangements be accomplished with the
utmost secrecY'.
"(9) That adult males (above the age of 14 years) be
interned separately from all women and children until
the establishment of family units can be accomplished.
"(10) No change is contemplated in Category 'B' areas.
"3. Although so far as the Army is concerned, such
action' is not an essential feature of the plan, but
merely incidental thereto, I, nevertheless, recommend
that mass internment be considered as largely a teD-
porarY' expedient pending selective resettlement, to
be accomplished by the various Security Agencies of
the Federal and State Governments.
"4. The number of persons involved in the recommended
evacuation will be approximately 144,000. (This total
represents all enemy aliens and Japanese-~erican cit-
izens in Category 'A' areas recommended to date.)
"5. It these recommendations are approved detailed
plans will be made by this headquarters for the pro-
posed evacuation. The number evacuated to be appor-
tioned by the Provost Marshal General among the Corps
Area Commanders concerned as the basis for fo~ula-
ting their respective plans. It is possible that the
state of California, and perhaps the State of Wash-
ington, will be able to offer resettlement facilities
for a given number of evacuees who may be willing to
accept resettlement.
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."60 Pending further and detailed study of the prob-
lem, it is further recommended: (1) That the Gommand-
ing General, Western Defense Command and Fourth ArBJ1',
coordinate with the local and State Authorities, in
order to facilitate the temporary physical protection
by them of the property of evacuees not taken with
them; (2) That the Commanding General, Western
Defense Command and Fourth Army, determine the quan-
tityand character of property which the adult males,
referred to in paragraph 2b (9), may be permitted to
take with them; and (3) That the Treasury Department
or other proper Federal agency be responsible for the
conserv~tion, liquidation, and proper disposition of
the property of evacuees if it cannot be cared for
through the usual and normal channels ."3l-k
Under the supervision of Assistant Secretary of War John L.
McCloy an executive order was drafted which would grant the military
such power over civilian life as was ~precedented in the history of
the United States, and a bill was drafted which would implement the
exe'cutive order with Congressional legislation and prescribe penalties
for violation by civilians ot any military rulings laid down under the
authority of the executive order.
While the country awaited Presidential action on the evacuation
issue, contusion was at a new high and acrid recriminations flew back
and forth from the West Coast to Washington, and between departments
and officials in Washington. West Coast Congressmen were heckled by
their constituents because of the delay; the Congresamen complained
angrily that their constituents were confusing the issue by making
"conflicting recommendations and appeals;" they blamed the President
tor his refusal to give them a personal, audience so that they could lay
their views before him; the War DepartMent resented the Attorney
General' s disapproval of the mass evacuation idea; Department ot Jus-
tice spokesmen "laid responsibility for inaction at the ArBJ1"s door,
asserting that the War Department can't make up its mind concerning
the disposition to be made ot American-born Japanese;" a group in Los
Angel.s was hardily proposing that the Nis.i should be excepted tram
any exclusion orders;3~w and "scores of American farmers" were report-
ing to the Los Angeles County agricultural cOmmissioner, "seeking
information on the ways and means ot taking over lands left idle by
evacuation of J~panese aliens tram prohibited military areas."38-x
In Washington, D. C., the President was faced with the necessity
of making a decision on such an issue as had never before confronted
a President of the United States. He was being urged by the West Coa.t
Delegation, by West Coast officials, by powerful organizations which
were exerting pressure through the press and radio as well &d by
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resolutions and petitions, and above all by the War Department and the
military c~ander re.pon8ible for the 8ecurity of the West Coa8t, to
exerci.. the broad powers that were hi8 in time of war by delegating to
the military extraordinary power over civilian life and liberty, a
power unPTecedented in American hi8tory except under conditions of
.artial law.
The President's Attorney General was opposed to such a delega-
tion of authority. The Attorney General's attitude toward this issue
was understandable on several counts: he was personally prominent
among the Mation's liberals; in his o~ficial capacity as Attorney
General of the United States, he had a more than academic interest in
keeping the actions of the Federal Government in line with constitu-
tional proVi8ions for the protection of citizens and resident aliens;
.ince one of his wartime functions was the safeguarding of national
security against espionage and sabotage, he could 8carcely have rel-
ished the imp1ication8 of the rising clamor for mass evacuation, as
such a demand obviously con.tituted & criticism of the w&¥ the Depart-
ment of Justice was performing one of its major wartime functions.
The careful and objective Munson Report on the Japanese situa-
tion in Hawaii and on the West Coast was available, and there was a
memorandum prepared by three of the President' s legal advisors. The
latter gave the President assurance that it was well within his war-
tiae powers to deal with the Japanese situation on the West Coast a.
necessity dictated, but it also warned against unreasonable assump-
tions, stating:
WThe power to prohibit entry by the general public,
citizens as well as aliens, into defined areas of
especial importance to the national defense is clear.-
The legal power to prohibit entry into such areas by
a particular class of persons or citizens rests upon
the reasonableness ~f the classification. So lonR
a8 a claesification of persons or citizens is rea-
sonablY related to a genuine war need and does not
unger !-;he guise of national defense discriminate
against any class of citizens for a purpose unr!:
lated to the national defenee no constitutional
~aranty is infringed. "*
Having warned against unreasonable assumptions, the report
straightway bogged down in a pitfall that catches many sincere persons
who have never known or seen many orientals. The report reads:
,j *underscoring adqed. )
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" * * * It is a tact and not a legal theory that Japa-
nese who are Aaerican citizens cannot readily be
identified and distinguished from Japanese who ow.
no loyalty to the United States. It is a tact and
not a legal theory that the unr.stricted aovGent ot
Japanese, American citizens as well as aliens, in
certain defense areas may lead, and has led 'in s.-
instances, to bloodshed and riot which cannot readily
b. controlled by police protection and which could
be injurious to our defense effort at a most critical
juncture. It is a condition and not a theory which
confronts the nation.
"The number ot person~ ot Japanese descent in the
three Pacific states is less than 110,000, includingboth citizens and aliena. Persons ot Japanese '
descent constitute the 8&llest definable class upon
which those with the military responsibility tor
defense would reasonablT dete~e to impose restric-
tions. NO one can tell a resident citizen or alien
trCXI. a Jaoanese soldier landed by oarachute trCD the
air or from small boats alOD.Q: the coast. Since ~he
Occiden . cannot rea dist sh one Ja ese
r.sident from another ettecti ve surveillance of the
movements ot particular Ja'Danese residents SUSD8c~eci
2f disloyalty is extremely diffic!:!!~ ~t'not pract~c~y
iapos8ible.*
"The Japanese problem is a special probl- which au8t
be met with a special remedy. Similar dangers ot
disloyal actiYities by citizens ot other racial stocks
cannot, and, in fact, need not, be handled in the same
way. It would, for example, present an insuperable
probl- of administration, not to mention the conse-
quent disruption of defense prod~on, to bar the
millions of persons of German or Italian stock from.
either seacoast area. MOreover, the normal Caucasian
countenances of such persons enable the average Ameri-
can to recognize particular indi Yiduals by distin-
guishing minor facial characteristics. It is thus
*Italics added. With all respect to the good faith of the three legal
advisors, the present writer contends that to anyone who has ever taken
. a good look at any two Japanese--barring identical twins--it is no more
difficult to distinguish between them than it is to distinguish be-
tween George Washington and Abraham Lincoln.
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more practical to leave the pre'V'8ntion of disloyal acts
by citizens ot European stock to the usual methods ot
police detection and surveillance.
"To meet this special Japanese problem on the West
Coast, precautioDar7 measures should be taken, but
these measures should be reasonably adapted to need,
and every ettort should be made to relieve unnec-
essary hardship. "43
'nle suggested aeasures did not include a 8&SS exclusion program,
but did include a proposal tor the establishment ot Special Defense
Areas which "persons of Japanese extraction should be allowed to enter
only under spec1allicense," and Limited Defense Areas, in which des-
ignated persons would be subject to curfew, blackout and other restric-
tions. . The mea.ures suggested to alleviate hardship were drafting or
enlisting American citizens of Japanese ancestry into the a~ed torces
ftand emplo7ing the. where they can be ot service to their country and
where they are least l1ke17 to tall under suspicion, justified or un-
justified." It was rec~ended that h~e guards under Army control
"should be utilized to patrol rural districts inhabited b7 Japanese
both for the protection of the Japanese and in the interest of the
national defense * * * ETer7 etfort should be made to avoid compelling
their migration, not onl7 for humanitarian reasons but because of the
serious effect it would haTe upon vegetable crops which are important
both to California and the nation." The report recommended estab~ish-
ing special reserYatioD8 at a "sate distance fro. the West Coast" where
the citizens could go 'voluntarily arid be "usefuU,y _ployed and liTe
, under 8pecial restriction8," ~d special reserYation8 within the
coastaJ. area where the popula~on was predominant17 Japanese, suggest-
ing: "Such reservations might be roped otf and all others than the
registered Japanese inhabitants of such reservations sight be debarred
tram entering such areas except under special licenses, while the
Japanese inhabitants would be forbidden to leave such reservationswithout special perJlit.n43 -
At the eleventh hour in the period of waiting tor Presidential
action, "presentative Elliott of Calitornia wired General DeWitt,
'" demandiaa that all California be declared a strategic area and all per-
sons ot Japanese ancestry be evacuated therefroa,42-D and the Cali-
fornia Joint Im8igration Commis8ion, on the basis that the Pacific
States were a combat sone and in danger, demanded that the Federal
authorities move out of California "every Japanese in California, alien
and citizen alike.w42-o The Attorney General bowed to the War Depart-
ment's thesis that in time of war the person best qualified to dete~
mine what constituted ailitarT necessity in a given area was the ~
manding general of that area and notified the President that the Attor-
ney General had withdrawn his disapproval ot the proposed exclusion
aeasure.
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\On February 19, 1942, the President signed Executive Order
No. 9066, which, under the wartime powers granted the President,
authorized the Secretary ot war "and the Military Co.-anders whom he
8&Y trom time to time designate * * * to prescribe military areas in
such places and ot 8uch extent as he or the appropriate Mili~ Co~
mander may determine, tram which any or all persons m&T be excluded."
The order further authorized the Secretary ot War to provide persons
di8located by exclusion orders with "such transportation, tood, shelter,
and other accommodations as may be necessary, in the judgaent ot the
Secretary ot War or the said Military Commanders. ft3l-1
Executive Order 50. 9066 cleared the way tor a c~ng gen-
eral to exclude indi'rlduals or groups ot indi'rlduals, regardless ot
their citizenship, trom any region he might designate. The language ot
the order was devised to avoid the appearance ot discriminAtion against
any specific racial or national group, but there was no pretense on the
part ot Government otticials or on the part ot the pre8s that the exec-
utive order was intended tor any purpose other than to ettect the
exclusion ot the Japanese tram the West Coast. Attorney General Biddle,
in announcing the President's action to the press, stated: HOt cour.e
th~ problem is mainly a Japanese problem," and admitted that it was
unlikely that ,any persons other than those ot Japanese blood would be
(attected. He assured Calito~nians, worried by rumors that martial law
~ wa. to be 'declared in their State, that the order did not constitute
martial law and that civil courts would continue to tunction. He
stated that persons ordered out ot an area "might ask tor writs ot
habeas corpus," adding, "I do not think the COurt8 will go behindmilitary judgment in the matter."41-k '
It was, tr~ that point, General DeWitt's prerogative to decide
whether the entire minority or only the alien third ot it should be
excluded.
,
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PART III .~)
TRIUMPH FOR 'DiE RACISTS
.
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CHAP'lER I
"A T '!HE DISCRE TION OF '!HE APPROPRIA'IE KI LI TAR! COMMANDER II
,
Most Californians were relieved when the President set his signa-
ture upon Executive Order No. 9066, but they were disappointed that the
Japa.nese population failed to disappear over night. Before 'the announce-
ment of the Executive Order was 24 hours old, the press was registering
complaints about the delay in getting the Japanese out.
Representative John Tolan, of Oakland, California, Chairdn of
the House Select Committee on National Defense Migration, arri vsd with
his coJIlllitteemen in San Francisoo to open hearings in that city on
February 21. '!he purJX>se of' the ,hearings was to explore the problems of
evacuation of "ene~ aliens and others fro8 prohibited military zones."
'!he Hearst press quoted Mr. '1blan as saying, on the first dq of the
hearings', that bombings in the ooastal region were a "practical cer-
tainty."4l-1 California's Attorney General Earl Warren testified that
the Japanese nd.nority was concentrated about the points of greatest
strategic importance; that the Japanese A~rican citizens oonstituted
the worst fifth column danger and should ,all be excluded from vital
areas; he DSntioned the approach of an "invisible deadline" when the
Nisei fifth column--as yet pure of sabotage--would rise up and strike a
8ha ttering blow in conjunction with aerial attack from the Japanese
enemy; he called attention to the fact that unsupe~sed migration of
Japanese to ,the interior had alreaqy caused trouble, and recommended
that a Federal agency should be put in charge to avoid exploitation
of the Japanese.I5-e
RiChard Neustadt, Regional Director of both the Social Security
Board and the Office of Defense, Health and Welfare Services, stated
, that of the 6, 500 alien enemies facing eviction under Depa.rtusnt of'
Justice orders who had called at his information offices to learn what
they should do and what rights they had, only 140 had asked for finan-
cial assistance. He said:
"However, that small number is not to be taken as a measure
of their need. Ra ther, it is to be taken as a measure of'
their pride and their desire to understand the reason for
this order and their desire to be as cooperative with the
Government as possible. In other words, we know of -rJ)""
cases who will need mney, who Mve strained every- resource
to move out of the prohibited are., but they prefer to
exhaust their own resources before aaking for any aid ot
ant kind."
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\He pointed out, too, that the Japanese residents were sacrificing
their property and that there had been "no provision for any custodian-
ship of any kind. "l3-f
Mike Jlasaoka, national secretary and field executive of the Japa-
nese American Citizens League testified at SODe length and Dade a state-
ment on the attitude of his people toward evacuation. The first sen-
tence of that statemnt has been quoted frequently .to establish the
willingness of the people to be evacuated, and the second sentence,
which qualifies that willingness, has usua~ been deleted. Here is
the full statement:
"If, in the judgnlent of military and Federal authori t.i.es,
evacuation of Japanese residents from the West coast is a
priDary step toward assuring the safety of this Nation, we
will have no hesitation in comp~g with the necessities
implicit in that j\¥igment. But, if, on the other hand, sum
evacuation is priuarlly a measure whose surface urgenCY'
cloaks the desires of political or other pressure groups who
want us to leave mere~ from motives of self-interest, we
feel that we have every- right to protest and to demand
equitable judgment on our uerits as American citizens."
He Dade SOlIS recomendations -for specific policies and procedures,
among which was one "'nlat, in view of the alarming developments in
TUlare County and other communi t es against incoming Japanese evacuees
an plans for voluntary evacuations be discouraged." He asked for the
appointment of responsible, oonded property custodians, made a plea for
"oonsideration and recognition of the Nisei's Amerlcan citizenship
status," and challenged the blanket accusation of disloyalty constantly
being reiterated against this group Which had a substantial representa-
tion in the armed forces of the United States.l3-g
'Dle testimony of Louis Goldblatt, secretary of the California
State Industrial Union Council, affiliated with the Congress of Indus-
trial Organizations, offered the most forceful and reasonable opposition
to the whole idea of evacuation on a national or racial basis that the
CoJllnittee was to hear:
.:; "We Lihe Union touncil7 naturally go along and concur with
all the recommendations that the Government dee~ necessary-
to safeguard this territo~. We feel, however, that a good
deal of this problem has gptten out of hand, Mr. !blan, in-
asmuch as ooth the local and State authorities, instead of
becoming bastions of defense of democracy and justice,
joined the wolf pack when the cry came out 'Let's get the
yellow menace.' As a matter of fact, we believe the present
si tua tion is a great victory for the yellow press and for the
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fifth oolumn that is operating in this country, which is
attempting to convert t1lis war from a war against the A:rls
Powers into a war against t1le 'yellow penl.' We believe
there is a large eleJent of that particular factor in this
present situation.
"I em referring here particularly to the attack against the
native-born Japanese, an attack which, as far as ~e can find
out, was whipped up. There was a basis for it because t1le~
has always been a basis on the Pacific roast for suspicion,
racial suspiciQn, which has been well fostered, well bred,
particularly by the Hearst newspapers over a period of 20
to 25 years.
"Well, the result is that during this present situation
local author! ties simp~ ran out on the problem. We are
happy to see the Federal Government step in and handle it.
We are hapPf to see your committee he~e, because, frarik~,
to date we haven't seen either civic or State leadership
that is oompetent to handle the problem or that has shown
a great enough degree of impartiality to merit being even
assigned the problem.
"So that, in addition to the fact that this entire alien
matter is. naturally one that belongs in the province of
the Federal Government, it is particularly important at
this time be cause, frank~, I think the only people who
have shown a semblance of decency and honesty and forth-
rightness in this whole situation are the second genera-
tion Japanese * * *
"What we are concerned with, ~. Chairman, is this: 'lliat
if this is to beoo~ the index ~f our dealings with the
alien proble~-in other words, that if we are not to deal
only with aliens but also with the descendants of aliens--
then there is no limit to this problem and the pro gram,
and this vitally affects our unions. It affects the prin-
ciples upon which we stand, affects the nature of our work,
our entire job in the administration of contracts and every-
thing else, because once this policy of making distinctions
or determining espionage or sabotage along racial, national
lines has begun there is no end * * *
"So that we can expect, I think, that if this campaign of
isolating the Japanese is successfUl the next step will be
for several incidents to occur which involve Germans or
Italians; then the whole of the wolf pack will scream to
the moon again and tllis time it will be 'Evacuate all
100079 o-46;~10 (141)
---
Italians, evacuate all Germans. I 'D1e principle will have
been set; Ule pattern will have been cut as it has been by
the Hearst press, by'the rabid, hysterical elements."
Mr. Tolan, as chairman, interposed: "Suppose you were General
DeWi tt or, the head of the Justice Iepartment on the Pacific Coast &rld
you had 120,000 Japanese. How -would you determine the loyalty and dis-
loyalty of these Ja~ese?" And Mr. Goldblatt replied: "In exact-;Ly the
same way I would proceed to tell who was a loyal or disloyal Italian or
German." '1b the question "Where would you get the information?". Mr.
Goldblatt suggested, that the FBI and other GoverI1DSnt intelligence
services kept pretty good files, and so did his own union, and that his
union had been in the habit of tUrning over information on espionage and
on the activities of the German Bund to the FBI. At this point Mr.
Tolan said:
"We had our F.B.I. in Honolulu, yet they had probably the
greatest, the most perfect system of espionage 'and sabotage
ever in the history of war, native-born Japanese. On the
only roadway to the shipping harbor there were hundreds and
hundreds of automobiles Qloggtng the street, don't you see?
There they sought to distinguish the Japanese in Pearl
Harbor from our American Japanese. 1)0 you think there is
a distinction fours elf? D:> you t~ ~e can trust them?"
Mr. Goldblatt answered:
"I thil1k t.hat the second generation of Japanese in this
Nation should not be distinguiShed from the second genera-
tion of any other nationality * * *. Unless the F.B.I. or
.the military authorities have documents and facts to indi-
cate differently.
**-**ok~:t ,. :;-:; If .. . M Mi~*****
"Where'is this to end, Mr. Tolan? Italians Will-be the
next to be evacuated, then the Germans. WQy stop with
the Germans? According to the present Federal order
Hi tIer could stay in San Francisco in a prohibi ted area
and one of German nationality would have to leave because
Hi tIer is an Austrian. So it will extend to Austrians.
I twill. go to Hungarians, to Bulgarians, to Finns, to
Danes. There are countries, many of them, whicll have
de clared war on us. Where is the mark to be dra1ln?
"And, Mr. Tolan, if we follow such a procedure we can land
in only one place. We will do a perfect job for those who
want to sabotage the war effort. We will have the AmeriCan
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people at each..other's throats. I know mtning camps that are
split right down the mtddle betweSl nationalities, where you
have a group of Poles at one end of the camp and a group of
GerIlS.ns at the other. You will have them fi~ting in the
streets against each other. You have Italians in the mining
camps alongside of Welshmep.
"Where is this going to wind uP.? '!his country is a nation
. made up of nationalities. The so-~led American is only
a product. He comes out of a crystal into which has been'
poured the ~oples of all the world. We forget what was
wri tten on the Statue of Liberty. I have the words here.
~ would like to read them."
Mr. Tolan said: "I don't think you 'better. Did you ever intend
to run for Congress?" Mr. Goldblatt said that he never had. Mr. 'lb1an
commented: "I think you would make a very <;iangerous talker the way you
are going here today. I think you are wonderful."l5-h
The !blan C~mmittee hearings held up and down the West Coast be-
tween Februa~ 21 and March 12 of 1942 began and ended with the commit- ,
teemen and the IIS.jori ty, if not all, of the witnesses believing that the
injuries sustained during the Pearl Harbor attaCk were intensified qy
major sabotage conmdtted by the Island Japanese.
'!he Japanese Anerican Citizens League provided about the only
leadership that emerged from the minority at this time. In 1942 it had
a reported membership of 20,000, all citizens 18 years old or older,
ma~ of them recent members. ' The league Was not actua~ representative
of the Japanese minority, but its officials at this time appeared as the
only spokesmen. These young leaders were articUlate, well informed, and
personable. They had a burden of staggering wej,ght, in assuming.respon-
sibility fo.r staving off the evacuation. '!here was a last-minute
attempt to organize a "Co-ordinated, Representatiye Nisei" group as the
Uni te4 Citizens League, at Los Angeles on the ve~ night of the signing
of Executive Order No. 9066. More than 1,500 Nisei and some of their
parents met for this purpose at the Ma~-Knoll Auditorium. JACL m~mbers .
and others Who were not members, produce men, businees and professional
people were prepared to make a last ditch stand for recognition of their
rights as American citizens. But any attempt this preponderately
school-age group of citizens could make against the forces bearing down
upon them at that particular time was predetermined to be as ineffective
as a rabbit's effort to stay the course of a bulldozer.
Lieutenant General reWitt 1)ad the author! ty of the executive
order behind him and the power to designate milita~ areas and the
people he wanted out of those areas, but for a time he delayed action.
'D1ere remained a few individuals a,nd a few groups of people on the West
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Coast who questioned the propriety of exiling United States citizens,
whatever their color, from their homes without individual appraisal. It
was possible that, in the event of a test case, the Supreme Court of the
United States JId.ght question the constitutionality of doSS exclusion
orders directed against citizens. General ~Witt .was urging quicic
passage of the bill to implement the executive order. It was Yar~ 21
before the bill became law and gave congressional approval to the execu-
tive order, and provided that "whoever shall enter, remain in, leave, or
commit any act in any mdlita~ area or milita~ zone prescribed, under
the authority of an EXecutive order of the President, by the Secretary
of War, or by any milita~ coJllDB.nder designated by the Secretary of War,
contra~ to the restrictions applicable to any such area or zone or con-
trary to the order of the Secretary of War or any such ndli tary com-
mander, shall, if it appears that he knew or Sho~ have known of the
existence and extent of the restrictions or order and tha t his act was
in violation thereof, be guilty of misdemeanor and upon conviction shall
be liable to a fine of not to eXceed $5,000 or to imprisonment for not
mr8 than one year, or both, for each offense."31-m
Certain organizations of people of good will were arguing against
the application of the expected evacuation order to the Nisei. The
majori ty of the Nisei themselves could not believe that, in the final
analysis, their citizenship would be disre~rded. However, two events
took place at precisely the righ"t tine to deaden the sound of voices
championing the Nisei, and to nake it unnecessa~ for General DeWitt
to wait further on Congress, and on what was ~ be Public Law No. 503.
,
, On Monday evening, February 23, 1942, after the second all-day
session of the Tblan Committee, and while President RoOsevel.t was making
a flreside chat over the national hook-up, some kind of seagoing craft
fired some ~hells at a piece of the California Coast, about seven ndles
north of Santa Barbara. The area included an oil refinery. Minor
damage was done to one PlDlping unit and derri ck. No tanks were hit;
no fires were started; and nobody was injured. The first of 15 shells
was fired at 7:10 p. m., Pacific war time, which would be 6:10 p. m.
sun time,; at that season dusk would have been well advanced by that
hour. Nevertheless witnesses were not lacking to identify the craft,
which was a mile offshore, as a Japanese submarine. One man declared
that it was larger than any United States sUbmarine he had ever seen.
Witnesses also saw flares and signaling from shore and over the
channel. The DeWitt final report describes the incident as follows:
"On February 23, 1942, a hostile submarine shelled Goleta,
near Santa Barbara, California, in an attempt to destroy
vital oU installations there. On the preceding day the
shore batte~ in position at this point had been withdrawn
to be replaced by another. On the. sucCeeding day, when
the shelling occurred, it was the only point along the
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\coast where an enemy submarine could have successfully
surfaced and' fired on a vital installation without coming
wi thin the range of coast defense guns. ,,31-1
J. Edgar Hoover, Dtrector of the Federal Bureau of Investi~tion,
two years la-ter commented on this incident in a memorandum addressed to
the Attorney General and inspired ~ General DeWitt's final report:
"At approxinate~ 7:10 p. m. on February 23, 1942, an attack
was made on the Santa Barbara area by an unidentified vessel
off the coast of California. Included in the area shelled
was an oil refinery. The blackout in this area went into
effect about one hour after the shelling had occurred and
although there were reports of lights and flares in thevicinity, investigations were made with negative results. .
Subsequent to the shelling Army authorities had planes scout-
ing for submarines all along the coast, and in connection
wi th these searches the krmy utilized numerous flares. There
was no evidence of shore-to-ship signaling and no evidence
of a landing in the area."44
,
IiNone of the available official or newspaper accounts of the inci- j
dent mentioned the examination of shell fragments, as was the case when
an incendiary bomb dropped in .the woods of Oregon on September 9, 1942,
and when the fragments bore Japanese markings.
The effect of this incident was immediate and pronounced. Repre-
sentative Alfred Elliott, of Tulare, california, shouted next day from
the floor of the House: "We've got to move all the Japs in California .
into concentration camps, sonewhere, some place,. and do it damn quick I
* * * Don't kid yourselves and don't let someone tell you there are good Ii
Japs. Perhaps one out of a thousand * * *,,38-y Representative Leland IFord, of Santa Monica, California, repeating rumors of signaling from I
the hills to ships offshore, declared to the House: "We've got to move
Japs .to areas where they ~'t do that kind of signaling," while
Representative Rankin, of MississippiJ improvised in support of his
West Coast fellows: "They're doing the same thing in Hawati--signaling
to their ships from the IOOuntain tops. ,,38-y Back in California the
district attorney of Santa Barbara County made a personal appeal to
General DeWitt for action.38-y The Veterans of Foreign Wars at Visalia,
the county seat of TUlare County, demanded immediate removal of all
Japanese, both alien and citizen, from the coast. Down in the south-
eastern corner of the State, the Riverside County Supervisors adopted a
resolution on February 24, and forwarded it to General DeWitt, demanding
immediate reIOOval of the entire Japanese American minority and warning
that farmers of the county might "take matters into their own hands"
unless action. was taken promptly by the Government.38-z
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In the small hours of February 25, Los Angeles had a blacltout
with antiaircraft guns brought into use. Five deaths resulted from
traffic accidents or heart attack and were laid to what the newspapers
called the "raid." 'n1e War Departnent stated officially that the alarm
was real; the Navy De}::6rtment stated officially that it was a case of
"jittery nerves."S8-A Whether the "Battle of Los Angeles" 'was or was
not a genuine raid, was sti~ unset tled in the fall of 1945. An
Associated Pre~s story reported from San Francisco under dateline of
October 28,1945:
"As many as five unidentified airplanes, either Japanese,
civilian or commercial, were over southern California the
night of February 24-25, 1942, during the 'Battle .of Los
. Angeles,' Fourth AAF headquarters disclosed today.
"Some three million people in the Los Angeles area shivered
and trembled that night as antiair?raft fire ripped the skies
and Army searchlights tracked unidentified airplanes over
Bever~ Hills through Long Beach and out to sea.
'" 'llie blackout and antiaircraft firing in the Los Angeles
area on the inoming of February 25, 1942, were caused by
the presence of one to five unidentified 'airplan~s,'
reported Lieut. Gen. John L. DeWitt, then commanding
general of the Fourth A~ and the Western Defense Command.
He added it was his belief tha t three planes appeared over
Bever~ Hills.
" * * * the officer said, 'My belief is that those three
planes could have been launched from subma.rines somewhere
close into shore under our detectors.'
It'llie officer said only 45 fighter planes were available.
for interception that night, and that if the unidentified
aircraft preceded an attack 'we did not want to have our
pursuit in the air, half out of gas when the Scttack came
in * * *'
"Naval intelligence at Los Angeles advised the same evening
an attack could be expected during the next 10 hours,
following which the Pacific Coast from Monterey, Calif.,
to the !fexican border was on 'yellow alert,' indicating
the enemy possibly was about 30 minutes away. ,,45
On November 1) 1945, comment on that statement came from Tokyo in
the form of an Associated Press story, whiCh appeared in the Washington
Evening Star under the caption: "JAP 'AIR RAID' OF LOS ANGELES IN '42
WAS MY'lH," and continued:
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"'!he battle of Los Angeles was a uorth. 'lhe Japanese did
not send planes over that city the n;i.g:ht of February 24-25,
1942, a Japanese Navy spokesman told the Associated Press
today. .
"'!he question was put because the 4th Air Force at San
Francisco Sunday said planes, possibly Ja]:8nese, were over-
head that night. .
"Captain Ome of the Ja]:8nese Navy ~1.d, however, that a
plane was launched from a submarine and sent over the
Southern Oregon Coast on February 9, 1942, 'to attack
military installations, but the lone plane was unable to
discover any.'
"Omae denied the Japanese had any plan to land troops on
Hawaii or the United States.
"He is liaison officer from the Japanese Navy" records
section, which is reassembl~ng destroyed information for
General MacArthur."46
'nle unidentified planes remain unidentified.
'With these two incidents, the outcry for immediate removal of all
persons of Japanese race from the coast rose to a deafening roar. On
March 1, General DeWitt informed the press:
"Military necessity is the sole yardstick by which the ArD\Y
has selected the military areas from which the exclusion
of certain groups win be required.
"Public clamor for evacuation from non-strategic areas and
the insistence of local organizations and officials that
evacuees not be moved into their communi-ties cannot and
will not be beededA for considerations of national security
must come first. "4~-q
Both the general and Representative 'lblan-then conducting hear-
ings at Seattl~were deluged with telegrams from officials of inland
states, protesting the "dumping" of the West Coast's Japanese population'
in their States. Only Governor Carr, of Colorado, said brave~ that he
would try to cooperate, and General DeWitt wrote him a note of apprecia-
tion. 'nle general said:
I' 'nle appropriate agencies of the Federal Government are
engaged in far-reaching prepa~tions to deal with the
problem, and a study is in progress by these agencies
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regarding the protection of property, the resettlenent and
relocation of those who are affected. n42-q
. '!he general promised that an announcement of an evacuation program
would shortly be forthcomng, and the next day, March 2, he issued
Public Proclamation No.1, designating M11ita~ Area No.1, consisting
of the western halves of Washington, Oregon and California, and the
southern portion of Arizona; ~litary Area No.2 was established as the
remaining parts of the States named. 'lhe proclamation stated further:
"Any Japanese, German or Italian alien, or any person of
Japanese ancestry now resident in Military Area No.1 who
changes his place of habitual residence is hereby required
to obtain and execute a Change of Residence Notice at any
United States Post Office. Nothing contained herein shall
be construed to affect the existing regulations of the
United States Attorney General which require aliens of
ene~ nationalities to obtain travel permits from United
Sta tes Attorneys and to notitj'" the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation and the CoJlmissioner of Immigration of any change
in pernanent address."
'1b the press the general said that enemy aliens would be excluded
from Military Area No.1 by future order, and soon; he promised that the
Japanese, both alien and Citizen, would be the first to go; and he
advised aliens to move out wi th their families at once and vo1untari~
to "save themselves possible future trouble. " 42-r
. Obediently a number of Japanese American families began moving
from the coastal area, in cars, in trucks, seeking a refuge from the
storm of hatred and fear which was ejecting them from California, and
finding that the storm had preceded them across the state line.
. .
""
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CHAP'IER II
'11IE CASE FOR 'mE GOVERNMENT
writing in-1945 of the wartime evacuation of Japsnese Americans,
Eugene V. Rostow, professor of law at Yale Uhi versi ty and formerly with
the State Departnsnt, called his article which appeared in the June
issue of the Yale Law Journal, "'nle Japsnese American Cases-A Disaster."
He titled a popularized version of the article which appeared in Harpers
a few JOOnths later, "Our Worst Wartime Mistake." His condemnation of
the whole program was sweeping. He wrote:
~'Our war-time treatment of Japanese aliens and citizens of
/l~apsnese descent on the West Coast has been hasty, unnecessary
\ and mistaken. The course of action which we undertook was
" in no way required or justified qy the circumstances of the
'war. It was calculated to produce both individual injustice
and deep-sea:vted social 5ladjustments of a CUDnllative and
sinister kind
,
"All in all, the internment of the West Coast Japanese is
the worst blow our liberties have sustained in many years.
OVer one hundred thousand men, women and children have been
imprisoned, some seventy thousand of them citizens of the
United States, without indictment or the proffer of charges,
pending inquiry into their 'loyalty.' 'nley were taken into
custody as a military measure on the ground that espionage
and sabotage were especial~ to be feared from persOns of
Japanese blood. 'nley were removed from the West Coast area
because the military thought it would take too long to con-
duct individual loyalty investigations on the ground. They
were arrested in an area where the courts were open, and
freely functioning. They were held under prison conditions
in uncomfortable camps, far from their homes, and for lengthy
periods--several years in sny cases. If found 'disloyal'
in administrative proceedings they were confined indefinitely,
although no statute 5kes 'disloyalty' a crime; it would be
difficult indeed for a statute tQ do under a Constitution
which has been interpreted to minimize imprisonment for
poli tical opinions, both by defining the crime of treason
in extremely rigid and explicit terms, and by limiting
~ convictions for sedition and like offenses * * *"
Set ting forth the evacuation as a triumph for the West Coast
racists and pressure groups, he said further that the racists "were
lud<:y in their general, for General DeWitt amp~ 'proved himself to be
one of them in opinion and values. As events happened, he be came the
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chief policy rraker in the situation, and he has caused more damage even
than General Burnside in 1863, whose blunderings with Vallandigham, the
Ohio Copperheada were the In''evious high in Amri can mill tary
officiousness. nil? ,
'_I
It is not, the ~IX>se of this chapter to challenge the essential
soundness of ]fr. Rostow's criticism, but to indicate that he bad the
advantage of hindsight ~en he made it. By 1945, when Mr. Rostow wrote
his article, factual knowledge bad re~ced the misinformation and
legends about the group that had been evacuated; the unknown and there-
fore easi~ misrepresented minori~ had become familiar to most locali-
ties of the united States, and to the fighting mn on every battlefront
of the war; by that time the Nisei of the 442nd Battalion had built up
an enviable record in Italy and in France, proving to a war-minded
America that they were not without devotion to the land of their birth.
In the dark and fear-ridden days of early 1942, the situation was
very different. '!he West Coast was under threat of attack by an enemy
that had given some reason for the belief that it could be everywhere
at once. 'DIat enemy was rushing from triumph to triumph in the Pacific;
our fleet had been crippled by the attack at Pearl Harbor; the West
Coast was a strategic area. 'B1e people who were racially akin to the
enemy were known to the vast djority of other Americans on~ in term,s
of a subtle proJ:;&ganda invented by genuine racists and political or
economic opportunists of the West Coast. War-generated fear, uncertain-
ty, hatred and suspicion dde it easy for people in high and low places
to identify this unknown group on the West Coast with the enemy across
the sea.
'DIe Conmanding General of the Wes tern IEfense Comnand and Fourth
Ar~ was held accountable for the defense of the West Coast. Wi th a war
in progress, with national security at stake, civilians, including the
~ Chief Executive of the United States, were not in a position to question
the resIX>nsible mili~ commander's judgment on matters of military
necessity in his area. The chance a civilian administration would run
in time of war, if it 'oPIX>sed the measures dictated by its military
experts, of bringing disaster to the country is a chance that a civilian
administration understandab~ prefers not to take. When the recommenda-
tions of General DeWitt for mass exclusion of the Japanese from the West
Coast were before the Administration in Washington, certain beliefs were
entertained there and elsewhere, beliefs that on the face of the mtter
justified the removal of the group from the West Coast.
At the tine when the executive order was issued and for near~
two months longer, offi cial Washington and the nation at large were
convinced that the resident Japanese of Hawaii had aided and abetted
the ene~ on December 7, had by their activities increased the heavy
losses in human li fe and in vi tal war equipment. 'll1e hysteri cal
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believed that all persons of Japanese descent were treacherous, Sly,
dangerous and preJ:s,red to sell out the United States to their ancestral
country at the first opportunity. '!he DK>re thoughtful people, who
avoided the racist approach, perceived that the group was indeed con-
centra ted arOund the harbors, airfields and oth~r vi tal, points on the
coast--and were not informed of the harmless reason for suCh distribu-
tion-and granted that the group of 112,000 men, women and children of
Japanese ancestry unquestionab~ conta~ed an unidentified and not
easily identifiable number of individuals w~o, in the event of invasion,
constituted a potentlal hazard to national security.
'!he military col\lllB.nder of the coastal area which held the concen-
tration of Japanese Americans said that exclusion of the group was a
mili tary necessity, and as early as January 5, he was basing his con-
viction that their presence constituted a real hazard on charges that
they were signaling to ships at sea, coIDlmlnicating with the eneDO' by
radio, and behaving in a way ~lculated to make the course of an
invading enemy smooth. In time of national emergenq-, and in the
absence of concrete proof that the ~~ars of the responsible general were
based on fantasy or misinformation, it was logical to accept his judg-
ment. That is what was done in the ear~ part of 1942.
The common belief in that nonexistent sabotage performed qy
Hawaiian Island Japanese, held at a time when the West Coast was threa~
ened with attack, was the pivot upon which the evacuation rotated. :ey
the time that affidavi t~ of Federal intelligence officers and Island
authori ties reached the TOlan Co~ttee and established the fact that
there had been no sabotage by Island Japanese on D3cember 7 or since,
the evacuation was well underway. '!he West Coast Japanese, their
ci tizen children, and their grandcllildren, were being rushed into
hastily improvised assembly centers set up on fairgrounds and race
tracks to live in former stables or tar paper barracks while they.
awai ted further dislocation.
The Tolan Commi t tee, in its Fourth Interim Report, issued in
May of'1942, published the Hawaiian affidavits which cleared the Japa-
nese in Hawaii of charges of sabotage, but the rumors persisted, and the
official denials were never given the space and placing in the press
tha t were accorded the rumors.
Once the wheels of the evacuation got rolling, it was to take
time, reeducation of the public and positive demonstration of the
loyalty of the evacuees to change the course of the vehicle. The
Government-sanctioned exclusion from the West Coast of the Japanese
American- minority as a measure of military necessity appeared to thepublic at large as an official endorsement of the racists I contentions
re~rding that minor1~. There was no strong official interpretation
of the evacuation enunciated by the President or the Secretary of War
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or the Attorney General to prevent the general public from interpreting
the evacuation order as a blanket Charge of disloyalty for the affected
J group. All that was said officially was that it was in the interests of
. military necessity that the evacuation had bem ordered.
C. B. Munson, iri the last portion of his report to the Washington
administration on the Japanese situation on the West Coast and in Hawaii,
wi th the assistance of the intelligence officers who had been working
closely with him, drew up some suggestions and recommendations, as of
December 20, 1941. First of all he recommended that the Nisei "should
. be encouraged by a statement from ~ government authority, 1/ defining
his underscored "high" as "President or Vice President, or at least
almost as high," so that -public attitude toward them would be ,tout-
lined. ,,59-c Secondly he stressed the fact that "their orfers of assist-
ance should be accepted through such agencies as: 1, Civilian Derense;
2, Red Cross; 5, U. S. 0., etc., etc." He spelled out the m9.tter of
"assistance't further:
) "'lhis assistance should not be nsrely monetary, nor should
it even be limited to physi oal voluntary work in se grega ted
Nisei units. 7he Nisei should work with and among white
persons, and (be) made to feel he is welcome on a basis or
equality. "59-c
Before dark of the day or Japants attack upon Pearl Harbor, the
Japanese American Citizens League from its headquarters in San Francisco
issued an offi cial atatement condemning the Japanese government and
pledging loyalty to the United States. The statement was wideJ..y
publicized over the radio and in the press of the nation. Had the
appropriate 'thigh" authority countered with a declaration of the Govern-
ment's faith in the loyalty of the Nisei, there is reason to believe
that the West Coast racists and superpatriots would at least have had
harder going to aChieve their objective of mass exClusion. Simi1ar~,
once the evacuation had been ordered, an administrative definition of
, the evacuation might have dispelled some of the confusion that wasram}:ant in 1942. .
During the early roonths of the war, the War Department had no
clear-cut policy on the use of Nisei in the armed forces. At the out-
break of war there were about 5,000 Nisei already in the A~, either as
volunteers or as subject.s of Selective Service. Individual commanding
officers devised their own policies for dealing with these men. Some
officers retained them; sons discharged them with blue cards and no
explanation-the blue card signifying that the discharge was neither
quite honorable nor quite dishonorable; a few officers became hysterical
on December 7 and gathered up any Nisei in their units and put them in
the guardhouse. General reWitt said befor~ the Subcommittee of the
House CoJllDi ttee on Naval Affairst "At one time we had a great rfB.rJ:$'
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.Japanese in military units on tbe west coast. '!hey were all a't DG"
request transferred out by the War ~part~nt to other organizations. "48
For some time there was no oonsistency in the treatment of the
Nisei who sought to volunteer or those whose numbers came up in the
draft. Generally speaking, the local Selective Service Boards of the
West Coast rejected them, classitYing them as 4-F or 4-C. However, a
few of the boards prQcessed the Nisei without prejudice. Some command-
ing officers refused to accept the Nisei Who had passed the local board
and had reported for duty. The War Department prohibited further induc-
tion of a~one of Japanese descent after Ma~ch 51, "Except, as may be
specifically autborized in exceptional cases." EX.ceptions proved to be
bilingual Nisei and Kibei who could qualify as language instructors and
interpreters for W-litary Intelligence. It was not until September 14,
1942, that Selective Service regulations were adopted, imPlementing the
ruling of the War Department and providing for the classification in
Class 4-C of any registrant of Japanese ancestry, a class reserved for
those oonsidered unsuitable for service because of race or ancestry. 49
'!here was to be a long and spiri ted campaign before the privilege of
fighting for their country was restored to the Nisei.
'nle ~d Cross, while allowing the evacuees to participate in a
mnetary sense in the Red Cross program, steadfastly refused to allow
the center residents to roll bandages or knit for the armed forces,
even going so far as to deny members of the Junior Red Cross units at
centers their right to fill game kits for the soldiers, and not allowing
center Red Cross organizations to be called "chapters"--they were called
"units" to differentiate between Japanese American branches of the
organiZation and others.
'!he usa granted full participation from the first.
'!he first evidence Bade public that the evacuation mi.ght have
been determined by other than objective considerations was provided qy
the .man who ordered the mass exclusion, General DeWitt himself, in
testimony before the Suboommittee of the House Committee on Naval
Affairs on April 15, 1945. Asked ~ the Chairman if he had any problem
that he w&1ted to leave with the Congressmen, General DeWitt replied:
"I haven't arw except one--tha t is the develo~ent of a false
sentiment on the }:&rt of certain individuals and some organi-
za tions to get the Japanese back on the west coast. I don't
want any of them here. They are a dangerous element. There
is no way to determine their loyalty. The west coast contains
too many vi tal installations essential to the defense of the
count~ to allow any Japanese on this coast. There is a
feeling developing, I think, in certain sections of the country
(155)
that the Japanese should be allowed to return. I am
opposing it With eve~ proper means at ~ disposal.lI48
Asked it he based his "determined stand on experience as a resul~
ot sabotage or racial history or what, II the general replied:
1'1 tirst ot all base it on D\Y responsibility. I have
the mission ot detending this ooast and securing vital
installations. lhe danger ot the Japanese was, and is .
now,;.-if they are permitted to oone back-espiona~e and
sabotage. It makes no difference. whether he is an
American citizen, he is still a Japanese. American
citizenship does not necessari~ determine loyalty.
"You needn't wor~ about the Italians at all except in
certain cases. Also, the sane for the Germans except in
individual cases. But we must worry about the Japanese
all the time uritil he is wiped oft the JIS.p. Sabotage and
espionage will make problems as long as he is allowed in
this area-problems which I don't want to have to worry
about. "48-a
It will be remembered that the general di.splayed his worry over
illicit signaling and radio transmission on the part of Pacific coast
Japanese in a memorandum addressed to Ja~s Rowe, Jr. , of the ~pa.rt-
ment of Justice, on January 5, 1942. In his final report on the evacua-
tion, published in. the latter half of 1943, the general repeated Charges
of. illicit signaling and radio transmission against the Japanese popula-tion of the coast. '
The Chief ot the Federal Communication Commission's Radio Intel-
ligence Division had reported a oonference with General DeWitt and his
staft, on January 9, 1942. In the course of this conference, the pro-
cedures of radio intelligence were explained to the general, and he was
informed tha t there had been no illegitimate radio trans~ssion or
sf gnaling from Japanese or other ooastal residents. 50
More than two years later, asked to comment on statements oon-
tained in the ~Witt final report, the Chairman of the Federal Communi-
cations Commission wrote the following letter to Attorney General
Francis Biddle, dated April 4,1944:
II '!his is in reply to your letter of February 26,. 1944 with
reference tQ Lieutenant General John L. ~Witt's Final
Report on Japanese Evacuation from the West Coast, which
was recently made public by the War ~partment.
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"You state that you are interested in the accuracy of General
DeWitt's account, in the first two chapters of the Report, of
the events leading to his decision that military necessity re-
quired the evacuation, and you note that prevention of signal-
ing by persons, presumably of Japanese descent, on shore to
enemy surface vessels or submarines off the coast apparently
was a very considerable part of the problem with which General
DeWitt was concerned during the period between December 1941
and July 1, 1942, when the evacuation was substantially complete.
You direct attention particularly to his reference to hundreds
of reports of such signaling by mean~ of signal lights and
unlawful radio transnd. tters and state tMt investigation .by
the Department of Justice of great numbers of rumors concern-
ing signal lights and radio transmitters proved them, without
exception, to be baseles.s.
"You inquire, first, whether during the ~riod from December
1941 to Ju~ 1, 1942, the Commission was engaged on the West
Coast in monitoring and identifYing signals reported to be
from unlawful transmitters and in locating any such trans-
mitters; and, if so, the number of reports received by the
Commission during this period of unlawfUl or unidentified
signals, with a detailed breakdown of the results of its
investigations:
"'Ihroughout this period on the West Coast as elsewhere
throughout the United States and its territories, the
Commission's Radio Intelligence Division was engaged in a
comprehensi ve 24-hour surveillance of the entire radio
spectrum to guard against any unlawful radio activity.
"Wi thin the area on the West Coast from whi ch the Japanese
were subsequentlY evacuated, the Cornndssion's Radio Intel-
ligence Division had in operation two Prillary Monitoring
Stations, located at Portland, Oregon, -and San Pedro,
California, and Secondary Monitoring Stations, located at
Seattle, Washington; Portland, Oregon; Arcata, California;
Larkspur, California; Fresno, California; Los Angeles,
California; San Diego, California; Yuma., Arizona, and
Tucson, Arizona. During the period here involved, the
Secondary StatioI) at Larkspur, California, was moved to
San Leandro, California, and was expanded to a Primary
Monitoring Station; and the Secondary Station at Yuma,
Arizona, was moved to Salinas, California. The Cbmmission
had additional stations at other places within the V{estern
Defense CollmIand.
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r"At all stations, there were special receivers and recorders
for intercepting and recording signals throughout the entire
radio spectrum. The Prima~ Monitoring Stations were equipped
with extensive antenna arrays and Adcodc high-frequency
direction-finding apparatus for taking bearings upon sky-wave
signals received from allover the world. They were tied in
with other Prima~ MoDi to ring Stations on the continent as
well as in Alaska, Hawaii and Puerto Rico, whicl1 together
constituted a nation-wide direction~fin~ng system for
immedia te coordinated action in taking bearings upon and
establishing the fix of any suspected transmitter and for
exchanging other information relative to identity of radio
stations. At the Seconda~ Monitoring Stations were mobile
units, equipped with loop direction finders, for going into
the field and quiCkly locating an .unidentified transmitter
by taking bearings within its ground-wave range. Other
devices enabled investigators to detenrdne the exact house
or' even room in which a transmitter was located.
"Soon after. December 7,1941, at the request of General
DeWitt, the monitoring facilities described above were
supplemented by patrols of mobile direction-finding inter-cept units along the West Coast from Canada to Mexico. .
These patrols were instituted for the JS.rticular purpose
of detecting apy radio transmissions from shore to ships
off the coast.
"In: the early months of the war, the Commission's field
offices and stations on the West Coast were deluged with
c calls, particularly from the Army and Navy, reporting
suspicio~s radio signaling and requesting the identifica-
. tion of radio signals. In hundreds upon hundreds of cases,
identification of the signal was made by Radio Intelligence
Division personnel merely by listening to it right at the
monitoring station. In no case was the transmission other
than legi tinate.
"In the case of 760 reports of unidentified or ,unlawful
radio signals wi thin tlle evacuated area during the period
in question, which could not be heard or identified qy
listening at the monitoring station, a field investigation
~ was conducted qy mobile direction-finding units. In 641 of
the cases it was found that no radio signaling at all was
involved. Of the 119 cases remaining, 116 were found to
involve lawful transmissions by following stations:
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Uni tad States Ar~ Stations - 21
Uni ted States Navy Stations - 8
Local Police Stations - 12
Uni ted States and Foreign
Commercial Licensed Stations - 65
Japanese Stations in Japanese
Terri tory -- ~
116
"'!he final 3 were found to involve the very short-range
transmissions of the ordinary commercial type phonograph
oscillator used in playing recordings for home amusement.
"'!here were no radio signals reported to the Commission
which could not be identified, or which were unlawful.
Like the Department of Justice, the Commtssion knows of
no evidence of any illicit radio signaling in this area
during the period in question.
"You also ask the extent to which General DeWitt or his
subordinates were informed of the operations of the
Commission's Radio Intelligence Division. The General
and his staff were kept continuously informed of the
Conmrl.ssion' s work, both through occasional conferences
and day-to-day liaison. In the earlier part of the war,
there was constant contact by telephone between Radio
Intelligence Division stations and Army and Navy posts
'along the West Coast for the purpose of fUrnishing these
agencies with bearings and other information pertaining
to radio s1"gnals. And as the result of a request of
General DeWitt in January 1942, the Commission established
a Radio Intelligence Center in San. Francisco for coordinating
radio intelligence information collected qy the Ar~, Na~
and the Commission~ This Center was tied in by teletype-
wri ter circuit wi th the Primary Yoni toring Stations on the
West. Coast, as well as with other Primary stations on the
Continent' through headquarters in Washington. As a result,
it was an integral part of the Co~ssion' s nation-wide
direction-finding system described above. As a part of
the plan for coordinating activities, Army and Navy per-
sonnel maintained a liaison attendance at this Center.
Both these services, moreover, had a direct telephone
circui t from the Center to their headquarters.
"You direct attention, further, to the statement in General
DeVlitt's Report that following the evacuation, interception
of suspicious or unidentified radio signals and shore-to-
ship signal lights was virtual~ eliminated. You state it
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rwas the experience of the Depart~t of Justice that,
although no unlawful radio signaling or any unlawful shore-
to-ship signaling with lights was discovered, a great
number of reports of suCh activity were received, and
tha t these did not diminish in number following the evacua-
tion. It is likewise the Co~ssion's experience that
reports of unlawful radio signaling along the West Coast--
which in .eaCh case were unfounded--were not affected by
the evacuation. In fact, throughout the year 1942, the
number of reports of unlawful radio operation requiring
investigation qy mobile units whiCh were received in the
Sta tes along the West Coast varied in close parallel with
the nwnber of such reports received throughout the wholecountry. .
"Final~, you refer to General ~Witt's memorandum of
Janua~ 5, 1942 to James H. Rowe, Jr., Assistant to the
Attorney General, set out in the Report, in whim concern
is expressed over the action to be taken in a case where
there should be strong evidence of shore-to-submarine
radio communication, but the unlawful radio transmitter
could not be located wi tllin an area mre precise than a
ci ty block, or even a general ar~a sum as Monterey County.
"You note that the D£morandum suggested that available
means were inadequate to locate and seize any such radio
transmitter, but state that if your understanding that
equipment was available for locating such a transmitter
is correct, the problem with which General DeWitt was
concerned would not arise in practice. Your understand-
ing is correct. As noted above, equipment developed qy
the Commission's engineers was on and after December 7,
1941 in the hands of its personnel on the West Coast,
which enabled them easi~ to locate the individual house
and even the exact room containing the concealed
transmitter. ,,51
The information, thus gradually acquired, was regarded as confi-
dential; no public official refutation of the Charges made against the
Japanese Americans was offered. There was a war in progress.
By March 2, 1942, when General ~Witt issued Public Proclamation
No.1, it had become apparent to him that voluntary evacuation would not
dispose of the enti~e West Coast Japanese population in any reasonable
length of time or without disorder. Problems of property disposal,
finance, employment and acceptance in other areas were constituting a
block to this voluntary movement. The minor movements of ~apanese
. aliens from prohibited "spots" in February had resulted for the most
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part in bewildered individuals or families simply moving in with rela-
ti ves or camping in the back yards of friends in other sections of the
same town or city. Some families had roved as far as the interior
valleys of California-to the dismay of marry of the ci tizenry in tllose
regions; very few had been able to migrate east of the State line. It
was plain that a controlled evacuation would have to be inaugurated for
the tens of thousands of people who could not plan or finance their own
evacuation, and that provision would have to be d.de for the ns.intenance
of a substantial part of the Japanese population for an indefinite
period, until their resettlement eastward could be accomplished in
orderly fashion.
. Up to this point the Western Defense Command's sole concern in
the ns.tter had been with the physical' evacuation, with clearing the
designated milita~ area of the Japanese residents. It was not consid-
ered feasible or proper that the milita~ Should assume responsibility
for the future welfare of thousands of families or that it should
adndnister an extensive resettlement program. 'll1e Iepar'flnent of Justice
was unwilling to take on such respon~ibili ties. Discussions between
representatives of the Department of Justice, the War Department and the
Bureau of the Budget ended in a decision to create a special civilian
war agency to assume jurisdiction over the evacuated population.
What was rost important of all in this stage of planning, the .
President requested the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to find
him a man to head the new agency who was without political ambitions,
a man of humanitarian principles with' a grasp of the social implications
of the evacuation, with administrative ability, and with skill to direct
the extremely delicate program in public relations posited by the con-
troversial nature of the issue of evacuation. 'll1e qualifications
required by the President in 'the director of an unprecedented program
were a determining factor in setting the key of the agency's future
policy.
A t this time a~d for some time to oome the voice of the racists
was dominating public senti~nt toward the Japanese Americans, and it
was clamoring for arbitrary detention of the entire minority for the
duration of the war and deportation of the entire group to Japan at the
close of the war. Had the President requested a different sort of
director to head the new war agency, it is obvious that the evacuation
sto~ must have had a mudl grimmer ending than it has had.
. -
!,
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